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Abstract 
This dissertation explores the intersections of memory and trauma in comics, arguing that 
the interrelations of the visual and the textual elements of this medium allow for an expanded 
understanding of how representations of trauma and memory function.  This project argues for 
the centrality of trauma studies in comics and graphic narratives, as well as the centrality of 
visuality—that is, how we see and how we understand what we see—in trauma studies.  Moving 
away from a model of literary trauma studies that focuses on “the unspeakable,” this dissertation 
proposes that we look instead at the intersections of the visible and invisible, the speakable and 
the unspeakable, through the manipulation of space and time in the comics medium.   
Investigating these possibilities, my research spans national and generic boundaries in order to 
tease out the inherent qualities of traumatic representations in the medium itself.  This analysis 
moves from superheroes to 9/11to epilepsy to family photographs, and from America to France 
to Rwanda, showing the ways in which comics’ juxtapositions of words and images, past, 
present, and future, and presence and absence, create possibilities for representing trauma and 
memory.  It is precisely in the spaces between images and words, between what we can see and 
what remains hidden, I argue, that these narratives of trauma and memory thicken and transform 
into dense and problematic zones of contact. 
This dissertation begins with an introduction to the broad ways in which the formal 
aspects of the medium of comics and graphic novels complement the literary and theoretical 
conceptions of trauma and memory, and an examination of the ways we can use comics to 
expand these notions to incorporate more precise ideas of the visible and visual.  I then move to a 
series of close analyses, beginning with the superhero genre and its legacy in Chapters One and 
Two, looking at the Batman franchise and Alan Moore’s Watchmen and the crises—personal and 
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historical, respectively—that they address.  Chapter Three moves to the Rwandan genocide and 
its representation in both fictional and autobiographical comics, drawing together landscape, 
colonialism, and trauma. In Chapter Four, I move to an examination of Art Spiegelman’s 
response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, teasing out the complex relationship between media 
images and personal images as intertwining representations of trauma. Chapter Five also focuses 
on the power of images, arguing that Alison Bechdel’s redrawn archive of photographs and other 
realia in her memoir Fun Home indicates the powerful agency of images—that is, their ability to 
destabilize and undermine the author and the viewer’s position as spectator. Finally, Chapter Six 
explores the rhizomatic nature of disability in David B.’s Epileptic, suggesting that rather than 
considering individuals and their bodies along a linear scale between two extreme points, we can 
reformulate our understanding of “normalcy” through a nonlinear, multivalent spectrum of 
experience. 
This notion of a nonlinear spectrum synthesizes the difficult problems of visuality, 
trauma, and memory that the dissertation explores as a whole, and it offers up a new mode of 
conceptualizing the narrative possibilities of representing trauma.  By taking in to account the 
absent, the hidden, the invisible, and the unspoken in these texts, “Picturing the Unspeakable” 
brings together the emergent field of comics studies with the recent visual and multidirectional 
turns in trauma and memory studies.  This project offers a new way of understanding individual 
and historical traumas not as a question of either/or (either visible or not, spoken or silenced, past 
or present, etc.) but as precisely a space of contact between those conventional binaries of 
representation. 
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A Note on Figures 
Figures throughout this dissertation have been omitted to respect their copyright status.  
Placeholders have been included, in order to retain both formatting choices throughout and  
citation information for reference.
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Introduction: Filling the Visual Gap in Memory and Trauma Studies 
 
Comics and graphic novels are a medium of dualities, constantly in tension between 
seemingly opposed or dichotomous tendencies. This dissertation takes up the shifting, uneasy 
aspects of comics and places them in conversation with notions of trauma, memory, and 
visuality. Emphasizing the zones of contact between image and text, spoken and silenced, what 
is visible and hidden, I argue that it is precisely in comics’ state of being “in between” that 
trauma and memory become paradoxically legible. Working across national and generic 
boundaries, this project thus examines the underlying structural mechanisms at work in comics, 
investigating what makes this medium so particularly suited to narratives of trauma, memory, 
and loss. 
In Neil Gaiman's Sandman, the ending scene of the first volume depicts the god Dream's 
revenge on his former captor, Alex Burgess. Because Alex held Dream prisoner for seventy 
years, Dream curses him with the doom of eternal waking. This is not the same as eternal 
wakefulness: Dream's curse means Alex constantly moves between waking and sleep, constantly 
remaining in between the two states. Gaiman and artist Sam Keith take full advantage of the 
comics medium to depict this movement of constant in-between-ness, as Alex exists in the seam 
between sleeping and waking. At one moment, for example, Alex's assistant reassures him that 
he is waking up; in the following panels, his head begins to melt and the artwork become 
grotesquely nightmarish, only to move back to Alex waking up again on the following page 
(figure 0.1).  
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figure 0.1: In Sandman, Alex moves between sleeping and waking. 
I open my dissertation with this scene because it illustrates one of the fundamental 
tensions in the comics medium: that is, the tendency to represent, however disjointedly, 
traumatic moments or fragile memories. The sometimes conflicting temporal dimensions of 
comics and the simultaneous presence and absence that comics reify in both visual and narrative 
terms make this medium particularly inclined towards narratives that circle around trauma and 
memory. Because comics, like Alex, are continually caught between conflicting tendencies—
between the present, past, and future; between what can be seen and what is hidden, omitted, or 
invisible—the medium itself allows for the potential to represent issues of loss, trauma, and 
memory. Echoing Freud’s work on the unheimlich vis-à-vis Hoffmann’s own “Der Sandmann,” 
Gaiman’s Sandman makes the moment of waking, that moment of uncertainty between sleep and 
wakefulness, concrete. Sandman’s capturing of that brief moment of transition from one state to 
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another, so ephemeral and fleeting, is indeed uncanny, as “everything is uncanny which ought to 
have remained hidden and secret, and yet comes to light” (Freud 4). 
Bringing the uncanny to light here means to actually make it both visible and familiar and 
yet unsettling. The formal tensions within the comics medium mean that comics actually perform 
the same ideas, themes, and tensions they narrate. Like Alex Burgess existing with and between 
sleep and waking, the comics page exists with and between text and image, presence and 
absence. These tensions reveal, too, that the representation of trauma and memory in comics 
depends upon not only the spaces in between panels but on systems that perform like the 
mechanisms of trauma and memory. Indeed just as trauma studies’ psychoanalytic side situates 
the moment of waking as itself the site of trauma (cf. Caruth, Lacan, Freud), so do comics situate 
the moment and space of in-between as the productive zone of representational possibility. This 
dissertation argues for a reconsidering of the possibilities of representing trauma in these graphic 
works not only as a project of fragmentation of subjecthood and of temporality—that is, of the 
impossibility of linearity and narrative—but as a project of paradoxical coherence made possible 
only through that which, like Dream's curse, resides in the spaces and moments in between: 
between visibility and obscurity, between the revealed and the concealed.  
The project of this dissertation is to pull apart and examine some of those mechanisms by 
which trauma and memory in comics reside in the meeting-space of text and image and depend 
on the friction between what is visible and what remains unseen, what is spoken and what is left 
unsaid. If trauma is considered a crisis of language, as Ruth Leys writes in Trauma: A 
Genealogy, then I would argue it is also a crisis of the visible, the disturbing notion that 
everything we see is not, in fact, everything that is there in the world, and that, just as we do 
when we read comics, we “fill in the gaps” in both narrative and vision to make sense of time, 
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space, trauma, and memory. The very structure of comics means that the visual and narrative 
elements work in tension with one another: its formal qualities echo the Caruthian conception of 
trauma as the thing that reappears unbidden due precisely to its dislocation in time and 
consciousness.  
Trauma and memory studies have taken a turn toward visual studies and art history in 
recent years. This turn reflects an examination of the language in critical approaches to trauma 
and memory, as Lisa Saltzman and Eric Rosenberg note: “The formulation of trauma as 
discourse is predicated upon metaphors of visuality and image as unavoidable carrier of the 
unrepresentable. From primal scene to flashback to screen memory to the dream, much of the 
language deployed to speak trauma’s character is emphatically, if not exclusively, visual” (xii). 
Nonetheless this visual turn is still, obviously, strongly linked with trauma studies’ long focus on 
language, speaking, and text—particularly where words circumvent, repeat, or fail to represent 
the traumatic event. Therefore if, to borrow Saltzman and Rosenberg’s words, “we agree that a 
potential space of trauma is that very domain that exists between the visual and the verbal, 
between that which is seen and that which is said, if we agree that trauma itself might emerge 
from the attempt to navigate that space,” then this dissertation takes comics to be the medium 
par excellence for such navigational feats (Saltzman and Rosenberg xii). Comics rely explicitly 
upon that space between the visual and the verbal, their intersections, and the blankness 
surrounding both text and image where invisibility and silence reside.  
Analyzing the visual aspects of the works in this dissertation thus draws attention to the 
construction of vision as such, that is, to the ways by which we understand the exchange of 
images and gazes both within the texts and between them and the reader. Visuality and vision are 
two related processes of sight: “vision suggests sight as a physical operation, and visuality sight 
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as a social fact,” that is, how we interpret and react to that which we see (Foster ix). Visuality is 
the constructed, performed side to visual processes, approaching the question of how we see that 
which is before us. While visuality, like trauma, must be historically specific and not applied as a 
kind of universalizing brushstroke, it is the purpose of this dissertation to examine the 
connections, whether divergent or similar, between acts of seeing, acts of trauma, and acts of 
representation across nations and genres. 
In Unclaimed Experience, Cathy Caruth defines psychic trauma as, "a wound inflicted 
not upon the body but upon the mind," and "an event that… is experienced too soon, too 
unexpectedly, to be fully known and is therefore not available to consciousness until it imposes 
itself again, repeatedly, in the nightmares and repetitive actions of the survivor" (3, 4). Looking 
closely at Caruth’s definition, it is clear that the perception of time is one of the primary 
functions of the mind damaged, as it were, by the blunt force of catastrophic experience upon 
what Kai Erikson calls “the tissues of the mind” (Erikson 184). The traumatic event is one 
experienced “too soon” to be fully incorporated or understood into consciousness, resulting in a 
psychic and temporal coexistence between the unwanted and unexpected return of the event in 
the dreams, hallucinations, flashbacks, etc. of the individual in the “present.” Duration and the 
experience of duration—time itself—no longer function linearly and conventionally, but as 
disruption and also simultaneity.  
The process of psychic trauma conventionally rests on a particular relationship with time. 
In most definitions, the individual is traumatized because s/he encounters an experience that 
cannot be fully incorporated into or understood by consciousness at the moment of the event’s 
occurrence. Again, it is an event experienced “too soon”: “It is not, that is, having too little or too 
indirect access to an experience that places its truth in question, in this case, but paradoxically 
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enough, its very overwhelming immediacy, that produces its belated uncertainty” (Caruth 
Trauma 6). Experiencing something so overwhelming results not in repression of the event but 
the utter unavailability of the event to consciousness. Furthermore, trauma is bound eternally 
with the issue of surviving: “[F]or those who undergo trauma, it is not only the moment of the 
event, but of the passing out of it that is traumatic; that survival itself, in other words, can be a 
crisis” (Trauma 9). Leaving the event and coming into “normal” life, in other words, is a kind of 
crisis in and of itself for the traumatized survivor. 
Caruth emphasizes such temporal aspects of trauma in her introduction to the first part of 
Trauma: Explorations of Memory, saying “[T]rauma is not experienced as mere repression or 
defense, but as a temporal delay that carries the individual beyond the shock of the first moment” 
(10). This carrying beyond the initial shock results in a sense of floating between temporal 
instances—the past of the moment of disaster, and the present moment. In his essay, “Notes on 
Trauma and the Community,” Erikson expands on this particular quality of the traumatized 
mind: 
[T]rauma has the quality of converting that one sharp stab… into an enduring state of 
mind…. [T]he traumatized mind holds on to that moment, preventing it from slipping 
back into its proper chronological place in the past, and relives it over and over again in 
the compulsive musings of the day and the seething dreams of night. The moment 
becomes a season, the event becomes a condition. (185) 
Thus the moment of trauma endures beyond that individual moment of catastrophe, so that the 
traumatic moment does not simply return but lives on as a continual process in the individual’s 
psyche.  
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 These signs of trauma are present in the very structure of comics. Eisner and McCloud 
both note that there is a substantial amount of cognitive work required of the reader for comics to 
function effectively; however, this work is all too often overlooked or underappreciated. Carrier 
demonstrates the trap into which scholars of comics seem all too often to fall: namely, that 
“when they are successful, [comics] have verbal and visual elements seamlessly combined” 
(Carrier 4). This statement shows the danger and seduction of comics; the apparent 
“seamlessness” of comics actually covers the complex ways in which they function. Perhaps it is 
easy to grasp Alex Burgess’s state in between sleep and waking, but to navigate between these 
contradictory panels, their shaping, their differing framing, and so on, requires a particular kind 
of reading. Comics perform extremely complicated processes of representation and by extension 
force the reader to perform processes of suture, “closure,” and identification, all while trying to 
appear “natural” (much like suture works in film—a “natural” process that masks a complex 
series of processes in order to create a particular result for the viewer / reader). 
Even our biological processes of vision are contingent upon a relationship of presence 
and absence, of filling in what we cannot see. As Ann Marie Seward Barry writes, there exists an 
actual gap in our vision anatomically speaking at the optic disc, where the optic nerve meets the 
retina. While the rest of the retina contains rods and cones, which receive light waves and 
transform them into data and images, the optic disc is empty, a blank hole in our vision that our 
brain seamlessly fills in based on experience and context.1 Our vision, then—our physical act of 
seeing—is itself a process of filling in, of creating a sense of wholeness from something 
disjointed. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I should say "almost seamlessly"—when looking quickly from straight ahead to the side, you 
can see a dark spot, like a quick spasm or stutter in your vision, that disappears as soon as your 
eyes focus to the side; this is the gap in vision located at the optic disc (Barry 26). 
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 Readers of comics perform a similar narrative process as their eyes move from panel to 
panel and page to page, "filling in" the gaps in between narrative moments in order to construct a 
coherent narrative. Scott McCloud calls this process "closure," that is, the act of "observing the 
parts but perceiving the whole" (63). Closure, McCloud argues, is the fundamental principle that 
allows comics to function, since the gutter (the space between panels) forces the reader to 
imagine what occurs in that in-between space: “the audience is a willing and conscious 
collaborator and closure is the agent of change, time and motion” (65). This process demands 
that the reader perform a significant amount of imaginative work; the reader imagines what 
happens in the gutters, and in so doing bridges any number of gaps or lacunae in narrative and 
form. The comic book or graphic novel itself is then riddled with holes (what Pascal Lefèvre 
calls “extra-diegetic” or “non-visualized space,” 157) that the reader must overcome or fill in by 
force of her own imagination. Such holes mimic the way in which traumatic events are 
represented in narrative and memorial form. 
The gaps that the reader must take responsibility for bridging are not the only structures 
that echo the mental and narrative structures of trauma. In Picture Theory, W. J. T. Mitchell 
breaks down one of the essential tensions between word and image: that text is generally aligned 
with the speaking and seeing self, while the image is the viewed object, the other (157). 
Therefore, if text is to self as image is to other, then comics are the simultaneity and spatial 
coexistence of self and other. If there is no essential difference semantically between the two, as 
Mitchell argues, then it might be fair to say that comics bring to the fore the crisis of subjectivity, 
the loss of the self in the sameness of the object—that is, comics allow us one means through 
which such tensions between subject and object can be represented, or at the very least hinted at.  
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This same idea connects to the layout of the page (Groensteen’s “spatiotopia”) of a 
graphic novel: the reader’s ability to see multiple panels on the same page creates a sense of 
simultaneity, even if those panels are read in a specific order. In fact the very form of the graphic 
novel itself allows for a near-simultaneous experience of readership. As McCloud writes, “Both 
past and future are real and visible all around us! Wherever your eyes are focused, that’s now. 
But at the same time, your eyes take in the surrounding landscape of past and future!” (104). In 
the mere act of viewing the page, therefore, the reader becomes involved in the concurrence of 
text and image, panels and captions.  
Panels themselves also alter the narrative experience of linearity and temporality: “The 
panel acts as a sort of general indicator that time or space is being divided…. Panel shapes vary 
considerably, though, and while differences of shape don’t affect the specific ‘meanings’ of 
those panels vis-à-vis time, they can affect the reading experience” (McCloud 99). Large panels 
emphasize a sense of time being drawn out or elongated, while smaller panels create a staccato 
rhythm. Panels might also overlap, rupture, spread over the borders of the page, or perform in 
other unexpected structural ways. The pages from Sandman pictured above, for example, contain 
panels of varying sizes and shapes on a black background, creating a sense of overlap; it 
becomes difficult, at some points, to know when one panel begins and another ends, heightening 
the sense of being suspended between sleeping and waking. These structural nuances are visual 
indicators linked to the experience of reading and understanding not just the work’s narrative but 
its purpose with relation to trauma studies.  
The graphic novel itself as a medium allows for such a destabilization of word and image, 
content and form. In Alternative Comics, Charles Hatfield argues that:  
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responding to comics often depends on recognizing word and image as two "different" 
types of sign, whose implications can be played against each other—to gloss, to illustrate, 
to contradict or complicate or ironize the other…. We continue to distinguish between the 
function of words and the function of images, despite the fact that comics continually 
work to destabilize this very distinction. (36) 
Hatfield thus argues that in comics or graphic novels, word and image are not necessarily 
exclusive (although one can work against the other) but can simultaneously undermine and 
produce coherent meaning. The words in a particular panel may contradict the image, or they 
may describe that image in a way that is, or they may be a character’s spoken dialogue or interior 
thoughts. It is necessary to think of a graphic novel not as a series of images with textual 
elements added, nor as a textual narrative that has been illustrated. Rather, comics are a separate 
medium, one that uses both text and image but does not rely on one more than the other. 
A line from The New York Times review of Art Spiegelman’s Maus points at another, 
more insidious issue associated with the comics medium: what, exactly, to name them. 
According to the reviewer, Maus “looks like a comic book” but actually is “pictorial literature.” 
There is a tendency to distinguish between comics, comic books and graphic novels, usually 
along the lines of “high art” against “low art.” In the last few decades, writers, critics and 
creators have expressed varying degrees of difficulty in giving a name in American English to 
what Scott McCloud defines as “juxtaposed pictorial and other images in deliberate sequence, 
intended to convey information and/or to produce an aesthetic response in the viewer” (9). All of 
the terms in circulation that fit this definition—comics, alternative comics, comix, graphic 
novels, graphic narratives, sequential art, etc.—are problematic for numerous reasons.  
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The term “comics,” for example, implies that there is something “comical” within the 
covers of the work, an implication that is uncomfortable not simply because of a common 
misconception of “comics” as an unsophisticated, juvenile medium. Such an implication might 
also trivialize more serious works like Maus, or many of the other works examined in this 
project. The term “graphic novel” has complex associations, as well: “graphic” is often 
associated with nouns like “sex” and “violence,” implying that what is contained within the work 
will be some sort of an exaggeration or over-the-top rendition. And not all works of this nature 
are “novels,” either. Works of autobiography like Maus, Fun Home and other texts included in 
this study are not novels, per se, according to the traditional definition of that medium; rather, 
they are memoirs based on personal and cultural histories. Finally, “sequential art,” the term 
created and preferred by comics master Will Eisner, excludes both one-panel comics (The 
Family Circus, for example, which McCloud’s definition also excludes, incidentally) and other 
works that perhaps are not presented sequentially.  
Many critics or scholars of comics begin their works by trying to define what comics are, 
how they function, and what we should call them. Frequently, these discussions begin with 
references to Eisner and McCloud’s respective works as important touchstones. Eisner and 
McCloud’s basic definitions of comics have been the touchstones against which others have 
situated their own work in the years after the publication of Comics and Sequential Art and 
Understanding Comics. David Carrier, for example, argues in The Aesthetics of Comics that 
McCloud’s definition ignores the importance of the speech balloon, which Carrier himself 
considers the crucial characteristic of comics: “The speech balloon is a defining element of the 
comic from pictures illustrating a text, like Tenniel’s drawings for Alice in Wonderland” (4). 
Carrier goes on to argue that “[t]he speech balloon is a great philosophical discovery, a method 
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of representing thought and words. Almost unknown before being exploited by comics artists, 
the speech balloon defines comics as neither a purely verbal nor a strictly visual art form, but as 
something radically new” (4). For Carrier, the speech balloon—that is, the insert of text inside an 
image—is what distinguishes comics from other forms of pictorial art. Accordingly, Carrier 
views the textual aspects of comics as the more important, in spite of his declarations that comics 
are in essence a mixed medium. In arguing for the dominance of speech balloons in comics, 
Carrier implicitly valorizes the text over the image. 
Noted French comics scholar Thierry Groensteen, meanwhile, holds the inverse to be true 
and argues for the primacy of the image over text in comics, saying, “If I plead for recognition of 
the image as preeminent in status, it is not for the reason that, except on rare occasions, in comics 
it occupies a more important space than that which is reserved for writing. Its predominance 
within the system attaches to what is essential to the production of meaning that is made through 
it” (8). Groensteen maintains that although the “language of comics” necessitates a mix of word 
and image, the image is the primary arena of producing meaning, while the textual aspect 
complements and heightens the meaning already conveyed in the image.  
The writers above are just a small sample of comics scholars and critics who are caught 
in a debate over how, precisely, to define comics and graphic novels.2 Most agree that, broadly 
speaking, comics are some combination of word and image, and that this combination differs in 
meaning from photographs and captions, or paintings and titles. In spending so much energy 
delineating the characteristics of comics, what all these critics show is a need to define, 
categorize, and legitimize the medium—a need that is understandable, given the earlier total lack 
of regard associated with comics in the eras preceding the 1980s. Since comics are a relatively 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For more, see Bart Beaty, Ron Goulart, Paul Gravett, Robert C. Harvey, Charles Hatfield, and 
virtually every author to write about or critique comics. 
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new area of interest in literary, artistic and cultural studies, many authors tried to establish their 
legitimacy and legacy. As the review of Maus cited above shows, taking comics seriously breaks 
the earlier modes and stereotypes of readership. In an effort to combat the frivolity and even 
illegitimacy associated with comics, writers spent a great deal of time and energy defining, 
contextualizing, and generally “proving” the validity of both the medium and their work. This 
drive towards legitimacy coincides with the rise in the publication of graphic novels as such—the 
standalone narratives contained in a single volume, like Fun Home, rather than those published 
serially over a longer period of time, like the long-running superhero series. Being able to find a 
sturdily bound graphic novel on a shelf in a local bookstore, as opposed to a flimsy, staple-bound 
comic book found at a newsstand or specialty store, added increased visibility and legitimacy to 
the medium.3 
In addition, when dealing with this new critical arena, critics and scholars have lacked a 
preexisting discourse to use in relation to the medium. As such, there was and still is a struggle to 
find the correct vocabulary when trying to discuss specific elements of comics. Not only 
concerned with how comics should be named, many writers struggle to find technical vocabulary 
for particular aspects of comics. As a composite art, comics require a composite vocabulary, 
using terms from literary studies, art history, and cinema studies to explain various techniques, 
aspects, and approaches. While words like “panel” seem to belong inherently to the realm of 
comics, other terms like “frame,” “close up” and “establishing shot” clearly originate in 
photography and film studies and, therefore, add to the sense that perhaps comics did (or do) not 
exist in their own right.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Shawn Patrick Gilmore’s recent dissertation, “The Invention of the Graphic Novel: 
Underground Comix and Corporate Aesthetics,” illustrates this development of the graphic novel 
in much more detail. 
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Even words like “speech balloon” become contested, with some preferring that term, 
others “speech bubble,” and still others “word balloon.” Most writers prefer “caption” to refer to 
text balloons or boxes that are not connected to a speaker, but a few writers call them “narrator 
boxes.” These variations on the same basic idea demonstrate a lack of a cohesive, “canonized” or 
official language and set of terms for discussing comics. This unique medium does require its 
own technical vocabulary and its own discourse, just as much as the medium itself contains its 
own kind of language and grammar—as Rocco Versaci says, comics are a “graphic language,” 
the “unique kind of language… to invite us into different worlds in order to help us better 
understand our own” (6). This graphic language contains terms borrowed from other disciplines 
as well as words belonging to itself only. 
Indeed, the desire to create a discourse unique to the study of comics even leads some to 
create terms for the sake of creating terms. Groensteen, for instance, argues for the use of certain 
terms like “spatio-topia” to refer to what is essentially “page layout” (17). “Layout,” of course, 
sounds less academic and more practical than “spatio-topia;” every design student and budding 
comics creator knows what “layout” means, while “spatio-topia” is denser and more particular to 
the study of comics (rather than their creation or production). However, the insistence on such 
terms indicates a greater anxiety over the legitimacy and the worthiness of comics as a scholarly 
pursuit. Such anxiety does not actually help to create a greater understanding of comics, but 
rather alienates and even distracts readers from better comprehending the interesting ways in 
which comics function.  
For the purposes of this work, the problems of what comics are and what we should call 
them are therefore of less interest than how comics function, and I focus on this latter aspect 
through the close readings in the chapters that follow. As Douglas Wolk argues in Reading 
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Comics: How Graphic Novels Work and What They Mean, “I’m not going to define comics here, 
because if you have picked up this book and have not been spending the last century trapped 
inside a magic lantern, you already pretty much know what they are, and ‘pretty much’ is good 
enough” (17). For simplicity’s sake, in this dissertation I try to limit my use of the words 
“comics,” “comic book,” and “graphic novel” to the definitions Wolk puts forth: “The industry 
calls thin, saddle-stitched pamphlets ‘comic books’… virtually any squarebound volume of 
comics sold on bookstore shelves a ‘graphic novel,’ and the form in the abstract ‘comics’” (61). I 
also use the term “graphic memoir” to refer to those particular works that are squarebound books 
but autobiographical in narrative, like Maus, Fun Home, and others. However, I choose not to 
engage in the debate over naming and defining comics, as the scope of this project focuses rather 
on how comics function in relation to trauma and representations of memory. 
Nonetheless, it is very important to note the distinction between the medium of comics 
and the various genres made possible in this medium. Often, as Wolk writes, “the way almost 
everybody [in America] experienced the medium was intimately tied to a handful of genres” like 
the superhero and detective genres (11). Historically other genres like Western comics during the 
“Golden Age” (1930s through late 1950s) and even romance comics in the 1960s and 1970s held 
wide appeal. And with Maus and other recent successful works of memoir like Alison Bechdel’s 
Fun Home, recent mainstream understanding of comics has shifted towards something more 
than—if still separate from—superheroes. 
 Calling comics a medium emphasizes its formal and structural aspects rather than the 
content or genre of a narrative. This project therefore considers the question of representing 
trauma and memory across generic boundaries, rather than confining itself to a single category or 
genre of narrative. This dissertation thus approaches the comics medium differently than other 
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recent major works of criticism, like Hilary Chute’s Graphic Women, which centers exclusively 
on graphic memoir written by women, or Charles Hatfield’s work on underground comics, 
Alternative Comics. Similarly, I examine works from multiple national contexts—American, 
French, Belgian, and Rwandan—to explore what similarities lie between these contexts, without 
erasing their cultural specificity.   
Comics, then, seem to be more than just the combination of two semantically similar 
media. Meaning is created not just through some kind of additive property, but in the nuanced 
complexities that arise from using these multiple axes of representation. As Mitchell writes, 
“Comparison itself is not a necessary procedure in the study of image-text relations. The 
necessary subject matter is, rather, the whole ensemble of relations between media” (Picture 
Theory 89). This does not, I think, mean ignoring the differences between text and image, nor 
does it mean eliding these categories into the black hole of undifferentiated semantic function. 
Rather studying comics requires examining the ways in which image and text—and form and 
narrative—work together and simultaneously resist one another. The two aspects can be 
synergistic and destabilizing all at the same time, undermining one another’s narrative power and 
temporal linearity.  
This dissertation thus takes on comics from different genres, forms, and national contexts 
in order to tease out the underlying issues of visuality and trauma within the medium itself. I 
concentrate on comics from the American and Franco-Belgian contexts, as these are the two 
largest and most influential Western traditions in comics. Reflecting the transgeneric approach of 
this project, the following chapters are organized neither by national tradition nor by thematic 
concerns. Rather, this dissertation turns from the superheroic to other explicitly fictional works 
to the autobiographic. The chapters thus move from one national context to another and back 
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again, illustrating the ways in which the structures and conventions of the comics medium 
function across national boundaries. Likewise the chapters cycle through concerns about 
individual trauma to larger historical catastrophes and back to the level of the individual or 
intimate representations of trauma and memory.  
 Beginning with the superhero genre means undermining, in part, some of its defining 
characteristics as action-driven, hypermasculine narratives. However, as the first analytical 
chapter demonstrates, this genre—or at the very least, one of its primary figureheads, Batman—
is fraught with problems of instability and invisibility. Focusing on one of superhero comics' 
most popular and enduring characters, I argue that Batman's identity is bound not merely to the 
trauma of his parents' murder but to the complicated intersections surrounding that event and his 
subsequent crises of identity as a figure between criminality and legality, between justice and 
vigilantism, and between visibility and invisibility. This chapter takes three Batman texts as the 
central axis of analysis: Frank Miller's watershed The Dark Knight Returns, Alan Moore and 
Brian Bolland's The Killing Joke, and Arkham Asylum, by Grant Morrison and Dave McKean. 
This chapter also analyzes the recent film trilogy directed by Christopher Nolan (Batman Begins, 
The Dark Knight, and The Dark Knight Rises), addressing the films as important contemporary 
cultural touchstones but also discussing the representational differences between the media of 
film and comics. 
Broadening the question of trauma to include both individual and historical levels, 
Chapter Two examines Alan Moore and Dave Gibbons’ watershed work Watchmen, which has 
won numerous awards and transcended early on the problematic comics/literature divide, being 
placed on various “Best Novels” lists (including those created by TIME magazine, Entertainment 
Weekly, and the Wall Street Journal). Arguing for the necessity of visuality in the text’s 
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representation of trauma, this chapter demonstrates the important intersections of vision, identity, 
and memory through the characters’ narratives and the text’s cyclical nature. Strewn with visual 
and literal references to World War II, the Holocaust, and the nuclear disasters of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, although the action unfolds in a distinctly 1980s setting, Watchmen offers a nonlinear, 
multifaceted conception of trauma—both historical and individual—that finds its media corollary 
in the form of comics themselves. 
Chapter Three continues to explore the representation of historical catastrophe and 
individual trauma, looking at the Rwandan genocide of 1994 in three comics: Rupert 
Bazambanza’s creative memoir Smile through the Tears; Cécile Grenier, Alain Austini, and Pat 
Masioni’s fictional Rwanda 1994; and another fictional work, Déogratias, by Jean-Philippe 
Stassen. These works use the trope of landscape to understand the genocide as a national and 
unnatural disaster. Even as these texts purport to resist both the genocidal and colonial regimes 
they nonetheless still consider Rwanda in terms of landscape, a landscape that both offers access 
to the genocide and distances, even exoticizes, it as the texts reproduce the authoritarian, colonial 
gaze. 
In the fourth chapter, the dissertation shifts even further away from explicitly fictional in 
an analysis of traumatic imagery in Art Spiegelman’s In the Shadow of No Towers, his artistic 
response to the terrorist attacks on New York of September 11, 2001. This chapter teases out the 
complex relationship between media images and personal images as intertwining representations 
of a specific traumatic moment. Moreover, Spiegelman’s difficulty in making sense of the events 
of that day, and of the media and governmental “co-option” of the event in the days following, is 
itself part of a knottier issue in self-representation, as Spiegelman simultaneously struggles with 
his own artistic legacy as creator of the groundbreaking comics memoir Maus. No Towers’ 
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messy, nonlinear narrative thus reflects not only the impossibility of comprehending the disaster 
itself, but also the convergence of experience, postmemory, and artistic creation in the 
representation of catastrophe. 
Moving back to more intimate or individual, rather than global or national, disasters, the 
fifth chapter takes up Alison Bechdel’s comics memoir Fun Home, which explores the narrator’s 
relationship with her closeted gay father and her own development of a sexual and independent 
identity. It is precisely in the gaps provided both in the structure of the comics medium and 
within the narrative itself that Alison’s “coming of age” story and her understanding of her father 
occur. Moreover, Bechdel’s redrawn archive of photographs and other realia indicates the 
powerful agency of images—that is, their ability to destabilize and undermine the author and the 
viewer’s position as spectator.  
The final chapter of this project brings many of the issues central to the previous chapters 
together in an examination of David B.’s Epileptic, a memoir of the narrator’s life under the 
shadow of his elder brother’s severe epilepsy. This chapter argues that Epileptic’s central tension 
lies in the movement of the text between representations of disability and historical trauma, and 
the witnessing of those various kinds of suffering that ultimately result in a sense of fracture and 
fragmentation. In presenting the rhizomatic nature of disability, the text suggests that rather than 
considering individuals and their bodies along a linear scale between two extreme points, we can 
reformulate our understanding of “normalcy” through a nonlinear, multivalent spectrum of 
experience. 
This notion of a nonlinear spectrum synthesizes the difficult problems of visuality, 
trauma, and memory that the dissertation explores as a whole, and it offers up a new mode of 
conceptualizing the narrative possibilities of representing trauma. By taking in to account the 
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absent, the hidden, the invisible, and the unspoken in these texts, this dissertation brings together 
the emergent field of comics studies with the recent visual and multidirectional turns in trauma 
and memory studies. This project offers a new way of understanding individual and historical 
traumas not necessarily as a question of either/or (either visible or not, spoken or silenced, past 
or present, etc.), but as precisely a space of contact between those conventional binaries of 
representation. 
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Chapter 1: Batman Can’t Die: Trauma, Desire, and the Batman Franchise 
 
The superhero genre is perhaps the most popular and enduring genre traditionally 
associated with comics, and Batman is one of its most beloved icons. To take up Batman as a 
figure for analysis is to engage with questions of violence, trauma, masculinity, and memory, 
even within the presumed levity of the superhero genre. This chapter approaches questions of 
individual trauma, individual desire, and gendered violence, and the complicated intersections of 
these issues with Batman’s position as a liminal figure between law and illegality, between 
private and public spheres. Trauma, I argue, functions not merely as the multifold catalyst for 
Batman’s existence, but also as an avenue into representations of desire and gendered violence 
through mechanisms of visibility and vision, both within the narratives discussed below and 
within the formal structures of the comics medium. Batman’s trauma becomes legible on and 
through the gendered body, the body as a visible and visual object, which in turn complicates and 
problematizes the connections between Batman’s desire, his trauma, and his relation to visuality. 
As I discussed in the introduction, Cathy Caruth and others conceive of acute individual 
trauma as a wound inflicted upon the mind, usually occurring from a catastrophic event that is 
experienced too soon, too unexpectedly, and thus remains outside of conscious memory. Instead 
the event returns in uncontrollable flashbacks or hallucinations that plague the survivor of the 
event (Caruth Unclaimed 3-5). Following this definition, the death of Batman’s parents, Thomas 
and Martha Wayne, would at first appear to be exactly this kind of event for Bruce Wayne. And 
yet, as this chapter argues, Bruce’s traumatization stems not merely from the death of his parents, 
but also from that death’s problematic position within Bruce’s own network of desires. This 
network includes both desires of an individual nature—Bruce’s “pleasure principle,” so to speak, 
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as well as his formation as subject (how he becomes a person with his own agency)—and of a 
more social and political nature, involving his moral and ethical feelings of responsibility for 
those surrounding him at the familial and the public levels.  
Indeed, Batman’s status as a heroic exception—the man who fills in the gap in authority 
and the law through his very position outside the law4—and his ensuing community-minded 
“good doing” are always a foil for Bruce Wayne’s private desires. This tension finds its roots in 
Bruce Wayne’s childhood trauma, which in itself is a matter more complicated than it may first 
appear. This chapter traces some representations of this trauma and its connection with Bruce’s 
desires, Batman’s powers, and ultimately the serial form of the franchise itself. The death of 
Bruce’s parents is not traumatic merely because it occurred, but also because it simultaneously 
enacts Bruce’s unrecognized desires, and keeps him trapped within a seemingly inescapable web 
of familial identification. Bruce Wayne’s position as the heroic exception is not a political 
stance, but a position stemming from desire, masochism, compulsion, and ultimately his 
in/ability to reinstate himself in the condition of heteronormativity.5  
Few comic book characters are as iconic and enduring as Batman; since his first 
appearance in 1939’s Detective Comics #27, the Batman character has remained in near-constant 
circulation, and has been adapted for radio, television, film, and other media to great success.6 
With nearly 75 years of publication and media history, Batman has become a major American 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See Todd McGowan, The Fictional Christopher Nolan 
5 I acknowledge that the use of the term “heteronormative” brings in all manner of questions of 
sexuality and queerness, like Batman’s relationship with Robin that so threatened Frederick 
Wertham in Seduction of the Innocent.  Others have thoroughly addressed this issue—see Will 
Brooker, Andy Medhurst, Nathan Tipton, and even Wertham himself.  As my own interests lie in 
other questions, I use the term to signify Bruce Wayne’s entry into a sanitized, normalized life 
with a wife / female partner, while well aware of its queer implications. 
6 For a more thorough history of Batman and DC Comics, see Les Daniels’s Batman: The 
Complete History, Gerard Jones’s Men of Tomorrow: Geeks, Gangsters, and the Birth of the 
Comic Book, and Will Brooker’s Batman Unmasked: Analyzing a Cultural Icon. 
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cultural touchstone and one of the most popular superheroes, alongside Superman and 
Spiderman. Unlike those and many other superheroes, however, Batman’s powers come not from 
alien planets or science experiments gone awry, but rather from his intellect (he is, after all, “the 
world’s greatest detective”) and his immense wealth, which allows him to purchase or produce 
the high-tech gadgets, suits, vehicles, training equipment, and so on that he then uses to fight the 
criminals and villains of Gotham City, his home.  
This basic narrative, consistent across all the iterations of Batman, stems from an “origin 
story”—the story of how and why Batman came into existence in his fictional universe—which 
itself has been through countless retellings, dating back to Detective Comics #33 (1939). Bruce 
Wayne is a billionaire playboy who, as a young boy, witnesses the shooting death of his parents 
during a mugging, resulting in his later decision to use the family fortune he inherits to become 
the crime-fighting, justice-minded Batman (also referred to as the Caped Crusader and the Dark 
Knight). He refuses, in most cases, to use guns or to kill anyone, even the criminals he works to 
bring down, in an effort to establish a distinction between himself (his illegal vigilantism and 
brutality) and the villains. 
Batman insists on this refusal to kill as one of the ways to maintain distinction between 
him and the villains he encounters, even as he himself violates the law, terrorizes Gotham and its 
citizens, destroys public property, and so on. He therefore occupies a position in between legality 
and lawlessness, an antihero figure who can shift between spheres and blur the lines between 
justice and illegality in ways that the police cannot. This liminality is brought about in part 
because Batman is, plainly, a superhero. The superhero figure is usually split in two: the 
superhero and the “true” or “secret” identity, the “normal” person underneath the mask. Thus 
Superman has his Clark Kent, Spiderman his Peter Parker, and Batman his Bruce Wayne. 
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Maintaining these separate identities is the source of both narrative and psychological tension, as 
many others have noted (see: McGowan 87-90; Brooker 171; Crutcher 65). Yet Batman’s split 
identity is actually a symptom of a more fundamental tension between Bruce Wayne’s personal 
or individual desires and his public (that is, his social and political) life.  
This chapter centers on select works dating from Frank Miller’s The Dark Knight Returns 
(1986), which revitalized the franchise after a long period of Comics Code-induced levity, 
embodied perhaps most prominently in the 1960s television series and film starring Adam West. 
I focus on these works from 1986 and after because they signal a return to the dark origins of 
comics’ most famous antihero, and because of their complexities and nuances in approaching 
questions of trauma, desire, and memory. These works are not generally considered “canon”— 
that is, they fall outside the conventional serial plot line of the Batman comics— but they are 
nonetheless hugely influential on the series and its adaptations.  
Miller’s The Dark Knight Returns begins this revolution with his story of Batman coming 
out of retirement to fight crime again as a middle-aged man who is still deeply embedded in a 
struggle with his memories and his desires. The Dark Knight Returns posits Batman’s agency as 
tied to his individual trauma and mechanisms of visuality, both within the text and between the 
text and reader. I then move on to examine Alan Moore and Brian Bollard’s The Killing Joke, 
which centers on the arch-villain the Joker but illustrates Batman’s compulsions and, in its 
ambiguous ending, hints at Batman’s enjoyment in remaining within his existing structures of 
trauma and desire. Grant Morrison and Dave McKean’s horror story Arkham Asylum: a Serious 
House on Serious Earth follows Moore and Bollard’s work both chronologically and 
thematically, as it concretizes the experience of madness and trauma across temporal boundaries. 
The chapter finally moves to Christopher Nolan’s recent film trilogy (Batman Begins, The Dark 
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Knight, and The Dark Knight Rises) as a contemporary cultural touchstone and an important 
example of the changes in representations of trauma with a change in media, finally concluding 
with the problem of romanticizing Bruce Wayne’s trauma and sublimating his desires. 
 
Batman Becomes Bat, Man, and Batman Again: The Dark Knight Returns 
Frank Miller’s 1986 short-run series The Dark Knight Returns essentially rejuvenated the 
Batman franchise which, as mentioned earlier, had been entrenched in a camp aesthetic that 
reached its zenith in the Adam West television show and film (dir. Leslie H. Martinson, 1966). 
Miller’s work was a financial, popular, and critical success, and effectively returned the Dark 
Knight to his darker side7. There are no more “Holy Bat Traps!” or “cans of Bat-shark repellant” 
as in the Martinson film, but instead a dark, gritty Gotham City, battles against governments and 
heroes as well as villains, and a middle-aged man struggling not only with the events of his past 
but with walking the fine line between justice and revenge.  
In Miller’s work, Batman comes out of retirement to help rid Gotham’s streets of 
increasingly violent criminals, fighting some of his most notorious enemies—Two-Face, aka 
Harvey Dent, and the Joker—as well as some new foes: the Mutant gang and their monstrous 
leader (see figure 1.1). Despite this series of victories against clearly delineated “bad guys,” 
Batman finds himself at odds with the Gotham City Police and the United States Government, 
which ultimately results in his confrontation with the government puppet Superman. Batman 
apparently suffers a heart attack in the process of defeating Superman; however, the final pages 
reveal that he has faked his own death, and the text ends with him beginning to train the Mutants 
and the young Robin to work for Gotham’s well-being.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Will Brooker convincingly argues for the “campy” Batman’s necessary position within the 
franchise.  See Batman Unmasked and Hunting the Dark Knight. 
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Figure 1.1: Miller’s Joker and the Mutant Leader, two of Batman’s adversaries in Dark Knight Returns (125; 73).  
Thus a major pattern at work in the text is one of rising and falling, or a cycle of returning 
in a kind of vertically-oriented spiral—a cycle, however, that depends on Bruce Wayne’s desires. 
This pattern appears on the first page, which depicts a fiery car crash and Bruce Wayne inside, 
thinking, “this would be a good death...but not good enough,” demonstrating the central tension 
of navigating the ambiguity of binaries that are conventionally thought to be fixed, especially in 
the superhero universe: between life and death, and between good and bad (10). “A good death” 
might mean a satisfactory death or a morally right one, and Bruce’s escape from the crash 
reveals that this death would be neither. The text therefore begins with a last-minute rejection of 
death, as Bruce escapes the crash at the last second; however, this scene also demonstrates 
Bruce’s embrace of death, of thrill-seeking, his pleasure at putting his own body at risk: “It (the 
exploding car) shoves hot needles in my face and tries to make me blind. I’m in charge now and 
I like it... The left front tire decides to turn all on its own. I laugh and jerk the steering wheel to 
the right” (10). His enjoyment in the face of danger and bodily harm is clear, and this enjoyment 
is bound up with his traumatic past in a web of competing desires. 
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Indeed almost immediately following this scene, Bruce Wayne wanders the streets of 
Gotham musing on the separation between himself and the Batman persona (figure 1.2): 
Batman was a young man. If it was revenge he was after, he’s taken it. It’s been forty 
years since he was born... born here. Once again he’s brought me back—to show me how 
little it has changed. It’s older, dirtier, but—it could have happened yesterday. It could be 
happening right now. They could be lying at your feet, twitching, bleeding... and the man 
who stole all sense from your life, he could be standing... right over there. (13) 
The following panels depict two Mutant thugs preparing to attack Bruce in the alley, until they 
realize not only that he can fight back, but that he wants to do so: “I don’t know, man, look at 
him. He’s into it—Can’t do murders when they’re into it—let’s hit the arcade, man” (13-14).  
 
Figure 1.2: Bruce Wayne remembers his parents’ death, encounters some Mutant thugs (13). 
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This is the first retelling in The Dark Knight Returns of Batman’s origin story, and 
tellingly he tries to maintain a separation between his competing alter egos, referring to Batman 
in the third person, but also referring to himself in the first and second person. Visually, these 
panels contain Bruce Wayne, not Batman; the absence of Batman here foregrounds the tension 
between the idea that Bruce and Batman are inextricable precisely through Batman’s absence: he 
is present only through the image of Bruce Wayne. This split between Batman and Bruce Wayne 
is linked with the moment of trauma; following Caruth’s definition, again, Bruce’s thought that 
“it,” the event, “could have happened yesterday” or “could be happening right now” illustrates 
the simultaneity of traumatic memory in the mind of the survivor. And when Bruce conflates the 
Mutant thugs with the man who killed his parents (“standing right over there”), it is as if time 
itself has ceased to have meaning in his mind. The possibility of fighting these Mutants appears 
to be a mental exercise in fighting the criminal responsible for the trauma in Bruce’s past. That 
is, here trauma effectively cancels time, leaving Bruce suspended between past and present.  
The very structure of the comics medium mirrors this suspension, as the panels depicting 
this scene all exist simultaneously on the page for the reader (cf. McCloud 104, and the 
introduction to this project). This temporal suspension is also bound up in questions of desire: 
just as Bruce enjoys the danger he faces in the car crash a few pages earlier, here he is apparently 
“into” the possibility of fighting the Mutants. He wants to be there, in that alley, fighting 
whomever he encounters there. Moreover, this scene is not a literal flashback to the moment of 
trauma: the panels remain visually in the present, following the middle-aged Bruce Wayne. He 
therefore has not been helplessly carried away into the past but instead actively chooses to be 
there, despite his insistence that “he [Batman] brought me here.”  
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As I described earlier, Thomas and Martha Wayne’s death is conventionally considered 
the Batman’s origin story, but Miller also presents another origin story through a dream 
sequence, in which a very young Bruce Wayne falls down a hole in the garden and encounters a 
swarm of bats living in the cave below. Bruce’s choice of the bat as his alter ego and his return to 
the cave as the alter-ego’s home (literally, the Batcave) is a way for Bruce to simultaneously 
embrace his fear and turn that fear against the criminals he fights; it is a kind of conscious 
appropriation of terror and trauma. In taking the form of the bat, Batman attempts to move from 
powerless to empowered via an appropriation of the vision that terrifies him. 
The narrative’s return to this boyhood scene, however, illustrates both the psychic break 
that occurs at this moment and its uncanny return in Bruce’s psyche. The use of red as an accent 
color to the predominantly black, gray, and white of the page gives this dream sequence a 
violent, nightmarish quality, culminating in a close-up of a bat’s face as it looms over the six-
year-old boy (figure 1.3). 
 
Figure 1.3: Miller’s second “origin story” (19). 
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I call this another origin story because according to Bruce, the bat was waiting in the cave and 
“claim[ed] me [Bruce] as his own;” he goes on to say that Batman “laughs at me, curses me. 
Calls me a fool. He fills my sleep, he tricks me. Brings me [to the Batcave] when the night is 
long and my will is weak. He struggles relentlessly, hatefully, to be free...” (19).  
Here the text again emphasizes the break between Bruce and the Batman, two separate 
entities housed in the same body; the bat and the Batman appear here unconscious desires 
resurfacing through dreams and tricks. Bruce’s struggle to repress this side of himself is equally 
the struggle between justice and revenge, yet it is precisely in this division between his two 
“sides” that he is able to both defeat criminals in ways the law cannot, and prevent himself from 
becoming criminal in the process. This struggle manifests itself as the vision of the terrifying bat, 
emphasizing both the visual nature of Bruce’s secondary trauma and the necessity of creating an 
appearance of appropriation. Visible mimicry of the visual trauma becomes a way for Bruce 
Wayne to both look like he confronts his fears, and to cover over his still-invisible and unspoken 
terror. 
This vision repeats itself later in the text, enacting the cyclicality and repetition that so 
characterizes trauma itself. After his initial defeat at the hands of the Mutant leader, bloodied and 
near death, Bruce returns to the Batcave, where he experiences yet another near-resurrection: “I 
can’t die... I’m not finished yet... and you’re not finished with me” (87). Over the next several 
panels a bat appears, and the captions repeat from the earlier Batcave origin scene: “Gliding with 
ancient grace, eyes gleaming, untouched by love or joy or sorrow… breath hot with the taste of 
fallen foes… the stench of dead things, damned things… surely the fiercest survivor, the purest 
warrior… glaring, hating… claiming me as your own” (88). The difference between this scene 
and the earlier one lies in shift from third to second person (“you’re not finished with me;” 
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“claiming me as your own”), as if Bruce is confronting and accepting the animal part of himself 
in the scene’s second repetition. 
Embracing the bat in himself is in fact necessary for Batman to return successfully to 
Gotham’s streets, defeat the Mutant leader and, later, the Joker, and even lead the people of 
Gotham during the pandemonium of the blackout near the end of the text. Indeed, only through 
fighting these battles can Bruce ultimately decide to let Batman “die,” in order to train and pass 
on Gotham’s wellbeing to the next generation; and only through accepting the Bat can he 
successfully fight those battles. Batman is therefore Bruce’s fear incarnate, a simultaneously 
instinctual and emotional being that Bruce tries to keep separate from himself. For to allow 
Batman to “break free,” as he says earlier, would also allow Bruce’s repressed desires to be free: 
his masochistic, compulsive need to fight the criminals who eternally stand for the murderer of 
Bruce Wayne’s parents. And this is the crux of Batman’s defining tension: Bruce Wayne is 
continually and nearly exclusively defined through his relationship to his parents. Even here, in 
his fifties, Batman is still bound up in a compulsion that stems from his lack of a unique identity 
or subjectivity. (And, as I will discuss in more detail later, this is why the ending of this text is so 
problematic: it presents a romanticized narrative of Bruce’s resurrection as a teacher/savior, but 
this narrative is only covering up Bruce Wayne/Batman’s trauma and lack.) 
Just before Bruce returns to the Batman costume, the text presents a visual and verbal 
flashback to the scene of Bruce’s parents’ death. As the scene begins, Bruce Wayne is watching 
television when the film Zorro appears onscreen. In the blue light of the television screen, the 
panels move closer and closer to Bruce’s face. The captions read: “Just a movie, that’s all it is. 
No harm in watching a movie... you loved it so much... you jumped and danced like a fool... you 
remember...” The narration is then interrupted with Bruce’s memory, in more yellow, brown and 
32 
 
gray tones in contrast with the black and blue of the “present,” and we see the Waynes leaving 
the cinema. “You remember that night—” reads the following caption, accompanying a close up 
on the “present” Bruce’s anguished face. The rest of this page and all of the following page are 
wordless, and show the young Bruce dancing in the alley, a hand holding a gun, Thomas 
stepping in front of Bruce, the finger squeezing the trigger, Martha’s death, and the mugger’s 
arm breaking the strand of pearls around her neck (figure 1.4).  
 
Figure 1.4: flashback to the night of the Waynes’ murder (Miller 23). 
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The short, uniformly sized panels and the lack of dialogue create a sense of the slowing 
down of time within and across the panels. This “slow time” gives the impression of the scene 
happening in slow motion: The finger pulling the trigger, the bullet casing leaving the gun, the 
strand of pearls snapping from his mother’s neck—these all happen across multiple panels, with 
moment-to-moment transitions (see McCloud 70). As such, this scene should “last” mere 
seconds or, at most, a few minutes, but it feels and looks as if it lasts much longer (a total of 
three pages). Time, therefore, loses its conventional structure within Miller’s manipulation of the 
comics medium, and moreover Batman’s sense of identity is bound up in this “slow time.”  
This “slow time” flashback then transitions into Bruce watching the news of all the 
crimes committed in Gotham that night. He then has another split conversation with himself: 
“The time has come. You know it in your soul. For I am your soul... you cannot escape me” (25). 
The text then moves to his office, where Bruce is listening to his answering machine messages, 
disembodied voices from his past: Jim Gordon, Superman / Clark Kent, and Catwoman / Selina 
Kyle.  
 
Figure 1.5: the bat escapes? (Miller 25). 
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Bruce is bathed in moonlight from the window and crisscrossed with the shadows of the bars of 
the windowpane, making it look as though he is in a prison cell (figure 1.5). The hellish bat from 
the second “origin story” bursts through the window, into and/or out of the “cell” in which Bruce 
stands, signifying not only his return to crime-fighting (culminating in Batman’s reveal on page 
35) but also his acceptance of that portion of his identity he spent the last ten years trying to 
repress. These panels present an ambiguous image of the cell: is Bruce Wayne imprisoned, or is 
the bat contained; and when the bat crashes through the window, is he breaking in, or escaping?  
This ambiguity, this slippage between competing desires, eventually leads to Batman’s 
confrontation with Superman, who stands as a kind of super-ego, representing the US 
government and, more broadly, the institutional and cultural structures that dictate the law. 
Superman is the Law empty of its complexities; he is the “big blue Boy Scout” who adheres to 
the structures of authority precisely because they are the structures of authority. If Batman is the 
heroic exception because he fills in the gap in the Law, Superman fails to acknowledge that a gap 
even exists. Therefore Superman must fight Batman, not only because the government tells him 
to do so, but also because Batman is necessarily criminal in his refusal to adhere to the letter of 
the law. 
When Batman finally fights Superman at the end of the text, he argues that “it has to end 
here— on this filthy patch of street— where my parents died” (190). He returns to the very space 
of the traumatic event in order to enact his own death: “this… is the end… for both of us” he 
says later, referring to both Superman and himself (194). Batman’s compulsion to repeat and his 
masochistic desire thus extend even to his death. In theory, then, this death indicates Batman’s 
inability to escape the Law of the Father; all his struggles to define himself as separate from his 
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father lead him to this end point, his death at the very moment he destroys the Law. There is no 
existence wholly outside of this Symbolic order. 
Like the death of his parents that Bruce repeatedly reenacts in memory, however, 
Batman’s death is not contained to a single time or place; unlike his parents, however, Bruce 
literally returns to the realm of the living as a physical presence rather than as mere memory. His 
heart begins to beat again after he is buried, Robin digs him up, and he gathers the Mutant gang 
plus Robin to him in what was once the Batcave (figure 1.6).  
 
Figure 1.6: Bruce Wayne’s “good life” (Miller 199). 
In a paternalistic move, Bruce passes on care of Gotham City to his followers: “Here, in the 
endless cave, far past the burnt remains of a crimefighter whose time has passed… it begins 
here— an army— to bring sense to a world plagued by worse than thieves and murderers… This 
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will be a good life… Good enough” (199). This “embracing” of life at the end of the text occurs 
only after the metaphorical death of Batman, revealing the fluidity between normally fixed 
boundaries—a fluidity, as we have seen, that characterizes this figure. He can be life and death, 
justice and revenge, past, present, and future, all in a single body.  
This embracing of life, however, presents a fundamental problem with Miller’s depiction 
of Bruce Wayne’s resurrection. If Batman has both defeated the Law of the Father and, in dying, 
acknowledged that there is no existing outside of that Law, then in what way can he come back 
to life? Miller’s Bruce Wayne seems to have given up the Batman persona, and thus given up the 
split in his identities and desires. Yet hiding in the cave sending others into Gotham to do the 
“dirty work” of cleaning the city still constitutes a split between public and private spheres, and 
Gotham still remains as the figure that eternally needs rescuing. Bruce thus remains within the 
same divided structures against which he spent the entire narrative struggling. Moreover, in 
drawing attention to Batman’s fluid relationship to normally fixed binary divisions, the text’s 
ending becomes equally fluid. Perhaps Batman is dead and Bruce will remain below ground, or 
perhaps he will return to the mask and reenter the world. Like the bat escaping or breaking in to 
Bruce’s life, the significance of the text’s ending is not “which option will Batman choose?” but 
the co-existence of these options. 
 
“What Do You Think I am? Crazy?”: Reason and Madness in The Killing Joke 
 While Batman is himself a figure of multiplicity, his many subject positions are also 
externalized through the villains he encounters. In Alan Moore and Brian Bollard’s The Killing 
Joke (1988), the figure of the Joker, with his violent actions and philosophical meanderings, 
actually reveals aspects of Batman’s psyche as well his own. The Joker’s connection to desire, 
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memory, and time brings the complexities of individual trauma to the foreground. Unlike Bruce 
Wayne, however, the Joker is not split in two through his trauma, but rather liberated to seek his 
desires with abandon. The Joker’s modus operandi is generally constructed as the use of fear, 
panic, chaos, and wanton destruction based not on some ideological or political stance, but rather 
out of pure pleasure for the acts themselves. Where the Batman is the embodied desire for the 
Law, or the need for rule, order, and rigidity, the Joker is the embodiment of chaos and panic. 
Thus the two characters are often each other’s antithesis; however, they are equally frequently 
the other’s complement.  
The Joker’s villainy reflects the similarities between himself and the Batman, revealing 
the moral and psychological ambiguity embedded within the text. While the Joker invokes 
madness as the paradoxically reasonable response to trauma, Batman’s tenacious hold on order 
speaks to his need to maintain his agency. Moreover, in its depiction of the female body through 
the violated figure of Barbara Gordon, the text furthers the notion of feminine passivity and 
masculine agency that so defines Batman and his masochistic desires. The Killing Joke renders 
the feminine body as visible (unmasked) spaces of violence, foregrounding the ways in which 
both the superhero genre and visuality itself are bound up in gendered constructions of violence 
and trauma.  
The Killing Joke begins with the Joker, having recently escaped from The Elizabeth 
Arkham Asylum for the Criminally Insane, shooting police commissioner Jim Gordon’s daughter 
Barbara and kidnapping Gordon, taking him to his recently-acquired abandoned carnival. Acting 
on the double premise that one (very, very) bad day can drive a person mad, and that madness is 
the only way in which the world makes sense, the Joker tries to induce Jim Gordon to madness 
through physical and psychological torture, particularly by showing him photographs of his 
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daughter’s naked, dying body. Jim Gordon does not go mad, however, and Batman arrives in 
time to chase the Joker through the carnival and capture him. Interspersed with these scenes are 
flashbacks to the Joker’s own “origin story” as Moore conceives it: a single day during which his 
wife and unborn baby are killed in a freak accident, and then he in turn is horribly maimed in a 
chemical accident during a robbery gone bad. 
 The Killing Joke tells the Joker’s origin story through a series of flashbacks colored in 
black, red, and white, in contrast with the multicolored panels of the narrative’s present. Each of 
these flashback scenes also features a series of panel transitions, in which the first panel of one 
scene visually mirrors or repeats the last panel of the previous scene. For example, the first 
flashback ends with the unnamed man who will become the Joker reaching for his wife; the next 
panel (in color) depicts the Joker reaching for his reflection in the Laughing Clown machine at 
the carnival (figure 1.7). This series of almost filmic transitions from flashback to present or 
vice-versa, in which characters in the present mimic the poses in the flashbacks, makes a visible 
seam between temporalities.  
 
Figure 1.7: The use of color and mirroring to reify shifting temporalities. 
The use of color in this text thus acts as a visual code for a temporal shift, making time 
itself visible and emphasizing the possibilities for a visually centered understanding of trauma. 
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For example, in another instance we see the Joker hold his head in his hands in despair, and then 
Jim Gordon holding his head in exactly the same pose. These transitions underscore the 
importance of time’s fluidity: the mirrored panels draw attention to the act of stitching together 
time within the text; rather than smoothing out time, the text seams it up. This visual echoing and 
the tangible presence of time do not mean the characters are exact doubles, but that certain 
aspects and emotional responses between characters and moments mirror one another. 
 This mirrored status occurs even at the beginning of the text, before the Joker appears. 
The opening panels of this work depict concentric circles of raindrops falling on the concrete, a 
geometric motif that recurs throughout the text (figure 1.8). These circles are the visual echoes of 
a target ring, coupled with the visual signifier of all kinds of other sensory aspects: the sound of 
falling rain, the chill in the air, even the smell of rain on the pavement. These drops are right in 
front of Arkham Asylum, which houses some of Gotham’s worst villains (Two-Face makes a 
brief appearance in a cell, for example). The concentric circles of rain are thus allied with not 
only nature but also the asylum and the chaos within that it attempts and continually fails to keep 
at bay.  
 
Figure 1.8: symbolic geometry: circles and lines in The Killing Joke. 
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As the Batmobile pulls up in front of the Asylum, its headlights shine through the rain, 
forming strong geometric lines that are juxtaposed with those concentric circles of rain; these 
lines create an immediate contrast between Batman and his need for order and linearity on the 
one hand, and nature, chaos, and the Asylum on the other. However, closer inspection of these 
images reveals that linear drops of rain form the circles, and the linear light beams shine from 
round headlights; thus even in their apparent contrast the Batman and Joker contain elements of 
the other’s geometric pattern. Thus the apparent contrast between linearity and circularity breaks 
down, and, as we will see with the ambiguous ending to the text, this breakdown demonstrates 
both Batman’s and the Joker’s positions outside of the Law. 
 Despite their many similarities, however, the Joker is clearly a villain, in part due to his 
love of chaos and destruction, and in part because he refuses to try to reinsert himself into the 
dominant social structures, choosing instead to remain in madness. As he begins to torture Jim 
Gordon at the carnival, the Joker takes a surprisingly Proustian view of the role of memory in 
madness and sanity:  
Remembering’s dangerous. I find the past such a worrying, anxious place. [...] Memory’s 
so treacherous. One moment you’re lost in a carnival of delights, with poignant childhood 
aromas, the flashing neon of puberty, all that sentimental candy floss... The next, it leads 
you somewhere you don’t want to go... Somewhere dark and cold, filled with the damp, 
ambiguous shapes of things you’d hoped were forgotten. Memories can be vile, repulsive 
little brutes. Like children, I suppose. Haha. But can we live without them? Memories are 
what our reason is based upon. If we can’t face them, we deny reason itself! [...] So when 
you find yourself locked onto an unpleasant train of thought, heading for the places in 
your past where the screaming is unbearable, remember there’s always madness. 
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Madness is the emergency exit... you can just step outside, and close the door on all those 
dreadful things that happened. You can lock them away... forever.  
The Joker’s monologue is a knot of converging ideas and qualities about memory, reason, and 
representation. Memory, particularly involuntary memory, takes on a kind of agency, moving the 
holder as it will, and madness becomes the Joker’s only site of resisting memory itself. To reject 
reason, he says, is to reject memory and thereby avoid facing the cruelty of the past. 
Playing on the popular view of comics as juvenile, the Joker plays up the carnival aspect 
of memory as adolescent, but with a dark, cruel side. The aromas and tastes of childhood can 
return abruptly, unbidden, traveling through time to produce sensations in memory’s holder, but 
those sensations can turn to terror just as suddenly. Memory, according to the Joker, can be thus 
a sensory experience, similar to Proust’s tasting the tea and madeleine cookie and flying through 
time back to his childhood:  
But when from a long-distant past nothing subsists, after the people are dead, after the 
things are broken and scattered, taste and smell alone, more fragile but more enduring, 
more unsubstantial, more persistent, more faithful, remain poised a long time, like souls, 
remembering, waiting, hoping, amid the ruins of all the rest; and bear unflinchingly, in 
the tiny and almost impalpable drop of their essence, the vast structure of recollection. 
(Proust 63-64)  
The senses thus contain “the vast structure of recollection,” and can pull an individual through 
time and space into memory itself, “amid the ruins of all the rest.” And yet, the Joker notes that 
“memories are what our reason is based upon;” these very ties to the past, unbidden though they 
may be, also demand that the subject situate himself within a web of identification and within 
reason, language, and rule. It is this necessary process of identification that the Joker resists, 
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leaving madness as the alternative. 
 Throughout this diatribe the Joker’s minions lead the naked and terrified Gordon through 
the carnival to the Ghost Train ride, in what appears to be a literal enactment of the Joker’s 
monologue: Gordon is taken from the bright and garish, if terrifying, open air of the carnival to 
the even more terrifying Ghost Train, “dark and cold, filled with the damp, ambiguous shapes of 
things.” Having previously examined Batman’s traumatic past in The Dark Knight Returns, 
however, we can also draw a parallel between the Joker’s words and Batman’s experiences. Like 
the Joker, whose flashbacks pepper this text, Batman experiences “treacherous memory” which 
leads him back to his parents’ death and to the dark, ambiguous shape of the Bat.  
 Unlike the Joker, however, neither Gordon nor Moore’s Batman take madness as “the 
emergency exit.” Indeed, whatever his psychic and physical struggles, Batman resists madness. 
The Joker, meanwhile, has fulfilled his own prescription; he is cut free from the reason, despite 
his seemingly reasoned-out thoughts. In his disavowal of memory, the Joker has also disavowed 
any identity other than “the Joker.” He has no alter ego, no known identity (a constant since his 
introduction into the Batworld in Batman #1, 1940). And therefore it is precisely through Bruce 
Wayne’s insistent struggle to keep his two identities apart, as we have seen, that Batman keeps 
hold of his reason and does not become ideologically and psychically unmoored like the Joker. 
 The Killing Joke, however, undermines the Joker’s own arguments, as his memories 
return despite his rejection of reason and embrace of madness. The text proceeds to work against 
part of the Joker’s claims as the panels depicting the above monologue transition immediately to 
another one of the Joker’s memories, when he learns of his wife’s death. These panels do 
literalize the Joker’s characterization of memory as something dark, cold and ambiguous, 
through the use of the monochrome palette and heavy shadows covering faces, rendering them 
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nearly unidentifiable. On the other hand, the flashback’s very appearance in the text, and its use 
of the mirrored transition panels described earlier (here, the doors of the Ghost Train ride 
become the doors in the bar where the Joker is finalizing his robbery plans), indicate that the 
memory of his wife’s death has not been “locked away forever.” Instead this memory appears 
seemingly unbidden, and the temporal structure of comics allows for the near-simultaneity of 
that scene and the narrative’s present, further illustrating the futility of active repression. Despite 
his madness the Joker cannot fully escape his own memories, even if he does disavow them. 
Trauma and memory are here linked in an intricate web of the visible but unspeakable, the 
memories rejected by the character yet embraced by the text. To visualize memory and trauma is 
to be between visibility and invisibility, to see only a part of the whole. Speaking to the potential 
for comics to represent, in their state in-between, trauma and memory, The Killing Joke situates 
the Joker’s madness between images and temporalities.  
 Later, as he runs from Batman through the carnival attractions, the Joker asks Batman 
what happened in his past: “what is it with you? What made you what you are?” He then 
continues: “Something like [the crime he imagines for Batman’s origin] happened to me, you 
know. I... I’m not exactly sure what it was. Sometimes I remember it one way, sometimes 
another... If I’m going to have a past, I prefer it to be multiple choice!” In admitting this, the 
Joker puts the entire text into question: are the flashbacks to the Joker’s origins “true?” Or are 
they merely a version of the truth? The Joker’s very existence shows that the events themselves, 
in his case, matter less than their effects; it is ultimately not important how the Joker went mad, 
only that he did. Memory is indeed treacherous, as the Joker says, but not solely in the way he 
describes. Not only does The Killing Joke prove the Joker cannot “lock [memories] away 
forever,” it also proves that those memories are fallible, inconsistent, inherently fragile.  
44 
 
Moore and Bollard’s text parallels memory’s fragility with the female body, binding 
memory, passivity, and violence together in a knot of visual representation. In contrast with the 
Joker’s overwhelming verbosity throughout the comic, Barbara is mostly silent, a voiceless blank 
space on which violence and trauma become visible. Near the beginning of the work, the Joker 
shoots Barbara in the stomach, sending her crashing through a coffee table and landing her in the 
hospital for the remainder of the narrative (figure 1.9). 
 
Figure 1.9: The Joker shoots Barbara. 
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After shooting Barbara, the Joker launches into an extended metaphor / pun in which 
Barbara is a text to be read—and this is exactly what happens to her later, when the Joker uses a 
series of photographs of her body to torture her father. After shooting Barbara, which forces her 
to crash through the coffee table behind her, the Joker says: 
Please don’t worry. It’s a psychological complaint, common among ex-librarians. You 
see, she thinks she’s a coffee table edition... Mind you, I can’t say much for the volume’s 
condition. I mean, there’s a hole in the jacket and the spine appears to be damaged. [...] 
Frankly, she won’t be walking off the shelves in that state of repair. In fact, the idea of 
her walking anywhere seems increasingly remote. But then, that’s always a problem with 
softbacks.  
The female body thus becomes a text on which the narrative of violence, madness, and trauma is 
written. Moreover the female body is a material object whose value lies not in its content—after 
all, the plot of the “book” goes unmentioned in the Joker’s metaphor—but in its appearance, its 
physical condition, and its value as an object of collection. To be an object of the gaze is thus to 
be a victim of violence, a space on which violence is written—but this written narrative of 
violence is of less importance than the appearance of the object itself.  
The female body thus functions differently than the hypermasculine bodies of Batman 
and Jim Gordon. While the Joker does torture Jim Gordon, and humiliates him by stripping him 
naked and chaining him up, the Joker intends for this violence to have a specific psychological 
effect (figure 1.10).  
46 
 
 
Figure 1.10: Jim Gordon’s active, masculine body in contrast with Barbara’s passive body in pieces. 
The sight of Jim’s masculine body is not that of an image of passive victimhood, but of a 
resistant body echoing Jim’s resisting mind. Barbara, meanwhile, becomes multiple images, her 
body framed and broken into many different pieces for the viewer of the Joker’s photographs. 
The many images of Barbara’s broken body find an echo in the multiple viewers of her 
photographs: Jim, the Joker, the Joker’s camera, and the reader all partake in the network of 
vision that establishes Barbara as an object of the gaze, whose body is not an active site of 
resistance but a blank space, where violence and trauma become the narrative that speaks for and 
through her. 
 Physical violence thus occurs on the feminine body, leaving Barbara to be nothing more 
than an image to be looked at, a book to be collected but not read. The Joker’s attack on Barbara 
leaves her likely paralyzed from the bullet passing through her spine, thereby rendering her 
nearly motionless for the remainder of the narrative. When Batman wakes her up in the hospital, 
she is in a state of panic: “It’s not okay! He’s... he’s taking it to the limit this time... You didn’t 
see. You didn’t see his eyes” (figure 1.11).  
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Figure 1.11: Barbara as passive witness to her own suffering. 
As she says this, the panel contains a close-up of her face, tears spilling from her wide, blue eyes, 
which are the central focal point of the panel. The horror of all she has encountered is therefore 
bound up in the act of looking, as she is forced to witness her own suffering. Her body, 
meanwhile, cannot respond, act, or resist in any way; she must rely on Batman for vengeance 
and justice. However, she accuses Batman of not being able to see, of being unable to witness 
and therefore unable to understand the Joker’s madness.  
 Thus the Joker’s senseless violence draws our attention to the total passivity of the female 
body in the text, which is in direct contrast with Batman’s hyper-masculine, yet paradoxically 
blinded, agency. Indeed, immediately following this moment Batman travels around Gotham 
interrogating all the criminals he can find in order to discover the Joker’s location. Barbara, 
meanwhile, is doubly confined: first to the hospital bed, and secondly within the frames of the 
photographs the Joker displays in order to torture Jim. She becomes purely a visual object, inert 
and passive (note: even though her image causes pain in Jim Gordon, it does so precisely 
because she has been rendered as an inert image; therefore even the agency one might want to 
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restore to her as the one who provokes a reaction from Jim is undone), and although she is one of 
the catalysts for Batman’s entry into the search for the Joker, any agency she may conceptually 
have in that position is cancelled out by her total incapacitation.  
Barbara thus comes to function in a similar way to Bruce’s mother Martha in Morrison 
and McKean’s Arkham Asylum and Nolan’s film trilogy. That is, Barbara Gordon, Martha 
Wayne, and even to a certain extent Catwoman / Selina Kyle, are all passive figures who, like 
Gotham City herself, are “damsels in distress” whom Batman wants to “rescue.” Thus it is 
through the female figure that Batman remains entrenched in his network of desires, as the 
violence written on their bodies continually prompts Batman into action. The female body 
becomes a site of trauma and violence, a space onto which men write the struggle between 
heroism and villainy, justice and crime.  
 
Batman and Bates: Arkham Asylum: A Serious House on Serious Earth 
 Grant Morrison and Dave McKean’s Arkham Asylum: A Serious House on Serious Earth 
(1989) follows close on the heels of The Dark Knight Returns and The Killing Joke both 
chronologically and thematically, and it takes the violence and madness of those earlier texts to 
an even more horrific level. In a thin but convenient plot line that allows for a veritable 
procession of some of the Gotham City’s best-known villains, the Joker leads the inmates of 
Arkham Asylum in a coup, holding the staff hostage until Batman agrees to enter the asylum and 
fight its residents one by one. 
 This story arc is interspersed with a second narrative, that of Amadeus Arkham, the 
asylum’s founder, and his experiences between 1901 and 1921. Arkham believes the family 
home is cursed after he and his mother both suffer from hallucinations of a large bat that haunts 
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the house and leads his mother to suicide. However, through a series of flashbacks, Arkham’s 
diary reveals that he actually killed his mother and then repressed the memory until one of his 
inmate-patients escapes and viciously murders Arkham’s wife and daughter. Traumatized anew, 
Arkham falls further into madness, eventually ending up incarcerated in the very asylum that he 
founded, where he apparently casts a spell to contain the evil spirit of the bat that haunted him 
and his mother. Dr. Cavendish, the present director of the asylum, finds Arkham’s journals and 
believes Batman is the evil spirit incarnate; taking it upon himself to finish Arkham’s work, the 
final scenes reveal that Cavendish organized the inmate’s rebellion in an effort to contain and 
defeat Batman. 
 Clearly, then, this text’s primary occupations are with issues of trauma, temporality, and 
cyclicality. Madness and horror are embodied in McKean’s distinctive artwork, in the page 
layouts, and in the letterings used. The art—which is, according to then-DC/Vertigo director 
Karen Berger, a mix of graphite and painting along with mixed media like “photography, 
sculpting, [and] an assemblage of odd objects” (“Afterword”)—is disorienting in its abstraction. 
Perspective and scale are fluid, and the blurry, shadowed figures are simultaneously recognizable 
and alienating, creating a sense of the uncanny within each panel. For example, the Joker still 
bears his trademark green hair, white skin, and disturbing crimson grin; yet McKean varies these 
features from panel to panel—in some moments the Joker’s smile takes up almost his entire face, 
while at others his eyes dominate, and at still others extreme lighting or shadow erase most of his 
facial features (figure 1.12). This shifting artwork effectively undermines the reader’s familiarity 
with the characters and makes reading a more challenging task.  
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Figure 1.12: The Joker’s different faces and distinctive lettering. 
Gaspar Saladino’s extraordinary lettering also disorients and challenges the reader. He uses a 
distinct font or color for many of the characters, from the beautifully ordered and conventional 
diary entries of Arkham that belie the madness underneath his words, to the electric blue, Greek-
inspired speech of the villain Zeus. The Joker’s speech (pictured above), bright red and full of 
splatters, borders on illegible and reflects not only his violence and madness but also his position 
outside of reason and the Symbolic order; that is, language no longer visually functions as it does 
for the other characters. Moreover his speech is not contained within conventional bubbles, as is 
the case with the other characters, but instead scrawls across panels unrestrained. 
Batman’s speech is white on a black background, indicating his presumed order and 
control—that is, his “black and white” view of the world, and the rigid morality against which 
the Joker, with his wild and uncontrollable language and actions, continually pushes—as well as 
his position as exception (his speech is a literal inversion of the “normal” minor characters’, 
which is the conventional black on a white background). However, Arkham Asylum soon 
undermines this alleged control: when Batman tells the Joker “I don’t take orders from you” and 
tries to refuse the Joker’s demand to participate in a perverted game of “hide and seek” with the 
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inmates, the Joker shoots one of the hostages and threatens to shoot Dr. Ruth Adams, pushing 
Batman to play the game and run through the halls of the asylum. Like Barbara Gordon in The 
Killing Joke, the female body is both passive impetus for Batman’s action and space for the 
possibility of violence. However, Arkham Asylum presents a second, alternative vision in which 
Batman himself becomes a feminized body, thanks in part to the way the space of the asylum 
itself functions. 
The space of the asylum underscores Batman’s position in between law and criminality, 
and between enjoyment and compulsion. Arkham Asylum is a liminal space both temporally and 
spatially, which allows Batman to act out his violent desires under the guise of the Law in a 
place where legality is suspended (after all, he enters the asylum because the police cannot). Yet 
his entry into this literal and psychological space can also be a mark of his darker, desires, which 
bring him closer to the asylum precisely because he mimics those whom he seeks to defeat. Just 
as the Joker can indeed force Batman to act, so Batman is equally susceptible to the space of the 
asylum itself, whose supposed purpose is to simultaneously contain and rehabilitate those gone 
mad. 
However, this is Arkham Asylum, a space with agency, and a history of both causing and 
containing madness. The violence of madness within its walls is a violence whose temporal 
aspects are unmoored, reflecting the temporal dimensions of trauma itself. Within the confines of 
the asylum, time is an abstraction and a condensation, a reality and an impossibility; that is, time 
functions within the asylum in a way similar to that of the traumatized subject, who is suspended 
between past and present. The two narrative arcs demonstrate the fluidity of time within the 
space of the asylum, as thematic, symbolic, and narrative elements repeat and recur, cut free 
from their conventional temporal restraints.  
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The Joker’s grand entrance into the asylum as he accompanies Batman demonstrates this 
temporal unmooring (figure 1.13). As he pushes the doors open, he says, “You’re in the real 
world now, and the lunatics have taken over the asylum. ‘April sweet is coming in....’” The 
following page is a splash page, on which the artwork bleeds all the way to the edge of the page. 
The central image is of the Joker grandiosely gesturing over a group of inmates seated in a 
dining room, but the accompanying panels of esoteric images and references—including the Star 
of David and a clock face—render the scene barely comprehensible. While certainly each of the 
images holds significance, their individual meanings (or possible meanings) take a secondary 
position to the overwhelming and erratic effect of their cumulation. The uneven, nearly 
unintelligible speech of the inmates adds to the chaotic and disorienting impression of the page. 
The lack of uniform panels and the complicated abstract images create the feeling that the order 
and organization of the “outside” no longer applies here “inside.”  
 
Figure 1.13: “Let the Feast of Fools begin!” 
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Indeed, although one panel on this page depicts a part of a clock face with Roman numerals 
marking time, the clock’s appearance here is not to indicate time’s passage but rather its 
existence. Like the mirrored transitions in The Killing Joke, the appearance of timekeeping 
devices here brings our attention to the seam of time, or time’s abstraction and lack of linearity. 
In fact many of the violent events in Arkham Asylum occur on April 1, from the present-day 
inmates’ coup to the deaths of Arkham’s mother and, later, his wife and daughter. Time and 
space thus thicken into something like Bakhtin’s chronotope, so the asylum becomes a space in 
which conventional time condenses, pauses, and takes on agency (Bakhtin 84-85). The house is a 
place of nightmares, where dream-time becomes a real, lived temporality as the narrative itself 
moves back and forth between moments in the present and the past. 
Amadeus Arkham’s journals, and his recovery of his repressed memory, further 
complicates the space of the asylum as not only a place of horror, but a place of violence on the 
female or feminized body. When Arkham enters the building on April 1, 1921, he finds the 
bodies of his wife and daughter, murdered at the hands of his former patient, “Mad Dog” 
Hawkins. As Arkham encounters the gruesome scene, he “finds it all to be perfectly rational,” 
and then “almost idly, I wonder where [his daughter’s] head is. And the I look at the doll’s 
house. And the doll’s house. Looks. At. Me.” The panels depicting this revelation depict an 
exchange of gazes between Arkham and the doll’s house; Arkham does not merely look at the 
doll’s house, but the object of the gaze returns that gaze back to the subject (figure 1.14).  
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Figure 1.14: “And the doll’s house. Looks. At. Me.” 
The daughter’s face is framed within the doll’s house, itself framed within small panels, so the 
horror of her death takes up the entire space-in-miniature of the house itself. While the daughter 
becomes a doll, an object, she also seems to become the house itself, an object with agency. This 
exchange of gazes between Arkham and the house is a moment of “slow time” similar to Bruce 
Wayne’s flashbacks in The Dark Knight Returns. As a cuckoo clock strikes—again, marking 
time’s existence, not necessarily its linear progression—the panels alternately “zoom in” on the 
clock and between the eyes of Arkham and his daughter. The clock therefore marks time and 
Amadeus Arkham’s move into madness as he “goes cuckoo.” 
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Figure 1.15: “Perfectly, perfectly rational.” 
After his daughter’s death, Arkham puts on his mother’s wedding dress “and I kneel 
down in that nursery abattoir. It all seems perfectly rational. Perfectly, perfectly rational” (figure 
1.15). The visual motif of blood-soaked lace appears here, signifying the violence enacted on the 
female body, but also, as we learn during the revelation of his mother’s murder, of Arkham’s 
taking on the feminine, victimized position. At one point earlier in the text he notes that the 
Japanese clownfish have the ability to change sex from male to female when the dominant 
female dies. If Arkham’s mother is the dominant female, when he kills her while wearing her 
dress, it is as if he also changes sex to replace the mother. Therefore when his daughter dies, he 
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again puts on the dress, and becomes simultaneously the victimized female body, and the body 
with agency, the body that can look back.  
The miniature doll’s house is thus a visual repetition of the larger house metaphorically 
filled with the horror of death—specifically female death. As Arkham wanders the house in an 
ever-worsening state of madness, the house becomes increasingly more active: “I feel that I have 
become an essential part of some incomprehensible biological process. The house is an 
organism, hungry for madness. It is the maze that dreams. And I am lost.” Arkham thus not only 
figures the house as a living organism, even though this “life” springs from death, but also 
conceptualizes this organism’s agency in reproductive terms.  
The house therefore becomes a perversely maternal space, giving birth to Arkham’s 
madness, and ultimately revealing to him, in a moment of Proustian involuntary memory, his 
own past: “And suddenly, the longed-for revelation comes, in the form of a memory my mind 
had suppressed.” Arkham then recalls that one year prior to his wife and daughter’s murders, he 
killed his own mother in an effort to “save” her from the apparition of a giant bat. He literally re-
members in these panels the body he dismembered in the first place, and then conflates the space 
of the house with his own life and life force: “I understand now what memory tried to keep from 
me. Madness is born in the blood. It is my birthright. My inheritance. My destiny.” Arkham then 
becomes incarcerated within the asylum he founded, the prison of his own making, in which he 
attempts to control the “spirits” in the house. 
Arkham’s position is, then, a figure between sexes, between victim and perpetrator, 
between reason and madness, between memories and the present. Grant Morrison’s narrative 
makes clear Arkham’s symbolic echoes with Batman, the ultimate liminal figure in the Batworld, 
whose state of heroic exception is also a state of traumatic exception, and whose masochistic 
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enjoyment of pain is a symptom of his compulsive need to battle this trauma. It is no 
coincidence, then, that the catalyst for Batman’s entry into the Joker’s game is a gun, a phallic 
weapon responsible for the violence enacted on the body of Bruce Wayne’s mother; the image of 
the weapon involuntarily triggers Batman’s memory of his parents’ death, like the sight of 
Arkham’s daughter triggers the beginning of his descent into madness, and that madness in turn 
triggers the memory of his matricide. 
Batman’s flashback covers four full pages, and over the first two, the panels alternate 
between memory and present as Batman confronts himself in a mirror while remembering the 
night of his parents’ murder. We see Bruce Wayne and his parents in front of a movie theater, 
whose marquee reads “Bambi,” as Bruce’s mother admonishes him for crying during the movie: 
“How dare you embarrass me in that way, Bruce! It’s only a movie, for God’s sake! It’s not 
real.” The next flashback panel shows a very young Bruce with a bright white tear coming from 
his eye, as a hand points accusingly at him; above his head floats an image from Bambi of the 
baby deer curled next to his mother. Martha Wayne’s admonishment continues: “Bruce, I’m 
warning you! If you don’t stop crying and act like a grown-up, I’m leaving you right here.” The 
following panels echo those final words—“leaving you right here”—as Batman stares at his 
reflection and then violently smashes the glass, while his memory continues to interrupt this 
sequence. The mugger shoots his father, and as Batman picks up a large shard of glass, the 
mugger then tears the pearls from his mother’s neck.  
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Figure 1.16: flashback to the Waynes’ death. 
In Morrison’s retelling of this Batman’s origins, Bruce Wayne feels guilt for his parents’ deaths, 
since his emotional reaction to Bambi has forced the family to leave the cinema early. The 
mugger’s attack on the Waynes is a realization of Bruce’s fear of his mother’s death, which the 
(here untold) story of Bambi first enacts. Thus the trauma of Martha Wayne’s death is fully 
unmoored from linear temporality, as the mother is killed first in the film, then in reality; 
moreover, Martha’s admonishment that she will “leave him right here” becomes literal with her 
death a moment later. 
However, instead of seeing the gunshot that kills her, as the panel depicting Thomas 
Wayne’s death does, Batman instead stabs himself through the hand with the glass shard he just 
picked up from the smashed mirror (figure 1.17). Batman’s wounding of his hand is not only an 
act of self-flagellation for the guilt he feels at having put his parents in the situation that results in 
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their death. It is also a way for him to both return to and mitigate the pain of loss: “I’m leaving 
you right here,” the refrain of this scene, is not merely a parental threat but a prophecy fulfilled 
moments later at the hands of the muggers. Like “Mad Dog” Hawkins, who, while in treatment, 
wounds himself “just to feel something,” so Batman wounds himself to feel physically the 
psychic wound of the loss of his mother—a loss that, should he express it in words or tears, 
would be an act of disobedience to his mother’s final words to “stop crying and act like a grown-
up.” Wounding his body and spilling his blood thus aligns Batman with the female victims of 
violence in this text: Arkham’s mother, wife, and daughter, whose bodies are all cut into pieces. 
 
Figure 1.17: Batman’s self-wounding. 
The self-wounding serves as the punctuation to the flashback, and on the following pages 
a series of nearly wordless panels makes this moment of self-torture slow down, similar to the 
“slow time” of the Waynes’ death in The Dark Knight Returns and Arkham’s discovery of his 
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daughter’s head in the doll’s house. Indeed, the similarities between Batman’s flashback and 
Arkham’s moment of trauma furthers the fluidity of time: within the chronology of the narrative, 
Arkham’s experience occurs before Batman’s; but within the text, the reader encounters 
Batman’s flashback first. Thus the text itself mimics the temporal disorientation of the traumatic 
experience. 
This mimicry extends in the “slow time” representation of Batman’s self-inflicted 
wounding. The first three panels show the slow movement of the blade through Batman’s hand, 
followed by panels alternating between drops of blood splashing in a pool and Batman 
withdrawing the blade, grimacing in pain and then staggering down a hall. In the final panel, the 
blurry silhouette of Batman says “Mommy?” Turning the page, the first panel the reader 
confronts depicts Norman Bates from Alfred Hitchcock’s Psycho, making clear the link between 
the violence and blood enacted on Martha Wayne, Mrs. Bates, and Arkham’s mother and 
daughter, and the men who then take their places in self-inflicted torture. 
Morrison and McKean thus transform Batman from a figure of order and rule to a 
dreamlike figure of unstable identities, who belongs as much to the space of horror and madness 
as he does to the position of heroic exception. Batman’s traumatic experience as it is represented 
here keeps him trapped in a compulsive cycle of repression and involuntary resurfacing. Because 
he cannot “work through” this trauma in the conventional sense—again, to do so would be to 
violate his mother’s final command—Batman is destined to repeat it, much as the space of the 
asylum is destined to remain a space of feminized horror. This text thus resists the notion of 
Batman “working through” his trauma, that problematic notion that Miller’s Dark Knight 
Returns posits in its conclusion. Arkham Asylum instead asks the reader to linger along with 
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Batman inside the asylum, the space of madness, memory, and trauma, without resolving its 
questions of violence and representation. 
Indeed, the text remains somewhat ambiguous at its ending as it resists easy 
categorization of hero and villain, as does The Killing Joke. Dr. Cavendish, the asylum’s current 
director, reveals himself as the mastermind behind the inmates’ coup, since he found Arkham’s 
journals and believes Batman is the bat-spirit that haunts Arkham and his mother. Dr. Ruth 
Adams kills Dr. Cavendish, and Batman’s reaction to his death—“he got what he deserved”—at 
first appears to be a violation of one of the major tenets of the Batworld, namely, that Batman 
abhors killing. However, as some critics have noted, Batman’s earliest stories are much more 
morally ambiguous than his later strict ethical code; in his very first appearance, he throws a 
criminal into a vat of acid and says this death is “a fitting end of his kind” (DC #33), a line that 
Morrison’s Batman echoes here.  
Thus Morrison and McKean not only take Batman to a more horrifying level than earlier 
texts and move him to a visual and psychological ambiguity, they also return him to his earlier 
state of moral ambiguity. In the notes accompanying the fifteenth anniversary edition of Arkham 
Asylum, Morrison says, “I wanted to approach Batman from the point of the dreamlike, 
emotional, and irrational hemisphere, as a response to the very literal, ‘realistic,’ ‘left-brain’ 
treatment of superheroes which was in vogue at the time, in the wake of The Dark Knight 
Returns, Watchmen, and others.” More than this, however, the text underscores the blurred line 
between madness and reason that began in The Killing Joke. The Joker’s parting words to 
Batman—“Enjoy yourself out there. In the Asylum. Just don’t forget—if it ever gets too tough... 
there’s always a place for you here”—reinforce this liminal and ambiguous position of Batman, 
as the spaces of madness and reason become inverted. Inside the asylum, Batman can endlessly 
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enact his compulsion to assert his masculinity in an attempt to square his desires with the social 
demands of the world outside of the asylum.  
 
Christopher Nolan’s Resurrected and Recycled Batman 
 The recent Batman films directed by Christopher Nolan— Batman Begins (2005), The 
Dark Knight (2008), and The Dark Knight Rises (2012)—are immense popular and financial 
successes that, in contrast with Morrison’s work, return to the “left-brain,” “literal” approach to 
the Batworld (Morrison). As Will Brooker discusses extensively in Hunting the Dark Knight, 
Nolan’s films posture themselves as franchise “reboots,” erasing the earlier critical and popular 
failures directed by Joel Schumacher (Batman Forever, 1995, and Batman & Robin, 1997) while 
improving on the dark cinematic tradition begun in Tim Burton’s lauded Batman (1989) and 
Batman Returns (1992).  
Just as Frank Miller’s The Dark Knight Returns covers up the silliness and camp,8 to a 
certain extent, of the earlier comic books and Adam West show, fans and critics alike frequently, 
and nearly obsessively, credit Nolan’s films with wiping the slate “clean” of the ludicrous and 
ridiculous Schumacher films, returning Batman to his grittier, darker past. Taking on the 
structure of the return through patterns of resurrection and falling, similar to those in Miller’s 
The Dark Knight Returns, Nolan’s films engage with Batman’s struggles with his past and his 
repeated, compulsive desire to fight injustice and save Gotham City; in their depictions of this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Although I am aware of the reclaiming of “camp” in queer studies, and in the reappropriation of 
the campy Batman and his relationship with Robin, I use the term here to draw attention to the 
ways in which the Nolan films try to erase that same campiness, instead reinscribing Batman 
into heteronormativity, just like Miller’s The Dark Knight Returns does. That is, Nolan’s films 
attempt to cover up not only Schumacher’s terrible and campy films, but they also attempt to 
cover up Batman’s own queerness. 
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desire, however, the films actually hearken back to the problematic depictions of desire in 
Arkham Asylum.  
I consider the Nolan films as a trilogy; while each film certainly can stand alone, they 
belong to the same discursive reality, and since they refer to and build upon one another, certain 
elements deepen and take on new meaning when the films are considered as parts of a cohesive 
unit. I also recognize that the technical and formal aspects of film are vastly different to those of 
the comics medium, and therefore, certain formal structures function differently (for example: 
framing, diegesis, and perhaps most pertinently timing and layout). However, as these films now 
stand as the texts to redefine Batman for a larger contemporary audience, they contribute to the 
current understanding of the Batman figure and hint at the dangers of the culteral imagination 
that produces not only the Batworld, but the superhero genre more broadly. 
The three films follow a certain pattern of movement: the first and third films, in their 
long series of exchanges between resurrection and fall, demonstrate Bruce Wayne’s struggle 
with both his (traumatic) past and his political and psychic desires. The second film, meanwhile, 
is more preoccupied with Batman’s “state of exception” and his struggle to remain precisely in 
that liminal space of paradoxically being included through his exclusion from the law— a space, 
as the two other films show, which is afforded him precisely through his personal traumatic 
experiences and a complicated network of proscribed desires.9 Functioning like Agamben’s 
sovereign who exists in a state of exception, Nolan’s Batman remains outside the regular social 
and political hierarchy. This section traces the ways in which the first two films serve to establish 
Bruce Wayne’s various forms of struggle with his desires as he seeks to remain the exception, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Even Bruce Wayne’s domestic spaces of the narratives follow this pattern, with the first and 
third taking place in Wayne Manor, family home and place of legacy, while the second has 
Bruce living in a penthouse in Gotham proper, “the safest place in Gotham,” a place, again, of 
exception.)   
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while the third film attempts to reconcile those desires through a kind of self-realization and, 
ultimately, a fallacy of a “clean slate” from which Bruce Wayne can begin life anew.  
That is, the trilogy attempts to sanitize Bruce’s trauma in two ways: by presenting the 
death of his parents as grief, fear, and loss rather than trauma as such, and additionally 
demonstrating Bruce’s consciousness and willingness to work around those emotions; and by re-
inscribing Bruce into dominant heteronormative ideology wiped clean of political implications 
by the end of the third film. Accordingly, the death of Thomas Wayne is necessary in order for 
Bruce to assert his own subjectivity. Martha Wayne’s life and death, meanwhile, allows Gotham 
City to take her place as both a maternal object and an object of desire, as the city simultaneously 
creates and comforts Batman, yet still needs protection (a position Selina Kyle / Catwoman fills 
at the trilogy’s end). Thus the ultimately Oedipal and conservative project of these films 
becomes clear, as the political and public acts of the Batman are subsumed in the private 
struggles of Bruce Wayne.  
Batman Begins, from its very title, posits itself as a reimagining of the entire Batman 
franchise, and the opening sequences reinforce that notion. The film opens with a scene featuring 
a young Bruce Wayne falling into a well, injuring himself, and consequently being attacked by 
the bats nesting below the earth. There is an abrupt cut to an adult Bruce Wayne (Christian Bale) 
snapping his eyes open, having apparently dreamed of this traumatic childhood moment. Like 
Miller, then, Nolan envisions a Bruce Wayne who is not only traumatized but who has 
experienced two “origin scenes,” two scenes of trauma that return to haunt his adult life. 
Compare this with the opening sequence of Schumacher’s Batman Forever, in which heavy 
orchestral music accompanies short, choppy shots of various iterations of the Bat-symbol, 
Batman suiting up, and entering his overly phallic and fantastic Batmobile: the focus here is on 
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Batman as icon, not Bruce Wayne as individual; on spectacle, not narrative. In the opening of 
Batman Begins, meanwhile, the Bat-symbol occurs only fleetingly in a sequence immediately 
preceding the initial well scene, as thousands of bats fly across the screen and eventually 
coalesce into a vague Bat-symbol, only to immediately dissolve again. Right from the beginning, 
the film’s focus is not the icon, but the individual. 
The film follows this individual, Bruce Wayne, as he lives among criminals and 
ultimately trains with Ra’s al Ghul’s (played by Ken Wantanabe) League of Shadows in order to 
learn how to conquer his fear of the criminals of Gotham City. But when the League reveals its 
plan to raze Gotham, Wayne instead burns the League’s monastic training facility and returns to 
the city to fight criminality and injustice there. Once home he, with the help of his butler Alfred 
(Michael Caine), creates the Batman persona, battles the corrupt Gotham police force while 
enlisting the help of “good cop” Lieutenant Jim Gordon (Gary Oldman), takes on a mob boss, 
fights the Scarecrow (Cillian Murphy) and his terror-inducing toxin, and ultimately saves 
Gotham from complete destruction at the hands of the “resurrected” Ra’s al Guhl, revealed to be 
Bruce’s erstwhile League of Shadows mentor and surrogate father-figure, Henri Ducard (Liam 
Neeson). 
The depiction of the Waynes’ death in Batman Begins effectively moves what is 
elsewhere a traumatic event, as we have seen, into the realm of suffering rather than trauma as 
such. Instead of representing the death of Thomas and Martha Wayne as something 
incomprehensible, a psychic breaking point that uncontrollably resurfaces, Nolan’s Batman is 
fully aware of both his loss, and his emotional responses to that loss. He is so aware, in fact, that 
even as a child he can name his emotions and feel responsible for their deaths, saying “it was my 
fault. I made them leave the theater. If I hadn’t gotten scared...! I miss them, Alfred, I miss them 
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so much.” The young Bruce can verbalize both his feelings of guilt and his recognition of the 
absence now present in his life, as “missing” his parents necessarily construes an understanding 
of their absence. In the following scene, as he trains with Ducard, a now adult Bruce can more 
fully articulate his emotions, saying “my anger outweighs my guilt.” There is no unspeakability 
of trauma here, no unstated or misunderstood emotions, as there are in Morrison’s text discussed 
above. The films make Batman’s past legible and understandable. 
Bruce can also recognize his own fear stemming from these murders and from his earlier, 
more primal fear of the bats—a fear which, in turn, prompts the young Bruce to insist on the 
family leaving the theater, thus binding the fear of bats with the loss of his parents. When he 
nears the end of his training with the League of Shadows, Bruce Wayne must “breathe in his 
fears,” as Ducard / al Guhl asks him to inhale a hallucinogenic drug (figure 1.18).  
 
Figure 1.18: “Breathe in your fear;” the bats appear immediately after. 
The film intercuts the image of Wayne inhaling the smoke, eyes closed, with a very fast shot of 
the earlier CG bats and of the gun shooting his parents. Unlike the comics medium, where time 
functions both within the panels themselves and across the page as a larger unit, in film, time 
functions more or less equally for all viewers. That is, the film speed, largely dependent on the 
frames per second, or, in the digital era, dependent on the whim of the director and editors, 
ensures that the framed images of film present themselves to us sequentially and within a fixed 
temporal dimension.  
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Thus the ways in which film can represent trauma are vastly different from comics. (This 
is not to say one way is better or worse, or that film cannot represent trauma at all—there are 
quite a few excellent examples of the latter, like Michael Haneke’s 2005 film Cache.) Here, 
however, Bruce’s fears are presented to us as linear, logical, controllable—after all, the purpose 
of this hallucinogenic experience is so Wayne can “face his fears and learn to control them,” in 
order to fight injustice (an ideological project explored in more detail in McGowan’s The 
Fictional Christopher Nolan). Unlike the comics texts, in this film there is very little involuntary 
memory; instead Bruce actively chooses to remember his parents’ death, turning it into a 
controllable, comprehensible narrative. 
Batman Begins operates through a system of metaphorical and literal sequences of rising 
and falling, of pairings forming and dissolving, of elements first breaking down and then 
rebuilding—all of which signify Bruce’s struggles to articulate his own desires and his own 
subjectivity. One of the most literal instances of this cyclicality is the space of Wayne Manor. 
During a flashback near the beginning of the film, when he returns home for the parole hearing 
of his parents’ murderer, Bruce tells Alfred that the house “is a mausoleum; if I had my way I’d 
pull the damn thing down brick by brick.” Yet by the end of the film, after Ra’s al Guhl has 
burned Wayne Manor to the ground, Wayne determines to “rebuild it, just the way it was, brick 
for brick” (echoing, indeed, Batman’s repeated injunction in Miller’s The Dark Knight Returns, 
“this is a good life— good enough”). Bruce Wayne arrives at this new, more nostalgic, more 
messianic view of his own home, and by extension, his family legacy and his own role therein, 
precisely through his home’s destruction and his own active re-inscription within that space and 
legacy— after all, he intends to take this as “a good opportunity for improving the foundations,” 
as Alfred suggests, thereby ensuring a space for Batman in the old/new home.  
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This pattern repeats in various iterations throughout the film, and most of these instances 
involve Wayne’s Oedipal struggle to take his father’s place in Gotham City. Thomas Wayne 
appears to be a near-saintly doctor whose goal is to cure Gotham of its diseases, both literal and 
metaphorical. With Wayne Tower at the very center of Gotham, and the elevated train 
connecting all parts of the city to that tower, Thomas Wayne effectively refigured the Gotham 
skyline to reflect his wealth and his legacy. Batman Begins is thus a story not only of Bruce 
Wayne becoming the Dark Knight, but of a man establishing himself in relation to his father. 
Bruce apparently idolizes Thomas, who tellingly rescues him from the well he fell down, who 
comforts him and protects him, and whose death not only leaves a psychic and physical absence 
in Bruce’s life but also lends to endless comparisons of the son to the father. All of the 
flashbacks to Bruce’s childhood involve Thomas Wayne; he is the guiding force in Bruce’s life, 
the Law of the Father incarnate.  
The film thus pivots around a series of scenes in which Bruce/Batman falls and rises, dies 
and is resurrected, simultaneously destroys and saves himself, his family, and his city. Bruce 
Wayne attempts to take his father’s place, just as when he lowers himself into the well to 
discover the Batcave in a shot that visually mirrors the earlier scene of Thomas Wayne repelling 
down to retrieve the young Bruce. To list some more of these resurrection scenes: his rise from 
crouch to standing in a swarm of bats inside the Batcave; his return to Wayne Enterprises (as Mr. 
Earle says, “Bruce! You’re supposed to be dead!” to which Bruce responds, “sorry to 
disappoint”); his awakening in bed after a two-day fight to survive the Scarecrow’s poison, 
which occurs on his birthday, playing even further on the rebirth/resurrection theme, especially 
as Alfred offers him “many happy returns.” These references to resurrection create a sense in 
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which Bruce Wayne must assert his individuality, his new life as separate from his parents’ 
legacy. 
To escape this legacy, however, proves to be a destructive act. Crucially, Batman must 
destroy the elevated train, Thomas Wayne’s crowning achievement, in order to save Gotham 
from Ra’s al Guhl, who intends to ride the train into Wayne Tower and therefore destroy the 
entire city. According to McGowan, “Thomas views the public transportation system not only as 
a way to accomplish good ends with his wealth, but also a path to unity” within Gotham 
(Fictional 92). Thus when Batman destroys the train, and Ra’s al Guhl along with it, he also 
destroys a symbol of his father’s legacy. Moreover, he simultaneously ensures that Gotham will 
not be united, that the League will not establish its desired, and paradoxically violent, balance. In 
this destruction, then, Batman both asserts himself as a subject in the Symbolic order, as he tears 
down his father’s position and places himself therein, and also ensures his own resulting state of 
exception as the savior of Gotham. Once Bruce’s father’s legacy and his one-time father figure 
are destroyed, Bruce can return to his manor and promise to rebuild it “brick for brick.” In 
exerting his own hypermasculine, theatrical agency, Bruce also rescues Gotham City, still 
functioning as the eternal damsel in distress. He therefore now can assume the place of his father, 
which he does literally by buying Wayne Enterprises back from Mr. Earle, who took the 
company public, and metaphorically, in his rebuilding of the family home. 
Therefore Batman must destroy his own family’s legacy—as a Wayne executive 
comments after Bruce’s “drunken” insults at his birthday party, made in an effort to save the 
partygoers from Ra’s al Guhl, “the apple’s fallen very far from the tree, indeed”—in order to 
save the city and, paradoxically, uphold that same legacy. In an article in Jump/Cut, McGowan 
writes that “the act of wearing a mask leads the superhero to believe that there is a true identity 
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that the mask hides, and this true identity is necessarily individual.” (“Risen”). Here, Batman as a 
masked figure saves Gotham, which reinscribes Bruce Wayne, the identity beneath the mask, 
into the narrative of his father’s legacy as guardian of Gotham. However, in doing so, a 
performed Bruce Wayne, drunken billionaire playboy, must insult his friends and associates, 
which simultaneously removes that image of Bruce Wayne from his father’s legacy (“the apple 
has fallen far from the tree”).  
Batman Begins therefore brings the tension between the mask and the hero’s “true 
identity” to the fore, something Rachel Dawes can see better than anyone as at the end of the 
film she tells Bruce that his “everyday” face is now his mask. That is, in attempting to establish 
himself and simultaneously grapple with his own fear and trauma, Bruce Wayne has allowed the 
Batman identity to become the “primary,” leaving Bruce as the “secondary” identity— but 
nonetheless leaving the trace of that man underneath the mask. This trace will prove to be 
Batman’s undoing in the third film, as McGowan argues, but Rachel’s association of this trace 
with the faint hope for a heteronormative future for Bruce provides the tenuous thread to which 
he desperately clings throughout the first two films, as she tells him that “your real face is the 
one criminals now fear. The man I loved, the man who vanished, he never came back at all. But 
maybe he’s still out there somewhere. Maybe someday, when Gotham no longer needs Batman, 
I’ll see him again.”  
Ensuring not only a sequel, but also a continued threat to Gotham, Batman Begins ends 
with the promise of a new adversary, the Joker, which in turn ensures Batman’s compulsive need 
to save the city—after all, once Gotham is saved, Bruce can presumably heal himself, return as a 
“normal” man, and achieve the promised future with Rachel. In Nolan’s follow-up The Dark 
Knight, Batman faces two of his toughest and simultaneously most popular and enduring 
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adversaries, the Joker (Heath Ledger) and Two-Face (Aaron Eckhart). Because of Batman’s 
intimidation and efficient presence in Gotham, the city’s criminals are far more limited, pushing 
the various crime syndicates to turn to the Joker to rid the city of Batman. The Joker wreaks a 
fair amount of havoc on the city to entice Batman to reveal himself; at one point, however, 
Harvey Dent takes Batman’s place in order to maintain Batman’s secrecy and simultaneously 
lure the Joker into a trap. Once arrested, the Joker blows up the police station and orchestrates 
the explosions that maim Dent and kill Rachel Dawes (Maggie Gyllenhaal), who is now Dent’s 
girlfriend. Because Batman still refuses to give up his identity, the Joker proceeds to blow up a 
hospital, and then arrange an ethical dilemma in which ferry passangers must decide whether or 
not to destroy another ferry—one full of convicted criminals, the other with average citizens. 
Neither ferry destroys the other, Batman apprehends the Joker, and arrives just in time to save 
Jim Gordon’s son from the vengeful rage of Dent/Two-Face. Dent dies in the process, however, 
and in order to maintain the illusion of Dent’s moral uprightness, Batman takes the blame for 
Two-Face’s earlier murders.  
Therefore as with the comics discussed above, the Joker functions as Batman’s 
complement: chaos to Batman’s order, bright colors to his black, laughter to his straight-man, 
unchecked destruction and murder to his rigid ethics of life. Two-Face, meanwhile, spends most 
of the film as Harvey Dent, “Gotham’s White Knight” in obvious contrast with the Batman’s 
“Dark Knight;” Dent is the public face of good in Gotham until he is disfigured, and Rachel is 
murdered. Thus the Joker acts on a mass scale, while Two-Face’s violence is on a much more 
private level; nonetheless both villains act to maintain Batman’s heroic exception, a position 
motivated through his masochistic desires. 
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The Dark Knight opens with a shot of city buildings in muted sunlight; suddenly a center 
window of the shiniest, most central building is shot out, so the center of the screen and, visually, 
the city, is punctured by the Joker’s scheme, chaos, and violence (figure 1.19).  
 
Figure 1.19: Breaking Gotham’s façade. 
That is, Gotham’s newfound wholesomeness, its decreased criminality, proves merely a façade, 
hiding dark, chaotic violence underneath. Batman’s efforts have petty criminals running scared 
from the Bat-signal, and in an effort to return Gotham to the criminal playground it was before, 
the mob bosses turn to the Joker for help.  
Nolan’s Joker is a man apparently hell-bent on chaos; as he says explicitly to Two-Face 
late in the film: 
Do I really look like a guy with a plan? You know what I am? I’m a dog chasing cars. I 
wouldn’t know what to do with one if I caught it! You know? I just—do—things. The 
mob has plans. The cops have plans. Gordon’s got plans. They’re schemers, schemers 
trying to control their little worlds. I’m not a schemer. I try to show the schemers how 
pathetic their attempts to control things really are. 
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This monologue is completely at odds, however, with the Joker’s actions and appearance on-
screen. In this scene, he is dressed as a hospital nurse, complete with carefully arranged wig and 
cap. And indeed in all of his “chaotic” scenes, every last detail is minutely planned: the timing of 
the phone call that causes the explosion inside the Gotham Police Department, the abductions of 
Rachel and Dent, the opening bank heist, and so on. The Joker’s weapon is not chaos but panic, 
and therefore we might think he can never be the true opposite of Batman, and can never be a 
sovereign exception.  
However, the Joker’s real power lies not in the panic he sows but in his absence of an 
alter ego. Like the other texts, this Joker has no alternate identity; indeed, when Jim Gordon 
interrogates him, he is lit and filmed so that he appears as just a head floating in blackness, to 
emphasize the answer to Gordon’s earlier question, “What’s he hiding under all that makeup?” 
(figure 1.20). 
 
Figure 1.20: The Joker’s head as empty signifier 
The answer, that is, is nothing—the absence of anything to be hidden, the lack of “true identity” 
under the mask. For Batman, this “true identity” continually pulls him back from fully embracing 
his alterity; for the Joker, he is only the disembodied head, he is nobody outside of the makeup—
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until, at least, the lights in the interrogation room flip on and Batman stands in sharp contrast to 
the Joker’s messy, colorful appearance. That is, the Joker stands as Batman’s ideological 
opposite precisely in his absence of identity, in his lack of fixity.  
Even the Joker’s past is unfixable in this film. At multiple points, he poses the question, 
“Do you wanna know how I got these scars?” and the varied answers (from his father, self-
inflicted, etc.) match with The Killing Joke’s problematizing of memory. The importance of the 
scars for Nolan’s Joker is not how he got them, but that he was scarred at all, and that he uses 
these scars as a signifier of his madness, to incite fear in others, and to signal memory’s 
fallibility. Moreover, Batman breaks the Joker’s narrative of the scars at the end of the film; 
when the Joker asks “do you know how I got these scars?” Batman responds, “No, but I know 
how you got these,” and then proceeds to fire his small metal “batarangs” into the Joker’s face. 
Batman not only breaks the Joker’s narrative (which, in its repeated variations, is itself a 
patterned repetition) but also adds to his disfigurement. While the Joker’s story seemingly 
transfixes other characters, Batman can remain outside it and break it. Although this ability to 
resist the Joker’s stories might seem to indicate Batman’s ultimate control over both the narrative 
and the Joker, the latter’s final observation as he dangles off the edge of a building speaks to 
Batman’s compulsion to enter battle after battle. “I think you and I are destined to do this 
forever,” the Joker laughs, and since Batman immediately races off to fight Two-Face—a villain 
the Joker created—that destiny is fulfilled, and Batman’s compulsion to fight crime and seek 
justice lives on. 
While the Joker poses the greatest threat to Gotham herself through the panic and 
destruction he enacts, Harvey Dent actually poses the greatest threat to the Batman as a symbol 
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of the hero who could take Batman’s place as Gotham’s savior.10 Early in the film Dent claims 
that “the Batman is looking for someone to take up his mantle,” implying that he could be the 
person to do so, but the film proves the opposite: not only is the Batman not looking for someone 
to take his place, the very public and very wholesome Dent can never be that person. In fact, 
Wayne does let Dent take his place as the Batman, but only as a ruse leading to the Joker’s 
arrest; Batman’s “true identity” remains a careful secret. In his open desire to become the public 
Batman, Dent threatens Batman’s own carefully constructed state of exception, his position 
outside the law.  
Batman recognizes the need for Dent to remain within the structures of the law, which 
simultaneously allows for his own desire to remain outside the law: “you’re the symbol of hope I 
can never be. Your stand against organized crime is the first legitimate ray of hope in Gotham in 
decades” (my emphasis). This is also why Dent’s accident and his transformation into Two-Face 
is so threatening: not only would he effectively undo Dent’s “White Knight” good deeds in 
Gotham, he would also force Batman to become legitimate, that is, within the law. Thus when 
Two-Face dies, Batman turns his face so the “good” half is visible and takes the blame for Dent’s 
death and the murders Two-Face committed. In so doing Batman not only ensures that he will be 
hunted and vilified by the Gotham police and public, but that he will remain in his state of 
exception. As Alfred says, Batman must “endure, Master Wayne... They’ll hate you for it, but 
that’s the point of Batman. He can be the outcast. He can make the choice that no one else can 
make. The right choice.” 
With Two-Face’s death and the Joker’s defeat, Batman effectively solidifies his position 
as the sovereign exception; he has become “the hero Gotham needs” even if the general 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 For a detailed exploration of Batman’s status of heroic exception in this film, see Todd 
McGowan, The Fictional Christopher Nolan. 
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population now thinks of Batman as a murderous villain. Taking up this narrative eight years 
later, Nolan’s final film in the Batman trilogy, The Dark Knight Rises, traces Batman’s rise back 
to symbol of hope and protection—a rise that is only possible through Batman’s quasi-sacrifice 
and Bruce Wayne’s total reinscription into a heteronormative life. Like Batman Begins, this film 
arrives at its conclusion through a series of falls and resurrections, ultimately illustrating the 
impossibility of remaining in a permanent state of exception and, as McGowan notes, upholding 
an essentially conservative view of Batman as an ideological figure. If Batman Begins 
demonstrates Bruce Wayne’s usurpation of his father, The Dark Knight Rises solidifies this 
position through its attempt to erase Bruce’s split identity. 
Taking place eight years after Harvey Dent’s death, Batman has retired and Bruce Wayne 
has become a recluse. Lured out of this seclusion by Catwoman, aka Selina Kyle (Anne 
Hathaway), Batman soon finds himself entangled in a messy plot to destroy Gotham involving 
the villain Bane (Tom Hardy) hijacking the stock exchange, arranging for a ring of explosives 
around Gotham, and building an underground army. Bane and his army take over Gotham and 
arrange for an impending nuclear explosion that would decimate the city. Batman, meanwhile, 
enlists Catwoman’s help to confront Bane, who defeats Batman and imprisons him in a pit. After 
escaping the pit, Batman returns to Gotham and, with the help of Catwoman, Jim Gordon, and 
the police force, defeats Bane and flies the nuclear bomb away from the city over the bay. The 
bomb detonates at a safe distance from the city but Batman appears to have died in the 
explosion; the final scenes, however, reveal that he has escaped and is living elsewhere with 
Catwoman. 
  McGowan argues that the butler Alfred is the true villain of this film because of his 
insistence on bringing Bruce Wayne back from the Batman persona, maintaining that the film 
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“concludes with [Wayne’s] retreat into an authentic identity beyond the mask. When he does 
this, he fails to recognize that the mask or the fiction contains in itself his true identity. Bruce’s 
lifelong servant Alfred leads him into the illusion of the true self beneath the mask, so we might 
say that Alfred is the villain of Dark Knight Rises” (“Risen”). Alfred’s overly romanticized wish 
for Bruce Wayne demonstrates this “villainy” (although as we have seen, Rachel Dawes plays 
the same role in the other films). In an effort to bring Bruce Wayne “back to the world,” Alfred 
tells him: 
Remember when you left Gotham? Before all this, before Batman? You were gone seven 
years. Seven years I waited, hoping that you wouldn’t come back. Every year, I took a 
holiday. I went to Florence, there’s this cafe, on the banks of the Arno. Every fine 
evening, I’d sit there and order a Fernet Branca. I had this fantasy, that I would look 
across the tables and I’d see you there, with a wife and maybe a couple of kids. You 
wouldn’t say anything to me, nor me to you. But we’d both know that you’d made it, that 
you were happy. I never wanted you to come back to Gotham. I always knew there was 
nothing here for you, except pain and tragedy. And I wanted something more for you 
than that. I still do. 
Alfred’s speech, which ultimately comes to fruition at the end of the film, puts Bruce 
Wayne firmly back in the world outside of Gotham as a “normal” man “with a wife and maybe a 
couple of kids.” Alfred tempts Bruce, therefore, with what McGowan calls “the fantasy of a life 
without the mask, the fantasy of a true life lived elsewhere” (“Risen”). By the end of the film, 
Bruce and Alfred literally enact this fantasy, as Bruce and Selina Kyle (Anne Hathaway) sit at a 
table at the same cafe pictured during the above fantasy scene. 
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In order to achieve this fantasy, Bruce must not only give up the Batman persona but also 
once again assert his dominance over his father and reinscribe himself into heteronormativity. He 
does so by paradoxically taking his father’s advice to heart. When the young Bruce falls down 
the well in the first film, Thomas Wayne comforts him, saying, “Why do we fall, Bruce? So we 
can learn to pick ourselves up.” This line is repeated in various ways in both Batman Begins and 
The Dark Knight Rises as both films navigate this pattern of falling and rising (figure 1.21).  
 
Figure 1.21: Thomas Wayne coming down the well in Batman Begins, and Bruce climbing out of the pit in Rises. 
Eventually, Bruce literally enacts this advice, as he declines the aid of a rope in order to climb 
out of the pit in which he has been imprisoned. No longer needing his father or anyone else to 
rescue him, it therefore appears Bruce has indeed picked himself up, allowing a final return to 
Gotham and a showdown with the villains Bane and Talia al Guhl, after which he fakes his own 
death and winds up at a café in Florence.  
The perverse irony of the film, however, is that Bruce never truly escapes Gotham, but 
rather trades her for another object of desire, Selina Kyle / Catwoman. After all, as Lacan says, 
our desire is the desire of the Other. Thus despite symbolically destroying Thomas Wayne in 
Batman Begins, despite learning to “pick himself up” and thereby healing himself, Bruce still 
remains trapped in a web of culturally dictated desire in which he now occupies the place of his 
father. If Gotham City replaces Martha Wayne as the decorative yet maternal object that needs 
saving, then Selina’s wearing of the mother’s pearls and her appearance at the cafe in the end 
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would seem to indicate that she has become the new maternal object. And so the ultimate fantasy 
of the film’s romanticized ending reveals itself: Bruce has not escaped, but rather entered into a 
less political, less public form of the same Oedipal structures; the Batman, meanwhile, also 
appears to live on, as the final shot of the film is of John “Robin” Blake atop a rising platform in 
the Batcave, implying yet another resurrection of the Dark Knight. 
Therefore one danger of the fantasy of overcoming that The Dark Knight Rises ends with 
is that it unsuccessfully covers up the traumatic past. It does not erase it since, as Selina Kyle 
repeats, a clean slate “doesn’t exist.” Selina here refers to a computer program that would erase a 
criminal’s record and, indeed, entire identity, allowing someone (namely, herself) a fresh start 
under a whole new identity. Batman offers Catwoman this program near the end of the film, and 
the implication of the final sequences is that both Bruce Wayne and Selina Kyle have used this 
program and begun their lives anew, under new identities, as they now relax at a cafe in Florence 
(figure 1.22).  
 
Figure 1.22: the “clean slate” fails. 
At the surface level, then, it would appear that Selina is wrong; the “clean slate” program 
seemingly both exists and works. However, at the level of the film more broadly, the “clean 
slate” ultimately fails: both Alfred and the audience see Bruce Wayne and Selina Kyle in this 
idyllic scene, and recognize them as precisely those identities (whether Bruce and Selina or 
Batman and Catwoman, those names are linked with their narrative identities, not with this 
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“new” clean slate). That is, rather than erasing Wayne and Kyle, the two have merely covered up 
those names and identities, and Alfred’s and the audience’s gaze brings them right back into the 
realm of the visible and legible, so that Bruce therefore doubly remains within the same 
structures he has been struggling with, even while the film pretends to disavow those structures. 
Moreover, this network of gazes emphasizes vision’s centrality to trauma and memory, as it is 
precisely in the exchange of gazes that the past reappears, unbidden, like memory’s repetition. 
More problematically, the films themselves also try to be this kind of “clean slate” 
erasing the memory of the Schumacher films, as Brooker addresses extensively. The films 
perform exactly the same kind of covering-over of its serial past as Bruce and Selina perform on 
their identities as “Bruce” and “Selina.” And this is the great failure of the films: in sanitizing the 
trauma of Bruce’s loss; in creating a fantasy of wholesomeness and successful overcoming of the 
dark, gritty, criminal Gotham; in pretending the Schumacher films, Adam West TV show, and 
campy ‘60s comics do not exist—all of this imagination only serves to remind us of that which is 
covered.11 
The sanitized and romanticized endings of The Dark Knight Rises and The Dark Knight 
Returns speak to the problematic position of trauma studies in the superhero genre. In inscribing 
Bruce Wayne back into heteronormativity (Nolan) and in his repositioning as the Law of the 
Father (Nolan and Miller), these texts offer a fantasy of overcoming trauma, of covering it up 
without necessarily fully healing. This fantasy is one of the most problematic aspects of the 
superhero genre: Batman is immensely traumatized, and compulsively follows his masochistic 
desires, and yet he is idolized and envied precisely because of this narrative of overcoming, this 
fantasy of erasing his trauma and masochism, that which creates Batman in the first place. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See, again, Brooker’s Hunting the Dark Knight. 
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Part of this problematic approach stems from the very creation of the best-known 
superhero characters themselves, as Gerard Jones argues in Men of Tomorrow: Geeks, 
Gangsters, and the Birth of the Comic Book. According to him and other comics historians like 
Douglas Wolk, many of the creators of superheroes were young first-generation Jewish 
Americans who used figures like Superman as a way to enact fantasies of overcoming or 
escaping their own difficult lives. Yet in offering an escape, these superhero characters also 
problematically romanticize trauma, figuring it as the necessary condition for a hero. 
The ambiguous endings to The Killing Joke and Arkham Asylum, however, provide a 
more nuanced approach to this superhero fantasy. Both texts end with a sense that the entire juro-
political system in the Batworld lends itself to the danger of endless repetition and 
traumatization, as well as the blurring of the lines between good and evil, sane and mad, legal 
and lawless, order and chaos. Because they cannot offer an alternative to those systems without 
romanticizing Batman’s position, nor without erasing and undermining the very problems and 
experiences of trauma, these texts instead end on difficult, ambiguous notes. Thus these texts 
reflect back the same mechanisms by which trauma functions, relying on the spaces between 
images and between gazes to linger in the zones where trauma, memory, and visuality meet. 
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Chapter 2: “As If I’ve Been Here All the Time”: Trauma, History, and Temporal 
Suspension in Watchmen 
 
The only graphic novel included in TIME Magazine’s “All-TIME 100 Novels,” 
Watchmen, since its publication in 1986, has simultaneously delighted and frustrated comics 
fans, casual readers, and literary scholars alike. Written by Alan Moore and illustrated by Dave 
Gibbons, Watchmen takes generic superhero conventions and pushes them to extreme limits: the 
superbeing as an amoral god, the sexualized female crime-fighter, the power-hungry totalitarian, 
the sociopath, and so on. In doing so, the text challenges our own notions of heroism and fantasy, 
as the problems encountered in the text take on frighteningly real historical echoes. Through its 
cyclical, repetitive structure, its oblique historical references, and its destabilizing of the visual 
realm, Watchmen makes trauma a particularly visible and visual crisis. 
Set in an alternate Cold War era world, Watchmen follows a group of crime fighters who 
come out of retirement following the death of a former colleague, the Comedian, who was also 
working for the US government. Believing the Comedian’s death to be one in a series of acts to 
eliminate superheroes entirely, Rorschach, who takes his name from his shifting, inkblot-test 
inspired mask, sets out to convince Dr. Manhattan, his girlfriend the Silk Spectre, and their 
former crimefighting partners Ozymandias and Nite Owl, to join him in investigating his 
conspiracy theory. With relations between the Americans and Soviets dissolving and nuclear war 
imminent, a monstrous alien appears in New York, killing thousands. Rorschach and Nite Owl 
discover the person behind the creation of this monster is their former colleague Ozymandias, 
and the novel ends with a confrontation between him and the other remaining superheroes. 
Dense, layered, fragmented, and nonlinear, Watchmen is a text that, as Iain Thomson 
notes, demands rereading:  
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Watchmen was written to be reread; indeed, it can only be read by being reread… [T]he 
parts all fit into a whole one only grasps in the end… Because that end is so unsuspected 
and surprising… the parts are given a new and different meaning… This new meaning, 
moreover, immediately strikes home as the true meaning of the work, thereby subverting 
and displacing the first reading. (103)  
Every character, every secret identity, every symbol, every theme, is endlessly reflected, 
refracted, mirrored, and doubled, so that each individual character or symbol becomes a site of 
convergence for multiple thematic interventions on the individual, textual, and historical level. 
This interconnectedness demonstrates what the god-like Dr. Manhattan calls the 
multifaceted jewel of time—each facet or moment is just part of a whole—and it emphasizes the 
notion of interdependence that persists between human beings and their world, their neighbors, 
and their selves. Each character in Watchmen is a site for exploring larger issues of trauma, 
history, temporality, and identity. Time, trauma, and memory all function in this text as links 
between the personal and historical, opening up individual experiences as political and historical 
arenas of representation. Moore and Gibbons create a multidirectional approach to the historical 
traumas of the Holocaust and the nuclear disasters of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Rather than 
claiming them as independent historical events, Watchmen asserts the interconnectedness of 
these moments, illustrating the compelling ways that individual and historical traumas overlap. 
In the repetition of historical disasters on a large scale and at the level of individuals, trauma is 
made present through the paradoxical upending of conventionally linear time. 
Writing about her experiences during, and interpretation of, the Holocaust, Charlotte 
Delbo famously stated, “Je suis morte à Auschwitz et personne ne le voit” (45). Often translated 
as “I died at Auschwitz and nobody sees it,” the original French is less fixed; “je suis morte” 
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could be either “I died” or “I am dead.” The ambiguity in the original phrase indicates one 
fundamental aspect of the traumatized individual: a kind of suspension in time (“I” both “died” 
in the past and “am” in the present). By “temporal suspension,” I mean the manner in which time 
appears to “stand still” so that the individual’s perception of time is not linear but cyclical and 
even erratic, so that multiple events and multiple states of being appear to be simultaneous. This 
perception of time, this “died” and “am dead,” is at once a psychic suspension between the 
present and the past (and even, in certain cases, the future) and an experience of those moments 
as simultaneous. Such a perception of time characterizes many of Moore and Gibbons’s 
costumed crime-fighters, namely Dr. Manhattan, Rorschach, Ozymandias and the Silk Spectre. 
These individuals, who experience trauma in various forms, do not deal with a linear return of 
the repressed, but rather a constant coming and going of moments known too soon to be 
understood by consciousness. 
That historical crises anachronistic to the text’s Cold War setting appear almost 
subliminally in Watchmen is testament to Caruth’s argument about the fluidity between trauma 
and history, or the failure of linear temporality in the face of historical trauma: “[W]hat trauma 
has to tell us—the historical and personal truth it transmits—is intricately bound up with its 
refusal of historical boundaries; that its truth is bound up with its crisis of truth” (Trauma 8). 
Thus World War II—and especially the disasters of the Holocaust and Hiroshima—”refuse” the 
“historical boundaries” and appear like a ghost of history haunting a text set firmly in the Cold 
War (though it is an alternate-reality Cold War) and in a world of crime-fighting (and sometimes 
criminal) superheroes. 
Watchmen emphasizes the role of vision and visuality in these representations of time, 
trauma, and history, as the traumatic encounters depicted are all of a particularly visual nature. 
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Moments in narrative time become visible and legible, and yet, through the juxtaposition of 
panels with their contingent gutters, the blank spaces where presence and absence meet, these 
moments also conceal as much as they reveal. As the characters experience trauma often as a 
visual encounter, so too do the readers experience those moments as simultaneously visible and 
invisible, hidden and revealed, in various different ways. The comics medium thus allows for a 
textual and visual enactment of the structures of trauma and memory; Watchmen performs an 
exchange of gazes within the text and between the text and its readers, allowing for an encounter 
at the intersection of time, memory, and trauma. Filled with half-visible signs and symbols, 
moments and memories, Watchmen concretizes the tension between what can be seen and what 
can be understood and reflects the visual structures of trauma and memory. 
 
An Intricately Structured Jewel: Dr. Manhattan’s Acute Trauma 
Dr. Manhattan is the only real “superbeing” in Watchmen—at least, in terms of being 
something more than human, though his actions are questionably heroic. Formerly known as Jon 
Osterman, Dr. Manhattan is a nuclear scientist who in 1959 was trapped in an “intrinsic field 
chamber” and disintegrated. Miraculously, something of Osterman’s consciousness remains 
behind and he manages to reconstruct himself, atom by atom, into a glowing blue humanoid with 
a deep understanding of atomic structures and systems. He is able to alter matter itself and 
otherwise defy common laws of physics (he can walk through walls, dismantle rifles without 
touching them, and cause objects to explode into atomic particles with a mere wave of his hand, 
among other feats). 
With this deep understanding of the mechanics of the world, Dr. Manhattan also comes to 
a different understanding of time. While the other characters generally experience time linearly, 
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for Dr. Manhattan, the past, present and future exist simultaneously. In Chapter IX, he explains: 
“There is no future. There is no past. Do you see? Time is simultaneous, an intricately structured 
jewel that humans insist on viewing one edge at a time, when the whole design is visible in every 
facet” (IX.6).12 Readers are already familiar with Dr. Manhattan’s temporality, as Chapter IV 
focuses on demonstrating this jewel, the perception of “the whole” of time. In this chapter, 
Manhattan narrates his formative moments from childhood and from his life pre-accident, while 
insisting on their simultaneity with one another and with his post-accident superhuman life. 
Chapter IV opens with a splash image of an old photograph lying in reddish-purple sand 
between some partial footprints. The first actual panel of the chapter shows Dr. Manhattan’s 
hand holding the same photograph, with captions—like conventional speech bubbles, only these 
are not connected to a speaking face, but instead function much like a voice-over in film—
narrating his thoughts: “The photograph is in my hand. It is the photograph of a man and a 
woman. They are at an amusement park, in 1959” (figure 2.1, IV.1). Over the next eight panels, 
Dr. Manhattan’s captions continue: 
In twelve seconds time, I drop the photograph to the sand at my feet, walking away. It’s 
already lying there, twelve seconds into the future. […] I found it in a derelict bar at the Gila 
Flats test base, twenty-seven hours ago. It’s still there, twenty-seven hours into the past, in its 
frame, in the darkened bar. I’m still there looking at it. […] It’s October, 1985. I’m on Mars. 
It’s July, 1959. I’m in New Jersey, at the Palisades amusement park. Four seconds. Three. 
I’m tired of looking at the photograph now. I open my fingers. It falls to the sand at my 
feet…. (IV.1) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Reflecting the original serial publication of Watchmen, citations are given by chapter (Roman 
numerals) followed by page (Arabic numerals). 
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Dr. Manhattan’s countdown to the dropping of the photograph thus tries to illustrate his sense of 
simultaneity, of the wholeness of time, by concurrently narrating Dr. Manhattan’s existence in 
multiple places at multiple times alongside the narration of the falling photograph.  
 
Figure 2.1: Dr. Manhattan’s multiple temporalities (IV.1). 
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According to the captions, Dr. Manhattan is on Mars in 1985 and in New Jersey in 1959 
at the same time—yet eight of the nine images are of Dr. Manhattan on Mars. The sole exception 
is the fourth panel, in which we see part of Dr. Manhattan standing in the crumbling building at 
Gila Flats, the same image from a previous chapter (III.20). Thus between the third and the fifth 
panels, the text returns to an earlier narrative moment; the effect is less of a flashback than it is a 
subtle insertion to make the reader feel as though Dr. Manhattan is simultaneously on Mars and 
in Arizona. Time, that is, is made visible on the page. This same effect occurs on the following 
page: panel four shows 16-year-old Osterman’s hand arranging the cogs of a watch in 1945, and 
this panel is surrounded by panels of scenes on Mars. Moreover, the effect of simultaneity is 
heightened on this page by the eerie resemblance of the silvery-white cogs on a piece of black 
cloth to the starry sky visible in each image of Mars, creating a visual bridge between space and 
time. After establishing this pattern of synchronicity, Dr. Manhattan’s narration continues 
through a series of flashbacks (or flash-elsewheres, if we are to believe that the events are, in 
fact, happening at the same time); each fragment illustrates a key moment in his development as 
both Jon Osterman and Dr. Manhattan. This narration is interspersed visually with non-
sequential images of Mars and of the watch cogs, reinforcing the sense of synchronicity, and the 
connection between time, trauma, and vision.  
This visual synchronicity is further encoded in the textual narration (the captions) of this 
chapter, which emphasizes Dr. Manhattan’s ability to experience “normal” linear time non-
linearly. While comforting one-time girlfriend Janey Slater, for example, he says, “As I lie I hear 
her shouting at me in 1963; sobbing in 1966. My fingers open. The photograph is falling…” 
(IV.11). Not only the content, but also the grammar, of such captions work to call our attention 
to the concurrence of events. Through the insistence on the present progressive (shouting, 
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sobbing, falling) the text itself is caught up in a seemingly unending moment of suspension 
between times and places, all ongoing and all simultaneous. In fact the very form of the graphic 
novel itself allows for a near-simultaneous experience of readership. As McCloud writes, “Both 
past and future are real and visible all around us! Wherever your eyes are focused, that’s now. 
But at the same time, your eyes take in the surrounding landscape of past and future!” (104). 
Indeed, as we read Dr. Manhattan’s caption, we are peripherally aware of the preceding images 
and panels. In merely viewing the page, therefore, the reader becomes involved in the 
concurrence of text and image; panels and captions; pasts, presents, and futures.  
This synchronous understanding of the world exists precisely because of Dr. Manhattan’s 
acute traumatic experience of disintegration. Curiously, some scholars like Jamie Hughes and 
Bryan D. Dietrich tend to attribute this perception of time to Dr. Manhattan’s understanding of 
the atomic structures of the universe, without exploring the fact that this understanding is a 
product of what Dr. Manhattan repeatedly calls “the accident”—that is, from a moment of 
extreme catastrophe that structures his entire being and consciousness. Like the rest of Dr. 
Manhattan’s past, he remembers the accident as the present: “The light is taking me to pieces,” 
he says, as the reader sees a disintegrating skeleton eerily similar to those images of shadows 
burned into buildings at Hiroshima (figure 2.2, IV.8).  
 
Figure 2.2: “The light is taking me to pieces” (IV.8). 
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This image literally returns later in the text—a physical repetition of the traumatic 
moment, not just a repetition in dreams or flashbacks— when Adrian Veidt attempts to destroy 
Dr. Manhattan in the very way Jon Osterman was destroyed the first time, in an “intrinsic field 
chamber,” but with slight alterations: the background is slightly altered; his head leans the other 
way; the last trace of the human eye in the first image becomes the last trace of the hydrogen 
atomic symbol on his forehead; and most noticeably, a genetically engineered cat joins him in his 
second disintegration. But despite these differences the effect is the same: Dr. Manhattan 
disintegrates, and then physically repeats this disintegration, in effect living (and dying) as a 
symbol of acute traumatic experience (figure 2.3).  
 
Figure 2.3: Dr. Manhattan’s accident, repeated (XII.14). 
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Dr. Manhattan’s synchronous and relative conception of time, therefore, stems not merely 
from his superior understanding of atoms, but from the traumatic moment, so that “the 
accident(s)” exist(s) with Osterman’s past, present, and even future, suspending him in time, in 
much the same manner as he physically floats above his former colleagues when he first appears 
after reassembling himself. Caruth writes that “[the] impact of the traumatic event lies precisely 
in its belatedness, in its refusal to be simply located, in its insistent appearance outside the 
boundaries of any single place or time” (9). Dr. Manhattan himself rejects the boundaries of 
common perceptions of time and place as a direct result of his accident. Likewise, in response to 
Janey Slater’s offhand comment that he’s “arrived!” (oddly enough, in the fashion world), Dr. 
Manhattan says “Have I? Sometimes I feel as if I’ve been here all the time” (IV.13). 
Yet despite these perceptions of simultaneity, of being there “all the time,” Dr. Manhattan 
also experiences a split in identity between pre- and post-accident, meaning that although 
concurrent, moments and identities are still separate and distinct units. Moreover Dr. 
Manhattan’s disastrous accident seems to literally separate his identities into Jon Osterman and 
Dr. Manhattan. Looking again at the first panel of chapter IV, Dr. Manhattan uses a distanced 
third person to describe the photograph, as if the image in the photograph does not correspond to 
his own identity (see again figure 2.1): “It is the photograph of a man and a woman. They are at 
an amusement park, in 1959” (IV.1). His post-traumatic identity becomes separated from his pre-
accident identity; he is no longer Jon, but Dr. Manhattan; that is not Dr. Manhattan in the 
photograph but a third-person “man.”  
This separation becomes clearer at the end of the novel after Dr. Manhattan experiences 
the second disintegration. Reappearing almost instantly after this second “accident,” again an 
unexpected and quite literal return of the traumatic moment, Dr. Manhattan says, “Restructuring 
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myself after the subtraction of my own intrinsic field was the first trick I learned. It didn’t kill 
Osterman… did you think it would kill me?” (XII.18). The split between Osterman and Dr. 
Manhattan is clear in the second sentence here; referring to Osterman in the third person 
indicates the total separation between Dr. Manhattan and his pre-accident identity. The accident 
thus creates a traumatic moment in which the self splits, like Charlotte Delbo, who “died at 
Auschwitz” and yet is alive to write about it. 
These multiple if separate identities are linked in Dr. Manhattan through the flashbacks 
that are scattered throughout his parts of the narrative. Such flashbacks are a form of involuntary 
recall that interrupts conscious thought; the (traumatic) past enters consciousness unbidden 
(Caruth Traumatic 152). Flashbacks also reflect the medium of the graphic novel, in their 
position within multiple panels viewed at once. These flashbacks are a kind of paradox: on the 
one hand they indicate Dr. Manhattan’s traumatized, but oddly liberated, view of time. On the 
other hand, these moments from his life seem to appear unbidden, at the expense of conscious or 
willed memory. Like the Joker’s understanding of involuntary memory and its power discussed 
in the previous chapter, Dr. Manhattan seems to be both aware of and still subject to memory and 
time’s structuring of existence. 
Yet like Dr. Manhattan’s flashbacks connecting his current and rejected identities, 
“[c]omics panels fracture both time and space, offering a jagged, staccato rhythm of unconnected 
moments. But closure allows us to connect these moments and mentally construct a continuous, 
unified reality” (McCloud 67). Creating a “unified reality” from broken images smoothes out the 
narrative and creates the impression that “in the world of comics [and of Dr. Manhattan], time 
and space are one and the same” (McCloud 100).  
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Moore and Gibbons exploit these structures of fragmentation and repetition inherent in 
comics to further entwine notions of personal and historical trauma13. The accident that causes 
Dr. Manhattan’s destruction and reconstruction appears at least superficially to be anomalous 
and intensely personal. In 1959, Osterman is trapped in an intrinsic field chamber when he 
returns to retrieve the watch he has repaired for Janey Slater; his personal, romantic relationship 
thus figures as the catalyst for his accident. Later, in one of the many prose inserts in the novel, a 
certain Professor Milton Glass declares that Osterman’s accident is “certainly unplanned and just 
as certainly unrepeatable” (n. pag.). However, the text implies that Dr. Manhattan’s experience 
of synchronicity is not actually limited to his superhuman self. In fact, that accident is both 
repeatable—near the end of the text, he is once again disintegrated— and planned—at least in 
the sense that Dr. Manhattan’s death fits a pattern established earlier in the text. 
 
Figure 2.4: Jon Osterman meeting Janey Slater (IX.5). 
This pattern is visible when Jon Osterman “first” arrives at the Gila Flats military base 
and nuclear research center. When he is introduced to Janey, his future girlfriend, she remarks, 
“Ohh, the new guy! You’re replacing Hank Meadows, right?” Osterman responds, “I am?” “I 
guess so. Hank died last fall, some kinda tumor. There’s his picture behind the bar there. The guy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 For a closer look at the intersections of personal and national trauma in Watchmen, see Brandy 
Ball Blake’s “Watchmen: The Graphic Novel as Trauma Fiction.” 
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with the glasses.” Janey says, gesturing to the same frame from which Dr. Manhattan earlier 
removed the photograph of him and Janey (figure 2.4, IX.5). Osterman is therefore already 
doubled—he is there to replace someone else—and furthermore this doubling hints at his own 
eventual appearance behind the glass of the frame dedicated to the employees of the base who 
die while working there. 
More than just a pattern, predestination or a fragmented sense of time, however, Dr. 
Manhattan’s accident and identity are also bound up with larger historical traumas. Dr. 
Manhattan’s name, of course, links him with issues of atomic power. The US government 
assigns him this name, chosen, as the text says, “for the ominous associations it will raise in 
America’s enemies.” Taken from the Manhattan Project, which led to the creation of the first 
atomic bomb, Dr. Manhattan becomes a figure of the US military’s power, its ruthlessness, its 
questionable moral treatment of those very enemies. As Dr. Manhattan’s narrative unfolds, it 
seems he fulfills this role as he destroys VC soldiers in Vietnam and carries out other militaristic 
and scientific feats on behalf of the US.  
And yet Dr. Manhattan’s relationship with his name and his governmental role is more 
complicated and resists such an easy categorization. In fact, while his assigned name aligns him 
with the perpetrators of total destruction, the accident itself aligns him with the victims of that 
destruction. Even as he explains the choice of his name, the text recalls another moment in 
Osterman’s life—1945, when he learns of the detonation of the atomic bomb in Japan. The 
connection between Manhattan and Hiroshima appears over and over again in the text. For 
instance, the image of Osterman’s disintegration described earlier visually echoes other moments 
in the text that refer to the atomic catastrophe of Hiroshima: the “Hiroshima Lovers” graffiti seen 
throughout images of the streets, the monster’s destruction of New York, and Dan’s dream of 
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Laurie (figure 2.5). Though he is a victim of a nuclear disaster on a small individual scale, Dr. 
Manhattan represents all the unease with nuclear weaponry that forms the basis for the Cold 
War, and he is thus visually linked to larger portrayals of nuclear destruction.  
 
Figure 2.5: Various nuclear images (IV.8; VII.17; XI.28). 
Furthermore, the text links the moment of Manhattan’s accident to the moment of 
Hiroshima’s bombing through the juxtaposition of a Time magazine cover commemorating 
“Hiroshima Week” with an image repeated from the moment of the accident (figure 2.6). This 
second image is of Osterman’s hands brushing Janey Slater’s as he takes a glass of beer that 
she’s offering in 1959. This image appears numerous times throughout Manhattan’s narrative; it 
occurs when Janey and Osterman meet for the first time, and it repeats in the panel just before 
Osterman disintegrates. The captions link this image with the preceding one of the magazine 
cover: they read, “on the cover there is a damaged pocket-watch, stopped at the moment of the 
blast, face cracked… Hands frozen” (IV.24). While the textual narrative refers to the damaged 
watch, the “frozen hands” also allude to Manhattan’s memory of the cold beer from Janey, 
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visually repeated in the panel following.14 Even in the instant before his death, Osterman “wishes 
for a beautiful woman to hand him a very cold beer,” but instead of the beer, he holds Janey’s 
watch. 
 
Figure 2.6: Panels 1& 2 from Dr. Manhattan’s accident, IV.8; panels 3 & 4 from the end of the chapter, IV.24. 
The text’s title, then, means more than just a group of vigilantes. The motif of the watch 
occurs throughout the text and connects Dr. Manhattan with Hiroshima, but also with WWII and 
the Holocaust. As a child, Osterman wanted to follow in his father’s footsteps and become a 
watchmaker. However, upon reading about the bombing of Hiroshima, Osterman’s father forces 
his son to give up watch-making and enter the hard sciences. Here we see Osterman’s father 
interrupting his son’s work, throwing away the watch cogs. He says: “Ach, these are no times for 
a repairer of watches. There will be more bombs. They are the future! Shall my son follow me 
into an obsolete trade?... Professor Einstein says that time differs from place to place. Can you 
imagine? If time is not true, what purpose have watch-makers, hein?” (IV.3). Much of 
Manhattan’s narrative therefore can be read as a kind of response to his father’s sudden rejection 
of both his profession and identity, and of time itself. Rather than agree with his father that “time 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 This image also contains a number of intervisual references, including Alain Resnais’s film 
version of Hiroshima mon amour, further emphasizing the image as a potential space for the 
intersection of memory, trauma, different histories, and representation. 
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is not true,” Manhattan instead illustrates its everlasting truth, that all events always exist. Even 
his father’s words indicate this: “[nuclear bombs] are the future,” he says, an uncanny echo of 
Manhattan’s still-impending accident and his literal transformation into a living nuclear weapon 
(IV.3).  
While it is obvious that the nuclear disaster of Hiroshima is one catalyst for Osterman’s 
turn toward physics and nuclear power—a turn that will lead uncannily to his accident—
Osterman’s father also implicitly makes Osterman’s individual story resonate with the other 
theater of World War II, and with the Holocaust. Referring to Albert Einstein here brings 
together not only the issues of relativity and even nuclear weaponry, but of the Second World 
War and the Holocaust—Einstein also fled the Nazi regime and moved to the US in order to 
escape persecution. Like Einstein, it is implied that Osterman’s father emigrated from Germany 
or Eastern Europe: “Ach” and “hein” mark his father’s speech with an eastern European accent, 
and his English is not structured like a native speaker’s. Even the name Osterman is Jewish and 
resonates with the word “ost,” or east.  
The references to Einstein in this chapter and elsewhere are not merely ways to 
underscore Manhattan’s experience of relativity. This section ends with a quote from Einstein, 
which reads “The release of atom power has changed everything except our way of thinking… 
the solution to this problem lies in the heart of mankind. If only I had known, I should have 
become a watchmaker” (IV.28). This citation illustrates Dr. Manhattan’s need for human contact 
in order to remain ethical—a need later fulfilled by Laurie, who reminds him of the 
“thermodynamic miracle” of human life. Here, however, Dr. Manhattan is in crisis, alone on 
Mars, distanced from humanity. While he posits that existence is a “clock without a craftsman,” 
he does so while sitting in front of the clock-like palace he has created on Mars. And throughout 
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this section, the watch cogs on their black background resonate with the stars above Mars, 
bringing the individual past into the present (figure 2.7). Einstein’s quote also indicates his own 
discomfort at having encouraged the real Manhattan project early on, claiming had he known 
what it would mean, he should have become a watchmaker. Thus his story and Dr. Manhattan’s 
are brought together again: both men “should have become a watchmaker;” and in a way, both 
do, through their understanding of time itself.  
 
Figure 2.7: “a clock without a craftsman” (IV.28); the watch cogs from the beginning of the chapter (IV.2). 
The visual elements of comics conceal and reveal this understanding of time, even while 
bringing together nuclear disasters and the Holocaust through Einstein. The Asian and European 
theatres of WWII thus are drawn together and embodied in a single figure. Embodying multiple 
historical traumas in a single acute accident, Dr. Manhattan stands as a figure for the 
interconnections between historical disasters and an individual’s lived experience. Moreover, this 
accident permits a vision of temporality that is both a symptom of individual and historical 
trauma, and a reflection of the comics medium itself.  
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Everything Imbalanced: Rorschach’s Chronic Trauma in a Cyclical World 
Dr. Manhattan’s “jewel of time” might appear at first to be unique to his position as a 
“superbeing.” However, Watchmen illustrates just how pervasive this experience of simultaneity 
is among different kinds of traumatized subjects. For example, functioning on some level as a 
foil for the acute trauma of Dr. Manhattan, Rorschach’s trauma is of a longer, more chronic 
nature. Like Dr. Manhattan, Rorschach is another nexus of personal and historical disaster. 
However, while Dr. Manhattan brings the personal into the historical and then up to the cosmic 
scale through his move to Mars and his relationship to the starry sky, Rorschach takes the same 
historical trauma of the Holocaust down in scale, bringing it from the astronomical to the earthly, 
even downright dirty.  
Yet unlike Dr. Manhattan, who appears to be aware of his position as traumatized subject 
if only through his perception of time and his recognition of the dangers of history, the masked 
vigilante Rorschach, “real” name Walter Kovacs, remains outside of reconciliation with his 
position as traumatized subject. Rather, he seems to relish in his extreme and violent attempts to 
establish himself as anti-criminal, in a world in which, to him, there can be only morally good 
and bad, without any relativism. Rorschach takes his name from his mask, made from the 
rejected dress of a woman who is later murdered, “viscous fluids between two layers of latex… 
Black and white moving, changing shape, but not mixing. No gray” (VI.10). From this material 
he makes “a face that [he] could bear to look at in the mirror,” and with this new face he attacks, 
captures and often kills the violent criminals of New York City (VI.10). Rorschach is a character 
of extreme binaries—black and white, high and low, right and wrong, good and evil, etc.—and a 
man for whom compromise is never an option, “not even,” as he says, “in the face of 
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Armageddon” (XII.20). Unfortunately for Rorschach, what he faces is ultimately Armageddon, 
and his unwillingness to bend or to see shades of gray prevents him from surviving. 
At one point in Chapter V, to escape capture by the police, Rorschach throws himself out 
of a window, landing, alas, at the feet of those very police. In the chapter’s penultimate panel, we 
see Rorschach’s feet in a puddle, one shoeless, exposing a tattered, holey sock (figure 2.8). 
“Everything balances,” claims the caption, spoken by one of the policemen, as if Rorschach’s 
vigilantism will be “evened out” by his incarceration.  
 
Figure 2.8: “Everything balances” (V.28). 
The irony, of course, is that Rorschach—indeed, the entire Watchmen world—is 
completely imbalanced. Even the panel’s composition, itself a kind of Rorschach test, resists  
that balance. One foot, neatly encased in its “elevator shoe,” brings Rorschach up to great 
heights, and one foot poking through its tattered sock reflects the lowly Walter Kovacs, poor, 
dirty, and insane. Behind the feet lies Rorschach’s hat, giving greater visual weight to the 
Rorschach identity over the Kovacs; however, the nearly identical coloring of the hat and shoe 
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also make the shoeless foot stand out as distinctive and different. Rorschach’s extremism takes 
him to soaring heights (sometimes literally, as the window and the elevator shoes show) and, as 
Walter Kovacs, to the lowest depths—son of a prostitute, father unknown, foster child, smelly, 
poor, unkempt apocalyptic sign-bearer and street wanderer who ends up facedown and exposed 
on a rainy sidewalk. 
The extremity of Rorschach’s life is tied to his prolonged suffering as a child. While one 
could say, as Jamie Hughes does, that “because society is cruel and merciless, so is he,” 
Rorschach’s stark and uncompromising worldview and extreme behavior result, at least in part, 
from a series of damaging incidents from his childhood culminating in a single complicated 
disaster (Hughes 552). In discussing these incidents, Brent Fishbaugh maintains that 
“[Rorschach] joins the fad of costumed crime-fighting not for fun, but out of guilt—guilt over 
what his entire race has become, guilt spawned not just from the events [that] surround Kitty 
Genovese’s15 death, but from his own misbegotten upbringing’’ (193). Yet it is not merely 
guilt—both social and personal—that “creates” Rorschach, but a splitting of his own sense of 
subjecthood and his identification with the perpetrators of crime. Even after Genovese’s murder, 
Rorschach accepts his earlier given name of Kovacs: “I wasn’t Rorschach then. Then I was just 
Kovacs” (VI.14). It is only after a particular incident, which I shall discuss in detail later, that the 
character himself draws a distinction between his pre- and post-trauma identities: “All Kovacs 
ever was: man in a costume. Not Rorschach. Not Rorschach at all” (VI.15). 
The younger of these identities, Walter Kovacs endures beatings at the hands of his 
mother and taunting by other children and teenagers, leading to a fight in which Kovacs burns an 
older boy’s eye with a cigarette, which, in turn, leads to him being placed in foster care. Upon 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Kitty Genovese is the woman who ordered the fabric from which Rorschach later makes his 
mask. 
	   	   102 
 
leaving foster care at age sixteen, he manages to lead a relatively stable life until he learns of the 
murder of Kitty Genovese, at which point he creates his inkblot mask and takes on crime-
fighting. Genovese’s murder is a historical anchor in the fictional world: in 1964, she was 
stabbed to death near her home while bystanders did nothing to help. In the New York of 
Watchmen, Rorschach is convinced that Genovese is the same woman who ordered a dress from 
the shop he worked at earlier, the fabric of which becomes his signature shape-shifting mask 
(figure 2.9). Wearing it becomes not only a sign of Rorschach’s moral, black-and-white 
worldview, but also a declaration of his own agency, his unwillingness to become a passive 
bystander. 
 
Figure 2.9: Kitty Genovese’s dress; “black and white. Moving, changing shape… but not mixing. No gray” (VI.10). 
Unlike Dr. Manhattan, who experiences one acute, life-altering disaster, Rorschach’s 
history is a slow build-up of multiple instances of emotional and psychological damage, 
culminating in a sharp psychic break, which causes him to reject entirely his previous identity 
and fully become Rorschach. Dr. Long, the psychiatrist who takes on Rorschach’s case, even 
recognizes that “It’s not [Kovacs’] childhood, his mother or Kitty Genovese. Those things just 
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made him over-react to the injustice in the world. They’re not what sent him over its edge. 
They’re not what turned him into Rorschach” (VI.16). Initially distracted from Rorschach’s story 
by his need to reach the “primal scene” of his childhood, Dr. Long eventually realizes that 
Rorschach is perhaps not responding to his treatment (despite Rorschach’s initial lies on the blot 
test) and attempts to discover the moment that truly damaged Rorschach. While this event is not 
from Rorschach’s childhood, as Erikson explains, not all physically or mentally violent events 
are necessarily traumatic, depending on the individual’s reception of them: 
The historian who wants to know where a story starts, like the therapist who needs to 
identify a precipitating cause in order to deal with the injury it does, will naturally be 
interested in beginnings. But those are no more than details to everyone else… because it 
is how people react to them rather than what they are that give events whatever traumatic 
quality they can be said to have. The most violent wrenchings in the world, that is to say, 
have no clinical standing unless they harm the workings of a mind or body, so it is the 
damage done that defines and gives shape to the initial event. (Erikson 184)  
In Rorschach’s case, all the violence of his childhood and early adulthood, while damaging, is 
not the cataclysmic wound that causes him to fully split from his former identity.  
While Genovese’s murder does provide the catalyst, as Fishbaugh notes, for Kovacs’s 
entry into the world of costumed heroes, it does not cause his psychic break. The key moment, 
according to Rorschach and others, occurs while Rorschach investigates the kidnapping of a 
young girl in 1975. Told through a series of mostly wordless panels, we see Rorschach entering a 
disused dressmaker’s building, where he sees two large dogs resembling German Shepherds, 
fighting over a bone. A quick search reveals the remains of pink clothing covered in teddy bear 
images in a furnace, and a freshly used cleaver in the kitchen. Realizing the child was murdered 
	   	   104 
 
there, Rorschach kills the dogs, themselves guilty participants for consuming the bones of the 
girl. When the perpetrator arrives, Rorschach handcuffs him to the furnace and sets the building 
on fire. According to him, this murder of the criminal is the formative moment, the moment 
when he ceases to be Walter Kovacs and fully becomes Rorschach: “Was reborn then, free to 
scrawl own design on this morally blank world. Was Rorschach” (VI.26). 
Triggering this narrative by Rorschach is an inkblot test that Dr. Long administers; in the 
first blot Rorschach sees a “dog with head split in half” (figure 2.10, VI.17).  
 
Figure 2.10: Rorschach’s Rorschach test (VI.17). 
The image of the dog here causes the recall of the memories of the night in question, but it also 
links this moment with an earlier memory: that of Kovacs fighting with some other boys. This 
memory is also delivered via flashback; the taunting Rorschach hears in prison causes him to 
flash back to his childhood, when two older boys mocked him and his mother and then smashed 
a piece of fruit in his face. In response, young Kovacs burned one boy’s eye with a cigarette and 
then jumped on the second boy, biting his cheek. As he is pulled off of the second boy, someone 
(outside the panel) calls him a “filthy little animal” and, as he is restrained, another voice calls 
him “an animal. Like a mad dog” (VI.7). Rorschach’s own animalistic tendencies, therefore, are 
mirrored in the presence of the German Shepherds, and this leads to a recognition and then 
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rejection of his self in the criminal. Recognizing Kovacs’ connection to the dogs, Rorschach kills 
them: “It was Kovacs who closed his eyes. It was Rorschach who opened them again” (VI.21). 
More than just Rorschach’s personal trauma, the dogs in this scene are one tie to a larger 
historical metaphor. In a post-Holocaust world, the snarling dogs fighting over the bone of a 
small child call to mind the attack dogs used at the Nazi concentration and death camps. That 
these dogs look like German Shepherds only furthers the association; a “pure” German breed, the 
German Shepherd was often the guard dog of choice at concentration camps, and Hitler owned 
and cherished several dogs of this breed. This connection might be considered tenuous were it 
not, however, for the presence of ashes, fire, and the smell of burning flesh. The ashes, found in 
the furnace along with scraps of the child’s clothing, recall the chimneys and ovens of Auschwitz 
and other death camps. Rorschach chains the criminal to this furnace and sets the place on fire, 
then “stood in street. Watched it burn. Imagined limbless felt torsos inside; breasts blackening; 
bellies smoldering; bursting into flame one by one” (VI.25).  
Literally turning the building into an oven for burning humans, Rorschach’s imagining of 
multiple bodies inside also creates a sense that this scene echoes a larger human bonfire, linking 
the dressmaker’s forms with the passive bodies of crematory victims. The image of the furnace 
takes on genocidal implications, as Walter Kalaidjian argues in “The Holocaust at Home”: 
“Presenced in the cinder is the phantom trace of what has been rendered absent by industrial 
murder and its subsequent cultural repression” (Kalaidjian 74). And while Rorschach’s use of the 
plural here might indicate simply the dress forms, the man’s body and his dogs, there is 
nonetheless an unsettling connection with multiple bodies burning “one by one” as if 
mechanically being fed into an oven.  
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Moreover, following the panels discussed above are three panels, each of which shows 
nothing but a close-up view of orange, yellow and red flames with Rorschach’s narration in 
captions above them. This fire enlightens (in a very literal sense) Rorschach to the absence of 
God and to the randomness of existence (figure 2.11): 
Stood in firelight, sweltering. Bloodstain on chest like map of violent new continent. Felt 
cleansed. Felt dark planet turn under my feet and knew what cats know that makes them 
scream like babies in night. Looked at sky through smoke heavy with human fat and God 
was not there. The cold, suffocating dark goes on forever, and we are alone. Live our 
lives, lacking anything better to do. Devise reason later. Born from oblivion; bear 
children, hell-bound as ourselves; go into oblivion. There is nothing else. (VI.26) 
The absence of preordained meaning in Rorschach’s life opens him up to a quasi-nihilistic view 
of the absurdity of existence. 
 
Figure 2.11: smoke and ash (VI.26). 
This absurdity, this absence of meaning in life, is both pregnant with Holocaustal 
imagery (the burning human fat, the smoke, the oblivion) and reflects the destruction of meaning 
in a post-Holocaust world. As Kalaidjian writes:  
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With the Holocaust… light as a guarantor of truth suffers a profound trauma. In place of 
the lichtung… we encounter [Elie] Wiesel’s ‘small wood in Birkenau’ and its ghastly 
backlighting from the burning children. This latter blaze cannot be fixed as an imaginary 
fire for theoria or contemplatio. Rather, its fire befalls the symbolic order of things, 
incinerating the everyday world of knowing subjects and representable objects. 
(Kalaidjian 50) 
Although this fire “enlightens” Rorschach, it does so only to reveal the absence of productive, 
meaningful, helpful light in the world—an absence echoed in Roschach’s pronouncement that 
“God was not there” (Moore and Gibbons VI.26). Like Dr. Manhattan, then, Rorschach is 
partially aligned with the historical victims of trauma, but also with the perpetrators: he 
experiences “oblivion” and also causes it; he begins killing criminals rather than imprisoning 
them. 
That Nazi death camps appear, if obliquely, in the middle of a Cold War graphic novel is 
perhaps less jarring when one considers that: 
[t]he history that a flashback tells… is, therefore, a history that literally has no place, 
neither in the past, in which it was not fully experienced, nor in the present, in which its 
precise images and enactments are not fully understood. In its repeated imposition as both 
image and amnesia, the trauma thus seems to evoke the difficult truth of a history that is 
constituted by the very incomprehensibility of its occurrence. (Caruth Trauma 153)  
The appearance of camp imagery here indicates not only Rorschach’s personal trauma, but a 
failure on a larger, historical level to fully comprehend the disaster of the Holocaust, leading to 
its reappearance in unlikely places, as I shall discuss later in this chapter in conjunction with 
Ozymandias. Linking the Holocaust with nuclear disaster through the figure of Dr. Manhattan 
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and with the psychotic Rorschach, Watchmen creates a web of disasters that is doomed, to a 
certain extent, to repeat itself. In what Kalaidjian terms “the terminal present after Auschwitz, 
where ‘eternity’ has become retrospective,” bringing Auschwitz into the narrative serves a 
greater social purpose and indicates the inescapability of this historical moment of crisis in 
contemporary imagination (51). As the world of Watchmen stands on the brink of nuclear 
annihilation, this possibility owes its existence to earlier moments of historical annihilation. 
Moreover, Rorschach becomes trapped in the same unending temporal structure as Dr. 
Manhattan, despite Dr. Manhattan blasting Rorschach into pieces at the end of the novel. In 
removing the Rorschach “face” to reveal the Kovacs “mask,” at the instance of his death, 
Rorschach implies that while Dr. Manhattan might kill Kovacs, he cannot eliminate Rorschach 
from the world (figure 2.12).  
 
Figure 2.12: Rorschach’s death (XII.24). 
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Indeed, Rorschach’s experience lives on, presumably, in his journal; the final panel of the whole 
text shows a newspaper employee reaching for Rorschach’s journal, opening the text up to the 
possibility that Rorschach’s desire to expose the truth may, in fact, come to fruition after all. And 
since the first words of Watchmen come from Rorschach’s journal, one wonders if the whole 
book, the very object the reader holds, is not some form of that journal. As Iain Thomson argues, 
“Rorschach’s Journal… serves as both an homage (ironic or not) to the tradition of the 
detective’s voice-over in film noir, and, more importantly, as a symbolic stand-in for the 
projected fantasies of the comic-book as such” (112).  
Rorschach and Dr. Manhattan, then, both embody the text’s own cyclicality, as their 
respective stories of trauma mimic the structure of nonlinear, traumatized time and the structured 
layering of the text as a whole. References to the Holocaust and Hiroshima appear only 
obliquely, however, as both narrative and visual background. These historical references serve a 
dual purpose: they enter the text as a way of setting up these characters’ own stories, so that 
Hiroshima appears as a means of illustrating Dr. Manhattan’s existence, or that the oblique 
Holocaust references in Rorschach’s story only demonstrate the gravity and sweep of his 
individual actions. But the individuals’ stories also serve as avenues into larger questions of 
history and cyclicality, as their actions and emotions reflect the same patterns of repetition and 
visibility as the historical moments revealed in the text. 
 
Swallowing Hitler’s Lies: Look on Ozymandias’ Work and Despair 
The text’s cyclical nature also indicates the frightening possibility for history to repeat 
itself, and, indeed, the monster’s “invasion” at the end of the novel is itself a kind of repetition of 
the Holocaust. The perpetrator of this monstrous crisis is Adrian Veidt, alias Ozymandias, “the 
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smartest man in the world.” Golden haired, physically exceptional, a self-made multimillionaire, 
Adrian Veidt presents an appearance of near-perfection. Yet underneath this surface Veidt is a 
homicidal megalomaniac, a man willing to sacrifice the many in the service of the many more or 
for “the greater good;” in his worldview, casualties are the necessary price for harmony, for a 
cleansed society, for the preservation of humanity. Veidt is a man who destroys half of New 
York City “for the greater good,” using rhetoric eerily similar to Hitler’s16. In fact, as he reveals 
his plan to Nite Owl and Rorschach in Chapter XI, Veidt says, “Hitler said people swallow lies 
easily, provided they’re big enough” (XI.26).  
Done presumably to save humanity, Veidt’s disaster also provides an opportunity for his 
own financial growth: while planning this destruction, he also plans to invest in erotic products, 
baby food and maternity goods, and in the post-disaster world Veidt releases a new perfurme, 
“Millenium” (X.8). More than just self-serving greed, however, this business-mindedness 
indicates Veidt’s investment in the very future of humanity—a future his plan, he hopes, will 
ensure. Literally investing in future generations and the continuity of the human race, Veidt 
appears to be of conflicting impulses: destruction and rebirth; charity and greed. Humanity’s 
future, Veidt argues, can only be assured through the interference of one man “all alone… just 
me and the world” (X.8). Thus Veidt reveals his megalomania, his misguided sense that he alone 
can save the world from itself, echoing again Hitler and his “thousand year Reich.”  
Veidt, like all characters in Watchmen, is a figure of dualities. Seemingly genuinely 
concerned with bettering Earth and the people living on it, Veidt donates to charity and sells self-
improvement plans, including the “Veidt Method” advertised in various panels. In these ads 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 “What we are doing is making a sacrifice in the interest of peace. We make this sacrifice, but 
we, at least, want to have peace in exchange for it” (Hitler’s speech at the Berlin Sportspalast, 
January 30, 1941). http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/hitler013041.html 
 
	   	   111 
 
appears the slogan, “I will give you bodies beyond your wildest imaginations,” which, after the 
catastrophe he inflicts on New York City, takes on extra meaning. Along the same lines, Veidt’s 
plan to save the world involves destroying millions of innocent civilians; he creates a monster, 
teleports it into New York where it explodes, killing millions, and as a result the US and the 
Soviets set aside their struggle and unify against what they assume is an impending alien attack. 
Veidt thus embodies the fallibility of the visible, or the disconnect between appearance and 
reality. While he appears to be the “golden boy,” he is a villain on a vast scale. 
Watchmen visually enacts this same fallibility through Moore and Gibbons’ structured 
use of repetition and perspective. As Iain Banks notes, Watchmen demands re-reading, and after 
the text reveals the culprit at the end, the reader can return to earlier moments and discover visual 
or narrative hints about Veidt’s villainy. For example, early in the text a man tries to attack Veidt 
in the lobby of his company building. Veidt disarms him and tries to convince the man to reveal 
who hired him, but the attacker instead takes a cyanide pill and dies instantly (figure 2.13).   
 
Figure 2.13: the death of Veidt’s would-be assassin (V.16). 
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In the final book, Veidt reveals that he shoved the cyanide pill in the man’s mouth, eliminating 
him as witness to Veidt’s plan. In concealing the truth of this moment, or in only partially 
revealing it, Watchmen underscores the shifting, unstable relationship between image, narrative, 
and trauma. The text contains the trace, belatedly revealed, of Veidt’s evil, and, in its hiding or 
altering of facts within those events, is ultimately implicated in the deception of the reader. That 
is, the text performs the same deceptions on the reader as Veidt performs on his world. These 
deceptions are of an explicitly visual nature—the panels and images themselves lie to us—
emphasizing the potential instability of the visual elements in comics.17  
Veidt’s Hitler-esque destruction of New York is itself a Holocaustal moment, as the text 
reveals other oblique references to the Nazi’s regime of extermination at the moment of the 
monster’s appearance. Peppered throughout the text, always in the background, are veiled 
references to a particular moment of history—posters advertising a November 2 concert at 
Madison Square Garden, “Pale Horse in concert with Krystalnacht” (XII.2). This misspelled 
“Krystalnacht” refers to the infamous Kristallnacht of 1938, a Nazi-led pogrom in Germany and 
Austria. As Doris L. Bergen describes, on the night of 9-10 November (the same month, not 
coincidentally, as the concert in Watchmen), “[c]rowds smashed the windows of businesses 
owned by Jews…. The attackers did not spare Jewish homes. They forced their way in, robbing, 
beating, raping and demolishing…. They burned scores of synagogues all over Germany and 
Austria and killed about a hundred Jews. Nazi authorities rounded up some twenty-six thousand 
Jewish men…” (Bergen 84-86). The misspelling of “Krystalnacht” does nothing to diminish the 
implications of including such a name in the text; as the concert starts, a newsvendor even 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 For more discussion on the potential for images’ unstable relations with reality and with one 
another, see the later chapters on Alison Bechdel (chapter five) and David B. (chapter six). 
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complains, “Holocaust comin’, goddamn knot-heads gotta party! I can hear their music coming 
from Madison Square!” (XI.6). 
Although these “Krystalnacht” posters remain in the background, and are almost always 
partially obscured by other figures or objects in the panels, the inclusion of such a name for a 
band is not only deliberate, but also indicative of the ever-disappearing yet still present memory 
of the Holocaust (see figure 2.14 below). The fact that the posters are always obscured may also 
indicate the inaccessibility of this past to the contemporary imaginary; the total memory of the 
destruction of the Jews remains unavailable, or available only in pieces to be later constructed 
(here, by the reader) into a whole. After all, as Bergen notes, Kristallnacht “marked the last open 
pogrom they [the Nazis] organized in Germany and annexed Austria,” and the bulk of the 
violence against Jews from this point on moved out of the public arena, and into the 
geographically removed spaces concentration and death camps (87). The obscured posters mirror 
this attempt to remove from sight the destruction of the Jews by restricting the reader’s access to 
the posters. Existing in that zone between revelation and concealment, these historical references 
occur precisely because of the representational possibilities in comics, that zone of contact 
between text and image, presence and absence. The graphic novel thus exhibits its own traumatic 
structure, with its nonlinear temporality and its repetitive imagery—including these 
“Krystalnacht” posters. Watchmen thus captures the pervasive sense that the Holocaust and 
World War II are always present, yet always at the margins, of popular culture itself.  
The historical implications of this “Krystalnacht” band name are brought to the fore near 
the end of the text, when Chapter XII (the final chapter) opens with large images of utter 
destruction wrought by Adrian Veidt’s “alien” monster’s arrival and immediate explosion in 
New York City. The first six pages of the chapter are full-page panels (a rarity in a comic that 
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mostly restricts itself to the use of the nine-panel page) showing nothing but piles upon piles of 
dead bodies and gutted buildings. The first two of these six pages are, presumably, at and near 
(respectively) Madison Square Garden and the Pale Horse / Krystalnacht concert. The first page 
shows a close-up view of bodies hanging out of broken windows, echoing the “Night of Broken 
Glass,” as Kristallnacht is known in English, while the second page shows the same scene from a 
more distant angle, so that the Madison Square Garden sign is (mostly) visible and the 
destruction of the surrounding buildings and people evident (figure 2.14). Thus the haunting past 
of the Holocaust returns in the annihilation of the population of New York City, bringing the 
historical disaster inside the narrative’s immediate one. 
 
Figure 2.14: the destruction of New York; note the obscured Krystalnacht posters (XII.1-2). 
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Veidt in fact consciously tries to situate himself in a long historical tradition of global 
conquest and violent conflict: he follows Alexander the Great’s warpath, adopts Rameses II’s 
Greek name, and cites Hitler in his attempt to save humanity from itself. He seems to operate 
under a long-term vision of the world (however perverse): he anticipates the fall of the masked 
vigilante in the late 1970s a decade before it happens, he solidifies his reputation and quits the 
vigilante scene, willingly revealing his hidden identity, well before vigilantism is outlawed, and 
he builds an intricate, pyramidal system of companies in order to carry out his plan. However, as 
the cyclical system of the text and Dr. Manhattan’s expansive view of time indicate, Veidt deals 
only with the symptom of humanity’s propensity toward disaster, not its cause. Lacking Dr. 
Manhattan’s more cosmically oriented view, Veidt’s world becomes surprisingly limited. 
The final irony of Veidt’s chosen pseudonym, Ozymandias, echoes the cyclical nature of 
the text itself and Veidt’s inability to recognize his own limitations. While Chapter XI ends with 
the famous line from Percy Bysshe Shelly’s poem “Ozymandias” (“My name is Ozymandias, 
king of kings: / Look on my works, ye mighty, and despair!”), it excludes the bulk of the poem, 
in which the statue of Ozymandias is described as a “shattered visage” in utter ruin, whose “two 
vast and trunkless legs of stone / Stand in the desert.” Shelly’s poem calls into question the 
notion of permanence; a statue of a former conqueror is reduced to pieces half-covered by sand 
in a vast desert, where the work upon which we are to gaze and despair is nothing but the 
dominance of nature and time over the works of humanity. Likewise, Veidt fails to acknowledge 
the possibilities of both his own fall and of the spiraling journey of humans toward destruction. 
He vainly demands we look on his work and despair, while remaining blind to the prospect that 
his own kingdom might one day cease to exist—a prospect, as discussed earlier, that the text 
itself makes all too clear. Veidt’s demonic plan to save the world through destroying half of New 
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York is thus a thematic and visual hearkening to the Holocaust and Hitler’s tyrannical vision. 
Through the comics’ disorienting visual structures and textual omissions, Veidt’s narrative 
demonstrates the fallibility of images and the ways the text can manipulate the reader.  
 
Mirror, Mirror: Nite Owl, Silk Spectre, and Destruction’s Future 
Laurie Juspeczyk, alias Silk Spectre, is the only active female vigilante in the novel, and 
her alias is both seductive and ephemeral. Laurie herself, however, fully and utterly resists the 
spectral. Dr. Manhattan calls her his “last link with humanity,” and ultimately, with Dan 
Dreiberg (Nite Owl), she reaffirms the domination of the body and the human over the spectral. 
Indeed, Laurie and Dan appear to be humanity’s triumph over disaster, a triumph realized only in 
their acceptance of the base, the carnal, the physical—in short, in their very flawed humanity. 
For Dan and Laurie, this humanity is not the insignificant nuisance it is for Dr. Manhattan, nor 
the self-destructive misguided mass Ozymandias sees, nor the meaningless cesspool of 
Rorschach’s view. Rather, for Dan and Laurie, life is sweet—“so damn sweet,” says Laurie 
(XII.22). 
Indeed, much of Dan and Laurie’s narrative rests on individual desire and subjectivity, on 
their unconscious wishes finding visual expression while remaining “unspoken.” Moore and 
Gibbons employ the trope of the mirror to bring the unconscious to light, demonstrating the ways 
in which desire and memory work together to form subjects’ identities. This mirroring is not 
always found on a mirrored surface, but often rather within the text’s structure. On page nine of 
Chapter V, for example, we turn from a close-up of a pirate’s face eating a raw gull to a close-up 
of Dan’s face, reflected in a mirror, eating a chicken leg on page 10 (figure 2.15).  
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Figure 2.15: Dan mirroring the pirate (V.9-10). 
The literal darkness of the image—everything in the panel is in a brownish sepia tone—echoes 
the thematic darkness of the pirate story, as well as the darkness of Dan’s own unconscious, his 
unspoken desires, which play out later in his apocalyptic dream scene (which shall be discussed 
later). Like the queen’s mirror in “Snow White,” mirrors and reflections reveal otherwise hidden 
truths about the characters, and in so doing, bring their unconscious wishes into both the realm of 
possibility and a larger network of personal and historical subjects intricately linked together. 
Here, this particular series of panels moves from the mirror to reality and back to the 
mirror, an example of both the “fearful symmetry” from the title of chapter and the visualization 
of Dan’s desire for Laurie. Dan is the “nice guy,” the one who helps Laurie through her 
separation from Dr. Manhattan, and who, it seems, genuinely fights crime out of a sense of honor 
rather than guilt, self-aggrandizement or megalomania. That the page begins with such a dark 
image is thus all the more unnerving; the unassuming Dan apparently harbors dark, unspoken, 
consuming desires. In the center of the page Dan offers her a place to stay, resulting in Laurie’s 
silhouette reflected alongside Dan’s in the mirror (figure 2.16).  
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Figure 2.16: Dan offers Laurie a place to stay (V.10). 
Thus on this page, Dan’s unspoken, unacknowledged desire for Laurie structures his actions and 
the resulting narrative, which brings him and Laurie together, while his outward actions remain 
friendly, even chivalrous. 
Two pages later a mirror appears again in an image of the pirate gazing at himself in the 
sea: “a madman with blood-caked lips gazed back at me,” the pirate says, as if Nietzsche’s abyss 
stares back (V.12). “The Tales of the Black Freighter” comic, which appears at various intervals 
in the text, serves as a many-layered allegory for various narrative strands in Watchmen. In the 
“Black Freighter,” a man attacked by pirates goes mad and kills various individuals in an effort 
to save those very people from the pirates he believes have already arrived. What the “Black 
Freighter” depicts, then, is a man who becomes the thing he is trying to avoid, that reflection of a 
madman with blood-caked lips, despite his well-meaning intentions.  
Lacan tells us that an individual’s own sense of subjectivity is structured through 
reflection. The subject sees itself in the mirror and, in misrecognizing the reflection as itself, 
identifies as a whole, unified entity like the image in the reflection. This stage is in fact a process 
repeated throughout a subject’s life; the subject takes on as identity the image it sees “in the 
mirror” or in the gaze of the other. In Watchmen, this creation of subjectivity is further 
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complicated by the ways in which the mirror shows both what the characters want, and want to 
avoid. 
In Chapter XI, Veidt refers to his tropical vivarium retreat in Antarctica as “[t]wo alien 
universes, separated by a membrane of fragile glass.” One may extend this metaphor to apply to 
all the instances of reflection and mirroring in the text; the reflective surface separates two 
worlds of conscious and unconscious desires, two subjects inhabiting the same body. When 
Laurie appears in the mirror of Dan’s guest bedroom, then, the mirror brings together multiple 
pairs of “alien universes”—among them, Dan and Laurie, the unlikely couple, and each 
character’s unacknowledged desires against their actual behavior. This page begins with 
“heaven” for Laurie and ends in “hell and damnation” for Dan (figure 2.17). Here, the mirror is 
again Dan’s projection of desire on Laurie; we see her undressing in the mirror, while our view 
of her in “reality” shows her fully-clothed back. Yet perhaps this mirror also reflects Laurie’s 
desire for Dan. She seems to try to deny her sexual side, especially in her rejection of her 
costume, “with that stupid little short skirt and the neckline going down to my navel? God, that 
was so dreadful” (I.25). Later, however, she voluntarily dons the costume to rescue some 
tenement residents caught in a fire, and the act of donning the costume for both Laurie and Dan 
gives expression to their unarticulated sexual desires. 
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Figure 2.17: Dan’s desire in the mirror (V.19). 
Dan and Laurie’s relationship, especially its sexual realization, is linked with the 
performance of simultaneous virility and violence. In Chapter III, the two of them experience a 
quasi-sexual moment while fighting some street thugs, Laurie naked under her overcoat, Dan 
without his glasses, both breathing heavily (figure 2.18).  
 
Figure 2.18: Dan and Laurie’s pre-coital violence (III.15). 
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Laurie lights a cigarette, a post-coital action repeated later after the two do finally have sex in 
Archie, Dan’s airship. The adrenaline rush of fighting criminals here foreshadows the necessity 
for Dan and Laurie to once again don their costumes in order to achieve physical intimacy.  
Their sexual relationship is dependent upon that very adrenaline, and as a result, that 
relationship is also dependent upon exterior stimuli, and dependent upon greater political and 
historical catastrophe. In the absence of such stimuli, Dan and Laurie’s “normal” lives are not 
enough to sustain that relationship. In Chapter VII, there is a slight play on the Clark Kent / 
Superman trope with Dan taking off his glasses and immediately attracting Laurie: “Why, Mr. 
Dreiberg, you’re dashing,” she says (VII.13). But this is not Superman; this is just poor, inept 
Clark Kent without his glasses on. Although Laurie is attracted to Dan in this scene, their attempt 
at lovemaking is awkward, stilted and ultimately unsuccessful in the face of Dan’s inability to 
“perform” (there is an ironic, almost sarcastic juxtaposition of Laurie and Dan on couch, and 
Ozymandias’ “flawless” gymnastics routine on the television).  
The problem, Laurie says before kissing Dan on the couch, is inhibition; yet the continual 
emphasis on mirrored desire makes it clear that suppression is not the sole factor in Dan’s 
reticence. Rather, his impotence appears to be a combination of helplessness and inhibition on 
both an historical and personal scale, as well as a fractured sense of identity. Immediately after 
this failed attempt at sexual intercourse, Dan experiences an apocalyptic dream, in which his 
former admirer, the “Twilight Lady” embraces Nite Owl (figure 2.19). The two peel off the 
other’s exterior to reveal Silk Spectre and Nite Owl underneath; the two masked vigilantes kiss 
and immediately explode in an image that echoes Dr. Manhattan’s nuclear disaster and the 
Hiroshima Lover’s graffiti discussed earlier. The dream posits Dan’s subjectivity as split 
between the naked human and the costumed vigilante; the mask becomes the interior core of 
	   	   122 
 
identity. Here, Dan’s unconscious expresses its inability to form a coherent sense of self, of 
desired object, and even of personal place in history. 
 
Figure 2.19: Dan’s dream (VII.16). 
In response, Dan dons Nite Owl’s goggles as an action against that very impotence. 
Indeed, once Dan and Laurie reenter the world of helping hapless citizens, Dan is able to realize 
his other desires. Their successful consummation echoes the dream sequence, with short, choppy, 
wordless panels, so that Dan’s real life and unconscious desires are now aligned (figure 2.20). 
Laurie observes that “there’s no quitting,” only “pauses between relapses” in “dangerous habits;” 
this observation applies to her smoking, but also to the crime-fighting she and Dan just engaged 
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in, and their resultant sexual relationship. Dan now feels “confident” like Ozymandias; costumes 
lead to potency and a realization of desire.  
 
Figure 2.20: Dan and Laurie’s dreamlike relationship (VII.27). 
Like Batman and Rorschach, then, we must ask: which is Dan’s true identity? Once he takes on 
Nite Owl’s mask, Dan is able to indulge in his desires, to become the mirror. In so doing he also 
positions himself in a narrative tied to larger stakes, both in terms of the world of Watchmen (he 
must go to Antarctica to confront Ozymandias) and in the apocalyptic vision of desire put forth 
in his dream. Individual desire, claims Watchmen, is always, if unconsciously, tied to a larger 
political and historical world—and a world of tension between the visible and the masked. 
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Although Dan and Laurie both don the mask to allow themselves a certain amount of 
liberation, Laurie’s freedom as her alter ego functions slightly differently than Dan’s. Mark D. 
White reads Dan and Laurie’s respective reentries into vigilantism as indicative of different life 
philosophies: “[Dan] is deliberate but not headstrong; he is cautious but not foolhardy. We can 
contrast his behavior with the Silk Spectre’s, who joins him in these endeavors but makes clear 
that she does it more for the excitement and to make up for the boredom of her sequestered life 
with Dr. Manhattan” (White 84). White’s reading of Dan and Laurie’s motives rightly 
acknowledges the role that personal desire plays for both characters; however, limiting Laurie’s 
motivations to reluctant boredom ignores and undermines her struggle throughout the text to 
claim an identity of her own.  
Forced into the Silk Spectre identity by her mother, Sally Jupiter, the original Silk 
Spectre, and later, acting as a “kept woman” (as she says) for Dr. Manhattan, Laurie has been 
molded to fit other people’s desires for most of her life. Laurie’s donning of the costume is also 
done for the possibility of sexual and romantic affair with Dan, creating a relationship in which 
she takes a more dominant role than she does with Dr. Manhattan. Although it might seem as 
though Laurie moves from (super)man to man without defining herself as an independent 
subject, it is precisely within her triangular relationship with Dan and Dr. Manhattan that she is 
able to face her past and begin to understand her own desires.  
This separation of subjectivity, the separation between unconscious and conscious 
desires, or between the image of Laurie and her interior life, echoes Dr. Manhattan’s sense of the 
wholeness of time. Rather than multiple moments occupying the same space—the same 
timescape—multiple levels of subjectivity occupy the same corporeal space. When Laurie travels 
with Dr. Manhattan to Mars in Chapter IX, the conflation of timescapes and desires becomes 
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tangible. While on Mars, Dr. Manhattan asks her to recall her earliest memory (figure 2.21). The 
text then shows us that memory; it is not solely textually narrated, like Dr. Manhattan’s story 
begins in Chapter IV, nor is it drawn from some outside perspective, like Rorschach’s silent 
flashback, but her memory is visible from Laurie’s point of view. That is, the viewer occupies 
the same literal viewpoint as the young Laurie (see again figure 2.21).  
 
Figure 2.21: Laurie begins to remember (IX.6). 
Moreover her memory becomes the present, again illustrating a sense of simultaneity and the 
possibility for comics to demonstrate that sense of coexistence. From one panel to the next, the 
narrative moves at least twenty years into the past, but it does so as if that past were happening 
right then, in the present of the panel, even though the captions narrate Laurie’s memory in the 
past tense.  
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Within Laurie’s retelling of the memory itself—a memory of her parents fighting, when 
she learns her mother’s husband is not her father—Laurie demonstrates an early understanding 
of time’s relativity. Staring at a snow globe, she explains: “There was this toy, this snowstorm 
ball, with a tiny castle inside, except it was like a whole world; a world inside the ball… it was 
like a little glass bubble of somewhere else. I lifted it, starting a blizzard. I knew it wasn’t real 
snow, but I couldn’t understand how it fell so slowly. I figured inside the ball was some different 
sort of time. Slow time” (IX.7). Within Laurie’s memory—her very first memory, in fact—she 
recognizes the possibility for a temporal experience outside of the standard. This description of 
another world inhabiting “slow time” is precisely the way her own memory functions; the text 
shows us a different world, a world of the past, in which events occur and then recur in 
fragments. 
What the world of the snow globe ultimately reveals is the Comedian as her father; the 
same man who tried to rape her mother later became her mother’s willing sexual partner. 
Remembering the snow globe leads to the recovery of this repressed knowledge. As soon as she 
tries to deny repression (“There’s n-nothing to avoid…” she stammers) the text brings fragments 
of captions and repeated images together in a series of panels that culminate in her face reflecting 
in a bottle of Nostalgia perfume (figure 2.22). Attempting to deny her own realization, she 
throws the bottle against Dr. Manhattan’s glass palace, destroying both as the captions repeat 
Laurie’s memory of the snow globe’s “slow time” (IX.24). The fragments of glass visually 
resonate with the fragmented text; the pieces of earlier captions break apart and re-form to create 
a new meaning, a new narrative for Laurie’s life.  
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Figure 2.22: Laurie throws the perfume bottle (IX.24). 
Indeed, Moore and Gibbons employ this strategy throughout Watchmen, using the essentially 
fragmented nature of the comics medium to form new meanings from repeated objects, symbols, 
images and words as the narrative develops. 
One such object is the very perfume bottle Laurie shatters. It is “Nostalgia, by Veidt”—a 
perfume that is advertised throughout the streets of Watchmen’s New York. Nostalgia, the 
longing for a past that never existed, is shattered along with Laurie’s illusions surrounding her 
childhood and the glass of both bottle and castle. As Laurie and Dr. Manhattan stand among the 
glass splinters of the wreckage of Manhattan’s Martian palace, Veidt unleashes his monster on 
New York. Thus two Kristallnachts occur: Veidt’s monstruous, large-scale destruction is 
simultaneous with Laurie’s very personal crisis. Yet this crisis allows for an opening of desire in 
Laurie; as her individual problems with identity align with the larger tragedy she encounters in 
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Chapter XI, Laurie is able to turn to her relationship with Dan Dreiberg and investigate her 
personal desires previously kept at bay behind her need to please others.  
 
Figure 2.23: Dan and Laurie as the Hiroshima lovers (XII.22). 
In their post-catastrophe embrace, Dan and Laurie project a gigantic shadow reminiscent 
of the Hiroshima Lover’s graffiti and of a Rorschach inkblot, so that the very moment of 
affirming what I earlier called the “triumph of humanity” becomes a spectral link to past and 
future disasters (figure 2.23). It might seem odd, after the previous discussion, to now say that 
Dan and Laurie’s affirmation of life is also an affirmation of death, of disaster larger than life. 
Yet the text itself insists upon the convergence of the personal with the historical and the 
cyclical, just as it does for the characters of Dr. Manhattan, Rorschach, and Ozymandias. Dan’s 
apocalyptic dream and the enormous shadow of Dan and Laurie serve to connect them to the 
same historical catastrophes discussed earlier, just as Laurie’s shattered bottle of perfume links 
her personal memories to the shattering of Kristallnacht, heightening not only the traumatic 
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nature of Laurie’s memories, but also the interconnectedness of the individual’s experiences with 
the historical or social memory of catastrophe.  
More horrifying, however, are the ways in which Dan and Laurie seem to actually turn 
towards the same pattern of history at the end of the novel. When they appear at Sally Jupiter’s 
retirement home, they have both dyed their hair blonde, and have created new identities that 
allow them to live as normal citizens again. As they leave, Dan says, “Y’know, maybe that 
wasn’t such a bad idea of your mother’s…” to which Laurie responds, “Children? Forget it. Not 
yet. You were talking about adventuring, and I’m not staying home changing diapers” (XII.30). 
Here, Dan and Laurie discuss implicitly the possibility of creating another “thermodynamic 
miracle,” the miraculous birth of an individual against the millions of other possible individuals 
(figure 2.24).  
 
Figure 2.24: Now-blonde Laurie and Dan (XII.30). 
Laurie’s act of reminding Dr. Manhattan of these miracles is enough to bring Dr. Manhattan 
back to Earth, despite his earlier disparaging of “life insisting on life’s viewpoint.” 
Paradoxically, however, Dan and Laurie’s discussion of perhaps creating those same 
thermodynamic miracles means that they are now just as future-oriented as Adrian Veidt was 
when he was planning New York’s destruction. Both now blonde and planning for a future, the 
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two of them look like Veidt’s “Millennium” forward-looking ad campaign (figure 2.25) and like 
Veidt himself, the only other blonde character. 
 
Figure 2.25: An ad for Veidt’s “Millennium” perfume (XII.31). 
Sarah Donovan and Nick Richardson read Laurie’s transformation at the end as an 
affirmation of her new-found independence, arguing that in redesigning her costume and 
changing her appearance, Laurie asserts her independence from her mother and moves towards 
self-determination (Donovan and Richardson 183). However, reading Laurie’s transformation 
this way ignores the associations her appearance and future-oriented outlook raise with 
Ozymandias. Moreover, the costume design to which Donovan and Richardson refer also has 
ominous associations; for one, the Comedian also wore leather and a mask—is Laurie now 
following in her amoral father’s footsteps, rather than her overly sexualized mother’s? The 
leather costume and mask also fits the depiction of Dan’s past admirer, the Twilight Lady, who 
appears in Dan’s apocalyptic dream as the woman under whose skin Laurie is “hiding.” I said 
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earlier that Laurie begins to understand her own desires, and that beginning does deserve such 
emphasis. Her new costume, new name, and blonde hair might offer the appearance of 
independence. However, in exploring these newly uncovered desires, Laurie also uncovers their 
darkness, their ties to larger historical struggles and the possibility for future catastrophes. 
What is terrifying about Watchmen, then, are the ways in which the text indicates the all-
pervasive temporal suspension, characteristic of the acutely traumatized individual, and expands 
it to include the most “normal” of humans. Although it appears that Dan and Laurie continuously 
act on their own personal relationships and their own navigations of desire, Watchmen makes it 
clear that every personal negotiation is also in some way political and historical. The text insists 
on drawing together individual and historical crises, so that when the individual emerges, she or 
he fits again into the same pattern, if at different places. Laurie and Dan’s appearance at the end 
of the novel indicate the multiplicity of possible futures, although some of those futures are 
ominously “golden” and reminiscent of Ozymandias’ desired utopia. In such ways, the future 
may not be a future proper, but a spiraled return to a catastrophic past—one in which the lessons 
presumed learned from the original disaster are forgotten. 
This conflation of past historical trauma with the (then) imagined contemporary trauma 
of a massive attack on New York City creates multiple and multidirectional levels of trauma. 
Watchmen is full of echoes of cultural or historical trauma within the individual and within text, 
all of which serve perhaps as a warning of the impossibility of fully moral actions in an immoral 
world. Perhaps, then, the inclusion of traumatized characters and subtle Holocaust images works 
to alert the reader to the importance of striving for memory and for moral action in a world 
quickly moving away from both. Veidt’s destructive monster and the disaster at the end of the 
novel put into question the sacrifice of many for the good of many more (the monster essentially 
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averts imminent nuclear war). But the inclusion of these images problematizes even further this 
sacrifice: at what point does it become criminal to sacrifice one group for “the good” of another? 
And what basis do we use in determining these groups? 
 Moore and Gibbons thus draw our attention to the possibility that historical trauma may 
once again occur. As Dr. Manhattan says to Ozymandias at the end of the novel, “ ‘In the end?’ 
Nothing ends, Adrian. Nothing ever ends” (XII.27). This sense of continuity pervades 
Watchmen, which itself is that same “intricately structured jewel” of temporal and narrative 
fragments, visual repetitions, and historical conflations. The oblique Holocaust and nuclear 
references in the text reflect the insidious nature of historical trauma, as it penetrates all layers of 
the narrative and the characters’ experiences. Moreover, these references also exploit the notion 
of visuality itself—the constructed, historically and discursively determined ways of seeing. 
Although the characters’ actions described here often seem to align them with the perpetrators of 
extreme violence even while they claim to be its victims, the text itself, in its visual and narrative 
presentations of these moments, renders visible those actions and their historical echoes. Thus 
the reader learns to see differently, due to the text’s insistence on both showing us and, 
paradoxically, hiding from us the subtle pervasiveness of the Holocaust and other traumatic 
historical events. Thus while the text insists on continuity, repetition, and the unending cycles of 
trauma, Watchmen simultaneously provides for the opportunity to recognize and rethink those 
cycles through its insistence on active readership and visibility. 
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Chapter 3: Paradoxical Visions: Traumatic and Colonial Landscapes in Comics of the 
Rwandan Genocide 
 
Moving from Watchmen’s oblique references to historical catastrophes to works whose 
central focus is genocide, this chapter investigates how the comics medium represents such 
extreme violence in the Rwandan context. This chapter is also a moment of shifting from 
fictional narratives to historical ones. Unlike Batman and Watchmen, which are clearly fantastic 
and fictional imaginings of the world, the texts I examine in this chapter take as their focus a 
real, historical moment. Discussing such texts means we are moving away from the role of 
traumatic historical moments in popular culture more broadly, to the specificity of the Rwandan 
genocide and its possibilities for representation through the comics medium.  
Over the course of approximately one hundred days from April to June, 1994, the small 
African nation of Rwanda experienced an explosion of genocidal violence perpetrated by one 
ethnic group, the Hutus, against another, the Tutsis. During this short time period, the 
Interahamwe (the militia whose sole purpose was to exterminate Tutsis), the Rwandan army, and 
Hutu civilians killed hundreds of thousands of Tutsis; estimates range from 500,000 to over one 
million victims of the genocide, in a country whose population numbered approximately 7.5 
million that year.18 The rapidity of the violence and the brutality of the massacres have fixed the 
Rwandan genocide among the worst atrocities in recent memory. 
Three graphic narratives take up these one hundred days of genocide, often in 
compelling, if disturbing, ways. Rupert Bazambanza’s memoir, Sourire malgré tout (Smile 
Through the Tears, trans. Lesley McCubbin, 2004), centers on the experiences of Bazambanza’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Death toll estimates vary depending on the source; cf. Lemarchand, Melvern, Bazambanza, 
Lyons and Strauss, Prunier, etc. 
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neighbors, the Rwanga family, most of whom fall victim to the genocide. The fictional Rwanda 
1994 (2009), by French writers Cécile Grenier and Alain Austini, and Congolese artist Pat 
Masioni, similarly takes place during the one hundred days of genocide as it follows one woman, 
Mathilde, as she tries to save her family both during and after the genocide. Finally, Jean-
Philippe Stassen’s fictional comic Déogratias (2000, English translation 2006) follows the titular 
character in the aftermath of the genocide as he wanders the city, and his participation in the 
genocide appearing as flashbacks within the text. Each bande dessinée takes up similar issues of 
madness, trauma, memory, and visuality, specifically though their use of the Rwandan landscape 
to signify the tensions between vision, trauma, and power within the narratives. These comics 
delineate three ways of seeing and depicting landscape: in Smile, the land is a lost Eden, a 
paradise and curative space that needs to be purged of the stain of genocidal and colonial 
violence. Similarly, Rwanda 1994 figures the land as a protective space of redemption, although 
the text also maintains that the landscape can be a place of terror and violence, and that its 
construction as a visible and visual space is an inherently colonial project. Finally, in Deogratias 
the landscape has lost its restorative qualities and instead is an ominous, threatening space, but 
also a space that disturbs and undermines the privilege of the distanced seeing eye. 
These three works are thus symptomatic of a certain visual tension present in the 
representation of genocide and trauma, particularly in a postcolonial context. These comics both 
conceal and reveal their narratives of trauma, much in the same way their landscapes both 
display and cover the bodies of the genocide’s victims. They also reveal the inherent possibility 
for violence in the act of seeing, while paradoxically still participating in that violence, by very 
nature of the visual medium. It is precisely this paradox of visuality that makes the comics 
medium so intricately wedded to the representations of trauma and memory. Moving between the 
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frames of the panels through the gutter spaces to construct the narratives’ progression, reading 
these texts and images creates a sense of a visible and legible space into which the trauma and 
violence can be written—and here, this space is that of the land itself. For all of these texts, then, 
the Rwandan landscape is thus a space onto which the symptoms of the genocide are rendered 
visible. 
Moreover, the manipulation of the landscape both echoes and complicates the 
construction of Rwanda as a land of ethnic antagonism—a construction developed and 
exacerbated through European colonialism. In binding representations of the Rwandan genocide 
and its trauma so inextricably to the (imagined) landscapes of the country, these texts reiterate 
the centrality of land to conceptions of Africa in the Western imaginary. Rather than some kind 
of alternative vision of Rwanda, these texts adopt the authoritarian gaze so strongly linked with 
the colonial eye. Smile and Rwanda 1994 explicitly argue for Rwanda’s victimization through its 
colonial legacy; simultaneously, however, the use of landscape replicates that same colonial 
legacy through the visual positioning of the reader. Déogratias, meanwhile, problematizes and 
inverts this privileged vision, destabilizing the victim-perpetrator binary and ultimately bringing 
the complex tensions between trauma, violence, and vision to the foreground.  
The colonial history on which these texts rests begins in the early twentieth century, 
when Belgium gained colonial control over Rwanda from Germany following the latter’s defeat 
in World War I. Under the Belgians’ colonial policy of “divide and rule,” Rwandans found their 
quasi-ethnic, economic divisions amplified and racially stratified into a hierarchy of privilege. 
The Belgians cast the Hutu, the largest ethnic group or class (approximately 84 percent of the 
population), as the less privileged class, and the Tutsis, a smaller ethnic group (approximately 15 
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percent of the population), as the ruling class.19 These categories of identity had existed before 
colonial rule, as the Tutsis were historically the wealthier ethnic group who traditionally raised 
cows, the most profitable agricultural product in the area; indeed, Tutsi kings and chiefs ruled the 
long-standing Kingdom of Rwanda (11th century c.e. - 1959). However, these categories were 
fluid and apparently mostly class-based, given that a Hutu individual could become Tutsi 
through substantial economic gain (Lyons and Strauss 25-26).  
The colonial powers of Belgium and, earlier, Germany ascribed racial characteristics to 
each group in addition to these economics-based divisions, stratifying and codifying them into 
something more fixed, more essentializing. The Belgians ascribed darker skin, shorter statures, 
and wider noses to the Hutus, while the Tutsis purportedly had longer noses, lighter skin, and 
longer necks— features considered of “Caucasoid” descent and therefore more desirable than the 
those of the Hutus. Under Belgian rule, Tutsis enjoyed greater privileges than their Hutu 
counterparts, including positions in government and access to education. After the Rwandan 
revolution of 1959, however, the Belgians enacted a power reversal, leaving control of the nation 
in the hands of the Hutu majority.20  
From 1959 until 1994, the essentialized divisions between Hutus and Tutsis (and Twas) 
continued to play a substantial role in the Rwandan political sphere, even while many Hutus and 
Tutsis intermarried, lived next door to one another, and encountered one another in schools, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 The third ethnic group, the Twa, is such a small minority— just one percent of the total 
Rwandan population— as to be nearly entirely excluded from Belgian racializing policies 
(indeed, only one Twa character appears in the three works examined here).  Considered a 
“pygmy” race, the Twa were defined as nomadic peoples, who hunted in the forests and traded 
with the other groups in Rwanda. 
20 The reasons for this reversal are also hotly debated among historians.  Possibilities include the 
Belgians beginning to find parallels between the Hutu-Tutsi situation and the Flemish-Wallon 
divide in Belgium, and thus their reversal of power in Rwanda reflects the Flemish politicians’ 
own positions at home; and the (white) Catholic Church’s authority being threatened by Tutsi 
priests (Melvern). 
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businesses, and churches. In 1973, ethnic tensions intensified when Juvénal Habyarimana led a 
successful coup against the government and became president; Habyarimana’s regime is credited 
with fortifying the Rwandan army and ordering massive amounts of weapons— mostly 
machetes— from other countries, as well as with intensifying the racialized divisions within 
Rwanda. With the start of a civil war in 1990 between the exiled, and mostly Tutsi, Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF) and the Rwandan government, official propaganda became more intense, 
inciting virulent emotions against the Tutsis.  
Although the two sides of this civil war signed a tentative peace accord in 1993, on April 
6, 1994, President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down over Kigali (the Rwandan capital) as he 
returned from further peace talks. The genocide against the Tutsis, who were blamed for the 
attack, began that same night, as radio broadcasts urged the Interahamwe to take up arms against 
their neighbors. While press coverage in the West often portrayed the genocide as spontaneous 
violence— a New York Times article from May, 1994 carefully avoids the word “genocide” 
altogether, referring instead to “massacres”— evidence later showed that the slaughter of the 
Tutsi population was planned well in advance (see: Power, Lemarchand, Melvern, etc.). This 
lexical sidestepping in journalism mirrors the US government’s unwillingness to name the 
genocide as such, in an attempt to avoid political or military intervention in Rwanda (especially 
following so close on the Black Hawk crisis in Somalia shortly before). 
Many have critiqued the international community’s response— or lack thereof— in the 
years since the genocide (see: Melvern, Bazambanza). The United Nations actually removed 
troops from Rwanda during the genocide, and ordered the remaining contingents not to intervene 
militarily. It was not until France began its “Operation Turquoise” near the end of June that the 
UN sent additional troops. When the genocide unfolded, international scrutiny increased as the 
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slaughter became more and more devastating, and especially as the violence began to have an 
impact on neighboring countries and, in particular, their natural resources. One of the striking 
images to come out of neighboring Burundi involved corpses of Rwandan nationals washing up 
in their lakes, contaminating the water supply of many areas. In some sense, then, the Rwandan 
genocide became visible to the rest of the world only once the surrounding lands began to 
“exhibit symptoms,” so to speak.  
The Rwandan genocide is, therefore, inextricably bound up with its landscape and its 
natural resources. Rwanda is “the land of the thousand hills,” a moniker itself resting on the 
landscape’s significance to nationhood; the propagandist radio station Radio Télévision Libre de 
Milles Collines refers to those same “thousand hills,” as does the Hôtel de Milles Collines, made 
famous in the Academy Award-winning 2004 film Hotel Rwanda. Just as the European powers 
in the nineteenth century saw Africa as a slab of land to carve up, redistribute, colonize, and 
exploit, so is the understanding of Rwanda in the 1990s still linked to such grounded—literally— 
conceptualizations of the nation as the land.  
This is not to say necessarily that there is such a thing as an “authentic” view of the land 
against which colonial vision situates itself. However, as this chapter lays out, the comics 
creators—whether Rwandan or European—adopt, whether consciously or otherwise, the 
structures of this authoritarian, colonial gaze. The conceptualization of the land as a visible 
marker and symbol of both nation and violence is one of the central concerns of the three texts 
examined here. Smile through the Tears and Rwanda 1994 both open with an image of the 
Rwandan landscape; Déogratias closes with one. Each text emphasizes the interplay of the 
natural and animal worlds with the human, and in doing so each uses the landscapes as a means 
of narrativizing the traumatic events of the genocide. All three of the comics examined in this 
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chapter conceptualize the nation and its violence in relation to its natural beauty and resources, 
thus feeding into a long-standing and colonial construction of Africa not as a continent of 
humanity but of primal nature: a space to be exploited and “civilized” (converted, Westernized, 
etc.). These comics use the landscape of Rwanda— its hills, mountains, rivers, and sky— to 
configure the genocide not solely as a massive, horrifying, and deplorable act of ethnic 
cleansing, but in part also as a fight over the landscape itself, over the nostalgic, idealized, 
precolonial “Natural Rwanda.”  
The covers of all three books demonstrate the centrality of landscape to the narratives 
contained within (figure 3.1). On the cover of Smile Through the Tears, a tearful Rose Rwanga 
stands next to one of Rwanda’s famed gorillas; between them one sees a tree with blood pouring 
from a machete wound in its trunk, and in the far background, the hills and countryside that the 
memoir opens with in its first panel. The covers of Déogratias and Rwanda 1994, meanwhile, 
are images and panels lifted from the narratives themselves: on one, Mathilde cowers in the river 
under some reeds, hiding from a fire in the background; on the other, Déogratias crouches by a 
river in tattered clothing, with the night sky above him taking up most of the cover’s space.  
 
Figure 3.1: the book covers and their landscapes. 
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On each cover, the landscape and the violence of the genocide are linked through the inclusion of 
the human figure. And yet each cover also illustrates the very different manipulations of 
landscape within each narrative: in Smile, the perpetrator has attacked the landscape and must be 
purged from it; in Rwanda 1994, the landscape is both threat and shelter; and in Déogratias, the 
landscape dominates and encroaches upon the character and the page.  
The term “landscape” encompasses two related concepts: a natural scene, the land, that 
the human eye gazes out upon; and a painting or representation of that scene. Yet landscapes also 
incorporate acts and ways of seeing, and W.J.T Mitchell charges us to “think of landscape… as a 
process by which social and subjective identities are formed” (Mitchell Landscape 1). Drawing 
on the Enlightenment and colonial project of conquest through categorization, Mary Louise Pratt 
notes that “[t]he landscape [of colonial Africa] is written as uninhabited, unpossessed, 
unhistoricized, unoccupied even by the travelers themselves” creating a “fantasy of dominance 
and appropriation that is built into this otherwise passive, open stance. The eye ‘commands’ what 
falls within its gaze; mountains and valleys ‘show themselves,’ ‘present a picture;’ the country 
‘opens up’ before visitors” (51, 60). As such, the connection between landscape and colonialism 
is clear; as Harry Garuba writes, “colonialism as a regime of power was largely organised 
through spatiality and subjectivity: spaces to capture, subjects to control… Colonial conceptions 
of space and people, and thus colonial mapping, were premised on a Cartesian logic which 
foregrounded the fantasy of an autonomous subject with a privileged view casting his eye over 
transparent space” (87). 
To this understanding of the framing of natural spaces as a structure of privilege and 
dominance, Brett Kaplan adds a characterization of landscapes as a physical and mental space 
that can simultaneously witness and conceal atrocity: “The landscapes in which traumatic events 
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happened, or where perpetrators dreamed up violent scenarios, can bear only unstable witness. 
On the one hand, visible traces of the past remain; on the other hand, an inevitable covering up of 
these traces by the movement of the landscape as nature either reclaims it or human desires 
reshape and repurpose it occurs” (Kaplan 2). Landscapes— “spaces and their representations, 
including man-made artifacts or portraits,” and I include broadly speaking the animal and natural 
here as part of the landscape, especially in their status as objects of the white, authoritarian 
gaze— thus can become also “timescapes,” spaces that capture and remain marked by traumatic 
events (Kaplan 3, Kluger 67).  
These two approaches to landscape— the postcolonial and the traumatic— cross over and 
complement one another in the comics discussed here. Even as these texts purport to resist both 
the genocidal and colonial regimes they nonetheless still consider Rwanda in terms of landscape, 
a landscape that both offers access to the genocide and distances, even exoticizes, it. Landscape 
“naturalizes a cultural and social construction, representing an artificial world as if it were 
simply given and inevitable, and it also makes that representation operational by interpellating its 
beholder in some more or less determinate relation to its givenness as sight and site” (Mitchell 
Landscape 2). As I will show below, these graphic works actually reproduce those very 
structures of privilege they wish to disavow. In these texts, the trauma of Rwandan genocide 
remains embedded within and covered by the landscapes contained within these pages, and as 
such the genocide also remains the thing circled around rather than directly confronted. In 
adopting and maintaining the colonizing eye/I to varying degrees, the texts examined here 
relegate the trauma of the genocide to a position of a specific and visually determined land. 
Through their uses of landscape, each text ultimately undermines its own supposed message by 
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reiterating the colonial gaze of exoticism and primitivism, keeping Rwanda as a land “over 
there,” and “of them.”  
 
Smile Through the Tears 
Rupert Bazambanza’s “creative nonfiction” account of the genocide, Smile Through the 
Tears, is a stylized graphic memoir, first published in Quebec as Sourire malgré tout in 2004. 
Himself a survivor of the 1994 genocide, Bazambanza chooses to center his memoir of this 
catastrophe on the lives of his neighbors, the Rwanga family, before and during the events of the 
genocide. Through the avatars of Charles and Rose, and their children Wilson, Degroot, and 
Hyacinthe, Smile Through the Tears aims to honor and memorialize the genocide’s victims, and 
to work towards preserving the historical memory of the genocide. Bazambanza explicitly lays 
out the text’s purpose in the introduction: “I dedicate Smile Through the Tears to the Rwanga 
family, to my father, my loved ones, and the nearly one million other victims of the Tutsi 
genocide in homage to their martyrdom. And I invite my fellow survivors to continue with this 
sacred task” (intro.).  
Indeed, Bazambanza views his very survival of the genocide as intricately bound up with 
a verbal and visual “mission” to speak and to offer testimony, in both the legal and the religious 
senses, to the atrocities of 1994: “I was spared so I could be a witness. My mission was to be 
town crier” (intro.). However, Bazambanza transfers this dual act of witnessing and speaking— 
crying, even— from his own experiences to those of his beloved neighbors:  
My story is told from the point of view of a family very dear to me whose near-total 
annihilation I witnessed: the Rwangas… I was in hiding with them and I lost them, 
without understanding why, one beautiful April morning in 1994. A morning as luminous 
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as any other: one of the characteristics that had made Rwanda the little African Eden so 
vaunted by tourists. I lost them, and the only thing I could do was to make them the 
heroes of this bitter tribute. (intro)  
Bazambanza thus appears to be aware of both the centrality of the Rwandan landscape to his 
conception of the nation, and of the significant absence in his work in choosing to focus on the 
Rwangas rather than on the Bazambanza family. However, Bazambanza’s strongly-held 
Christian beliefs and his overwrought, affected language make it difficult to identify at what 
points his words might be ironic rather than genuine; here, as in other places in the narrative 
itself, it is difficult to distinguish between melodramatic sentimentality and ironic self-reflection. 
Just as humanity lost Eden, and as Rwanda lost its paradise-like qualities, so did Rupert 
Bazambanza lose the Rwangas, and so did he apparently lose either the ability or the desire to 
write his own story. Bazambanza omits the story of his own family— he appears only briefly, in 
a few panels, as a character in the memoir— in favor of relating the story of the Rwangas. Thus 
the traumas of the author’s own experiences remain only in the background of the story of the 
martyred and saintly figures of the Rwanga family, through whose lives and deaths lie 
Bazambanza’s— and, by extension, Rwanda’s— redemption and the return to a lost paradise. 
The text’s dialogue and captions are so obviously constructed that they draw attention to the 
memoir’s fictitiousness, even while insisting on the veracity of its own story. This story of the 
Rwanga family and their suffering is a real, individual experience of the genocide, but the 
memoir also wrangles with the nostalgia for both the lost family members and the lost ideal 
construction of Rwanda.  
This twofold nostalgia thus drives the narrative’s construction of the land itself as the 
vessel through which Rwanda can be reclaimed. In Smile Through the Tears, landscape functions 
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as something emotional, feeling, and highly visible, an idealized space within which both sorrow 
and redemption are legible. The Rwandan landscape acts as a “holy landscape”: “The holy place 
is a paradise from which we have been expelled, a sacred soil that has been defiled, a promise yet 
to be fulfilled, a blessed site that lies under a curse” (Mitchell Landscape 261-62). Thus this 
memoir transforms the victims of the genocide into saintly martyrs, the Rwandan landscape into 
an Eden defiled by those who perpetrated the genocide, and the acts of committing and atoning 
for these crimes embedded within the landscape into a particularly visual and visible 
performance. Such a view is problematic in that it repeats and reinforces the colonial structures 
of religion and vision, linking them together even while repudiating the Western construction of 
Rwanda’s ethnic divisions.  
The memoir opens with an extended panel depicting a lush landscape, with a second 
panel containing a close-up of two eyes crying superimposed over the top of this landscape 
(figure 3.2).  
 
Figure 3.2: “Why such a river of tears in this enchanting country of a thousand hills?” (1). 
Visually, the text thus begins with an emphasis on a very specific kind of vision—one that is not 
only emotionally invested, and not only a vision of landscape and individual humanity linked 
together, but also of a blurred state of vision (looking through tears is not a sharp, direct form of 
vision). This blurry vision is in part heightened through the text’s italicized font and its 
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noticeable wordiness: the captions and dialogue boxes, all using the same italicized font, tend to 
visually overpower any given page. The narrative overwhelms the landscape of the page, just as 
the events of the genocide come to function as a kind of blot on the Rwandan landscape, 
obscuring or distorting it and the nation that it comes to represent.  
In Smile, everything is visible, but at a slant, inflected with an emotionality and, as 
Michael Chaney describes, a hagiographic, overtly ideological bent. The landscape, taking its 
place within this system of text and ideology, is a means through which the text can access that 
ideological vision. The text problematically configures the landscape as an Edenic space, 
hearkening to an image of Rwanda and its land as a lost paradise and as the center of the 
Christian mythology of creation. Doing so places Rwanda squarely within that matrix of Western 
ideology, rather than creating a space for Rwanda as resisting Western hegemony.21 
Rwanda as a naturalized, Edenic space is also the verbal entry into the memoir of the 
genocide, as it opens with a visual and textual meditation on the Rwandan landscape:  
Why such a river of tears in this enchanting country of a thousand hills? The genocide of 
the Rwandan Tutsis took place under the shocked gaze of the international community. 
One million slaughtered. Those who could have stopped the horror did nothing, 
seemingly indifferent to the drama. Rwanda, it was often said, is too small, too poor and 
too black to elicit compassion. Faced with the unbelievable, the martyred Rwandans 
could only wonder. (1)  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Interestingly this same paradox exists in Rwandan national politics post-genocide.  For 
example, the creation of the gacaca, the grassroots, village-level “courts” in which perpetrators 
of the genocide would step forward and ask their neighbors for forgiveness.  These courts are a 
version of their precolonial equivalent, and signify Rwanda’s attempt to find solutions outside of 
Western structures of the law.  However, these same movements of forgiveness are often phrased 
in Christian terms, as wronged individuals are expected to extend grace to confessed 
perpetrators.  I am indebted to Tim Wendig for this valuable insight; cf. Stover and Weinstein, 
My Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity. 
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This text, meanwhile, literally “takes place under” the sorrowful gaze of the survivor, whose 
tears spill from her eyes into the landscape below (see again figure 3.2). Smile thus rests itself on 
those same naturalized imaginings of Rwanda as the “enchanting country of a thousand hills,” 
where a human tragedy is figured as a bounded and natural catastrophe. The eyes at the 
beginning of the memoir—eyes that indicate a problematic slippage between Rwandan and 
Western gazes— are not active, watching eyes, but something to be looked at. The image of the 
eyes undermines the agency associated with the gaze in this instance, as these eyes do not look 
out at anything, do not see anything, but rather emote, or become themselves signifiers of a 
certain pathos. The Rwandan landscape into which these eyes are inscribed is, therefore, the 
product of a more distanced perspective, one whose gaze can encompass both the land and its 
pathos simultaneously. 
The text poses the Rwandan landscape as Edenic, and European colonization and later the 
genocide as the sins for which the nation must atone in order to return to paradise. This Edenic 
landscape of the opening page quickly reveals itself to be a landscape in need of purification, 
most often in the depiction of President Habyarimana’s airplane, which typically appears as a 
mechanical blot in an otherwise idyllic scene. It is an element that needs purging or extracting 
from the landscape in order to return it to its “natural state.” The images that depict 
Habyarimana’s plane all place it in relief with the natural surroundings. In one panel—one that 
stretches across the top of the page—two Rwandans watch the President’s plane as it flies above 
another brilliantly green landscape (14). A small bird appears in the sky near the plane; the sharp 
relief of a radio control tower breaks the scenic horizon in the right of the panel (figure 3.3). This 
tower stands in contrast not only with the green tree in the foreground of the left of the panel, but 
with the small, corrugated-roofed buildings that dot the landscape in between the large tree and 
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the tower. This visual arrangement seems to suggest that humans and nature might peacefully 
coexist, were it not for the disruptive, technological blots that the plane and the radio tower 
present.  
 
Figure 3.3: Habyarimana’s plane and the air tower in contrast with the landscape (14). 
Habyarimana is represented as a figure who disrupts the “natural” order of the Rwandans, 
inciting violence and enforcing racial divisions where, according to the text, none existed 
originally. In another example, the final panel of the page shows three children in the foreground 
in a tree (one eating a banana), staring at a plane as it flies at sunset above the green countryside 
(figure 3.4).  
 
Figure 3.4: Habyarimana’s plane again (26). 
“Look! Habyarimana’s plane! He’s fleeing with the State coffers!” exclaims one child. Another 
responds: “The opposition says it’s his fault we’re homeless. We ought to take down his plane!” 
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(26). In the right of the panel, a small bird flies level with the plane, but moving in the opposite 
direction. The plane and the bird—the man-made and the natural, the man charged with 
increasing the racial tensions and disrupting the natural order next to an animal figure 
representing the “real” Rwanda—occupy the same visual plane, but move in opposite directions. 
In this panel he is charged with displacing the humans, turning the children homeless.  
Despite the insistence on Habyarimana’s responsibility for the suffering of the Tutsis, his 
death— again, the event that signals the start of the genocide— is a kind of traumatic wish 
fulfillment. The day Habyarimana’s plane is shot down, time literally becomes inscribed inside 
the panel, with the date (6/04/1994) appearing underneath the caption box but within the frame 
of the panel next to the flaming plane making its steep descent (figure 3.5a, 39). It is also the top 
left panel and its “timescape” contrasts with the final panel of the page (lower right), which 
depicts the corpses of the ten Belgian UNAMIR soldiers who were protecting then-prime 
minister Agathe Uwiringiyimana (figure 3.5b). The motion of the falling plane contrasts with the 
utter stillness of the dead bodies. Therefore although the text at several points foreshadows 
Habyarimana’s death and even hints that his death would solve Rwanda’s problems, when this 
wish does come to pass it results in a terrible destruction. 
 
Figure 3.5: Panel A shows Habyariman’s plane crashing; panel B depicts the UNAMIR soldiers’ bodies (39). 
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The landscape—the “natural” Rwanda—is thus the site and sight of violence, while 
humanity is the scourge that has soiled the nation. If Rwandans and the rest of the world atone 
for their sins—of genocide, of violence, of racial discrimination, of exploitation of other humans, 
animals, and the natural world—then harmony will be restored and Rwanda will once again be a 
paradise on Earth. In the final panel of the text, Rose Rwanga stands with a war orphan and with 
her son Wilson’s girlfriend; a path through the verdant countryside stretches before them towards 
the pale blue hills in the background (figure 3.6). “Our country is a paradise!” Rose proclaims. 
“But its own people have sullied this Eden. You young people, your mission is to restore 
harmony so that your children never know the meaning of the words ‘racial discrimination.’ You 
must work to ensure that no parent or child will ever again suffer what we’ve suffered. But the 
road is long. Take all your courage and go!” (64).  
 
Figure 3.6: “Our country is a paradise!” (64). 
One problem with this view is its overwhelming nostalgia for an idealized, naturalized, 
and paradoxically sanctified past. In the text’s eagerness to sanctify the Rwanga family and, 
more broadly, all the victims of the genocide and demonize the perpetrators of the genocide, it 
engages in a construction of the nation and of the land that itself perpetuates the same 
representational structures that it claims to disavow: All the Tutsi characters have lighter skin, 
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long noses, long necks, and tall, slim builds; all the darker-skinned Hutu characters are short and 
stocky with wide noses. In an effort to combat the institutionalized racism that his children 
encounter at school, Charles Rwanga narrates his version of the early history of Rwanda: “First 
those called the Twas came here to hunt in the forests. Then came farmers to clear the fertile 
fields. Those were called the Hutus. And then came the cattle breeders, seeking pasture for their 
herds. These were called Tutsis. These three peoples complemented each other with their 
different skills. Since cattle dominated the economy, certain Tutsis became powerful chiefs” (6). 
Rwanga, and by extension, the text, imagines the Rwandan past as idyllic and firmly connected 
with the land and its uses. Rwanga’s narrative of Rwanda’s origins rests on an economic, not 
ethnic, division, based on the economies of working the land (figure 3.7). 
 
Figure 3.7: the land produces the Rwandan peoples (6). 
Moreover, as Michael Chaney notes, Bazambanza’s text does not move away from those 
naturalized and nostalgic visions of race (95). The illustrations accompanying Charles Rwanga’s 
version of history visually preserve those racialized elements that Rwanga’s verbal narrative 
discounts. The Hutu and Tutsi figures in these panels display stereotypical racial characteristics 
even as Rwanga insists on the economic, not ethnic, construction of Rwanda’s internal divisions. 
In this way, Rwanga’s narrative matches the longstanding historical dissonance between the 
economic and ethnic understandings of the structures in Rwanda. Even the preeminent African 
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history scholar Gérard Prunier, writing in 1995, perpetuates the racialized divisions between 
Hutu and Tutsi: “[The Hutu] had a standard Bantu physical aspect…. But the Tutsi were 
something else altogether. Extremely tall and thin, and often displaying sharp, angular facial 
features, these cattle-herders were obviously of a different racial stock than the local peasants” 
(5). Prunier thus subsumes the economic divisions between these groups of people into a larger, 
more “significant” category of race. Significantly, this same racialized account of the peoples of 
Rwanda occurs within a larger historical and framework, in which Prunier posits that Rwanda’s 
physical landscape, its geographical situation, is a defining factor in allowing the genocide to 
occur (3).  
These conceptualizations of the racial and of the geographical are intimately connected in 
the colonial and postcolonial imaginary. Indeed, the use of stereotypical, racialized images and 
figures finds its counterpart in the continual return of the landscape as visual trope, signifying at 
once the pseudo-natural existence of a constructed notion (the bounded landscape of the nation, 
the bounded image of the panel) and the idolized, Edenic myth of paradise and return. 
“Landscape is quite capable of becoming an idol in its own right—that is, a potent, ideological 
representation that serves to naturalize power relations and erase history and legibility” (Mitchell 
Landscape 262). This idolatry is exactly what Bazambanza’s text enacts: it transforms the vistas 
of Rwanda into idealized and ideological spaces that naturalize the nostalgic ideal of a unified 
Rwandan past even while insisting on the need to purify that same space of the plague of “racial 
discrimination.” Rwanda is a land that needs to be reclaimed from both the Hutu extremists and 
the colonial powers, to return to the natural, harmonious order that the characters and the text 
imagine.  
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However, in its insistence on this Edenic space, the text reenacts the same power relations 
connected with the colonial gaze. After all, what is Eden but a Judeo-Christian (read: Western) 
mythological space? The spread of Christianity into Rwanda owes itself to those same colonizing 
missionaries against whom the text rails.22 The overt Christian tones and references, the saintly 
portrayal of the Rwangas, and the invocation of the Christian God at numerous moments point to 
the tension within the text between struggling against Rwanda’s colonial legacy and decrying the 
West’s (lack of) reaction or intervention, and the ideological and religious structures that 
Bazambanza adheres to and inherits from that same colonial legacy. 
Not only does Bazambanza reproduce a significant aspect of colonial and religious 
ideology, but also the insistence on using the landscapes in the text as a signifier for the nation 
actually reproduces the European privileged gaze. As I mentioned earlier, the opening panels 
reify both the landscape and the African gaze into objects within a more distanced field of vision. 
That opening page then continues on to present the European (that is, colonial) gaze, as we see 
two (rather dandy) Europeans looking through cameras—one video, one still photography—at a 
large gorilla set against a backdrop of mountains, echoing the mountains in the first panel’s 
landscape (figure 3.8). This misdirection extends to the portrayal of the UN soldiers present in 
Rwanda who failed to stop the violence: “As for the UNAMIR, the Interahamwe had long noted 
that the troops were only there as observers, and scorned them” (45). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Although Christianity in Rwanda can sometimes be considered a “folk religion,” with 
practices outside of official Church doctrine, I would argue that Bazambanza’s use of religion in 
this memoir is along traditional lines. 
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Figure 3.8: the misdirected white gaze (1). 
One UN soldier asks, “Why do you take such pleasure in showing off these crimes you’ve 
committed against your own countrymen?” to which an Interahamwe member responds: “Isn’t 
that what you came to do— contemplate their deaths? So don’t be shy! Go ahead and look! Open 
your eyes wide and take lots of photos! Then send your reports” (45). The text acknowledges 
both the supposed passivity inherent in the role of audience, and the position of the European 
gaze as the defining perspective. The UNAMIR appears to fill the same role as the Western 
(read: white) tourists, while the black bodies of the genocide’s victims are now the tourist 
attraction to be looked at. 
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The conflation of the genocide’s victims with the object of the European gaze pervades 
this text, often with highly problematic results. At one point, Habyarimana says, during an early 
radio interview, “we need our gorilla habitats more than we need these refugees. The parks bring 
in foreign currency. For this reason, I can never allow refugees to come and occupy our only 
uninhabited land. Let them stay where they are. I don’t want to lose everything that we gained 
during the 1959 revolution” (2). Habyarimana uses the gorillas—a national emblem—as a reason 
to keep Tutsi refugees in exile, while later comparing those same refugees to other kinds of 
animals, namely vermin: “When I give the signal, Hutu civilians shall begin eliminating Tutsis 
while we take care of those cockroaches, the invaders!” (14). Using language that echoes the 
Nazi’s linguistic dehumanizing of their victims as “vermin,” Habyarimana thus stands as the 
coercive figure who vilified the Tutsi and orchestrated their extermination. Yet in his 
exploitation of the gorillas as representative of Rwandan identity and his intertwining of this 
image with that of his dehumanized victims, Bazambanza’s portrayal of Habyrimana also 
situates him firmly within this privileging, determining, and violent network of land-oriented 
signification. 
Habyarimana’s privileging of the gorillas thus at first seems to be part of the ideological 
propaganda machine working to devalue the Tutsis. More so than its human citizens, gorillas 
appear to be the avatars of the “true” Rwanda; as one RPF soldier remarks, “It seems even these 
gorillas are begging us to right the wrongs they’ve suffered at the hands of the MRND—young 
ones kidnapped and sold to strangers, and adults killed trying to protect them!” (figure 3.9, 19). 
Thus gorillas occupy a twofold space of signification in the memoir: on the one hand, they are, 
as Michael Chaney says, the silent and perhaps strange witnesses of the genocide; on the other, 
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they are also the symbol of the Rwandan nation as something natural, endangered, and 
spectacular.  
 
Figure 3.9: the gorillas as national symbol and witness (19). 
However, the text’s representations of the gorillas is highly problematic, since it deploys 
the figures of the gorillas in the same colonial and specular / spectacular way that it claims to be 
working against. One panel, for example, shows a gorilla lying in a pool of blood, mimicking the 
position of so many of the dead human bodies throughout the text and in fact mirroring, in a very 
disturbing way, a panel from the previous page in which a woman lies dead (figure 3.10).  
 
Figure 3.10: the position of the gorilla parallels the position of the murdered woman (60-61). 
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Visually, then, these two separate panels equate the gorillas with the human victims of the 
genocide and, by extension, the inverse. While the memoir does deploy the gorillas as a kind of 
national and natural witness (cf. Chaney), the degradation of African peoples to apes and 
monkeys is a longstanding and hugely problematic racist allegory. Thus the echoing of the 
human and ape victims’ deaths in these panels is an ambiguous moment. Adding to the 
ambiguity here is the fact that the human victim on the opposite page is a Hutu; the racist 
overtones become thus even more heavy-handed.  
The caption of this panel featuring the gorilla also remains relatively ambivalent: 
Following their defeat, the criminals in power went on a rampage of destruction to ensure 
that nothing remained for the new government. Even the gorillas— an endangered 
species the world seemed to care more about than the human victims of discrimination it 
consistently ignored— were destroyed to prevent their being a source of income. In the 
end, racial discrimination benefited no one. Had it only known, the world might have at 
least saved the gorillas! (61)  
Is the text being ironic or sarcastic here, or earnest? Due to the ideologically heavy-handed prose 
throughout the work, it is difficult not to take this statement at face value. The lamentation over 
the loss of Rwanda’s gorillas therefore actually reaffirms the Hutu propaganda and the 
exoticizing, fetishizing Western vision that both so celebrate the gorillas over the humans of 
Rwanda.  
That Western gaze so distant as to focus on the tangential aspects of the genocide thus 
infiltrates much of the narrative. To return to the final panels of this memoir, then, is to return to 
the question of the colonial gaze and its inherent blindness. As Rose Rwanga exhorts her young 
companions to “take their courage and go,” there is a literal turning away from the land as that 
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which covers atrocity and toward the land as that which extends into a paradoxically nostalgic, 
Edenic, utopian future (see again figure 3.6). Not only do the characters turn away from the mass 
grave sites where their loved ones are presumably buried, but the reader must literally turn the 
page away from these graves (also visible in panels on the previous page) to view the Edenic 
promise. Rose Rwanga’s smiling face, turned toward both the child audience within the panel 
and the readerly audience without, is the antithesis to the crying eyes that open the memoir. As 
Mitchell writes, “landscape is an object of nostalgia in a postcolonial and postmodern era” 
(Landscape 20). Smile’s longing for the redemption of an Edenic Rwanda is precisely that 
impossible nostalgia for a pre-colonial ideal past—one that cannot possibly be reclaimed, even as 
it attempts to cover over and turn away from its traumatized present. 
 
Rwanda 1994 
Like Smile, the 2009 two-album fictional bande dessinée Rwanda 1994, written by Cécile 
Grenier and Alain Austini, and drawn and colored by Pat Masioni, posits the Rwandan natural 
landscape as a space where the genocide and its aftermath are suffered, written, and healed 
within the land’s physicality. However, unlike Smile Through the Tear’s vision of the land as 
Edenic, Rwanda 1994 places Rwanda’s landscape within a complicated dualism of (post)colonial 
understandings of visibility and trauma. The land is both threat and comfort, shelter and 
exposure, present and past. 
The first part of Rwanda 1994, “Descente à l’enfer” (Descent into Hell) follows a 
mother, Mathilde, fleeing the genocide with her two children, Paul and Marie. Mathilde’s friend 
Rose and her French fiancé, Jacques, manage to escape Rwanda on one of the last UN transports 
while holding Mathilde’s third child, an unnamed infant son, but the UN truck drives away 
158 
 
before Mathilde, Paul, and Marie are able to climb aboard. After their abandonment, Mathilde 
and the children alternate between the relative safety of the wilderness and the dangers and 
violence of their town. During one attempt to flee into the jungle, Marie is killed, and Mathilde 
and Paul are separated from each other. Mathilde wanders the riverbank in an attempt to find 
Paul, but instead is “rescued” by a Hutu man who keeps her as essentially a slave while posing as 
her husband in a group of Hutu militia. Paul, meanwhile, hides near the bridge over the river 
until he can safely return home after the genocide, at which point begins the second part, “Le 
camp de la vie” (The Life Camp).  
Once home, Paul navigates cadavers, cholera, land mines, theft, near-starvation, and child 
predators with the help of other orphaned survivors. Jacques, the Frenchman who rescued 
Mathilde’s infant son, returns to Rwanda and flies his small plane in search of Mathilde and her 
family, and eventually finds her in the midst of the Hutu refugee camp. Upon learning that her 
son is alive, Mathilde poisons her captors and, with the help of a young Hutu boy, fights her way 
to the waiting airplane. The text ends with Mathilde, the orphaned Hutu boy, and the pilot 
Jacques flying back toward Mathilde’s home to find Paul. 
If Smile’s aim is to sanctify Rwanda and the genocide’s victims, then the apparent aim of 
Rwanda 1994 is to vilify the European—specifically French—involvement in and perpetration of 
the genocide. This aim is undermined, as I will show, in the text’s inclusion of the Frenchman 
Jacques who acts as the “white savior” of the African woman, and in the text’s uncritical 
adoption of the Western gaze and construction of the landscape. However, the French soldiers in 
this novel are portrayed as even more hateful and aggressive than the Hutus who carry out the 
genocide.  
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These French soldiers uphold the racial divisions between Hutu and Tutsi (and the 
associated stereotypes and power dynamics), punishing Tutsis while privileging Hutus. At one 
point, a group of French soldiers stops a van full of Tutsi civilians on the road, and force the men 
to wait in the van or at the side of the road while the soldiers rape the women, including Mathilde 
(42-43). At other moments, the French say they will take care of an area’s remaining Tutsi 
“vermine,” employing the same dehumanizing language of those who orchestrate the genocide; 
they shoot escaping Tutsi victims; and they exhort the Hutus to “cleanse” (“nettoyer”) the land 
where dozens of Tutsis are hiding from the genocide (58, 51). These are only a few examples of 
the utterly reprehensible behavior of the French soldiers in the text. Rwanda 1994 therefore 
represents the French as in some ways worse than the Hutu genocide regime; they are one of the 
most threatening forces in the Rwandan landscape of this novel. 
The land of Rwanda 1994 contains and conceals many life-threatening dangers, from 
buried mines, to choleric water, to camouflaged French soldiers, to gasoline poured on the reeds 
next to the river and set alight. However, none of these dangers is “natural;” rather they are all 
man-made and inserted or insinuated into the landscape, dangers that seem to originate with 
neither the Tutsis nor the Hutus, but with the Europeans. Thus the text creates the sense that, as 
in Smile, the violence of the genocide and the violation of the land are products of Rwanda’s 
colonial legacy. The horrors of the genocide do not spring from the land itself, but from the 
human manipulation of the land.  
Rwanda 1994, like Smile, opens with an image of the Rwandan landscape; while Smile 
emphasizes this landscape’s timelessness or its eternally Edenic qualities, 1994 opens with a 
landscape stamped with a caption giving a place, date, and precise time: “Arusha, 6 avril 1994, 
17h50” (figure 3.11, 7). The image in the foreground is of a plane marked with “Republique 
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Rwandaise,” and a crowd of people lining the red carpet leading to the plane; given the time, 
place, and national airplane, we understand that this is the moment before President 
Habyarimana flies back to Rwanda, and to his death. Over half the panel, however, is the 
landscape behind the plane at sunset. By including the crowd in this panel and the explicit 
temporal marker, the landscape lacks any sense of the Edenic timelessness of Smile. The figures 
are frozen in a particular moment, and including the hour and minute in the caption lends a sense 
of precision to the “timescape.”  
 
Figure 3.11: Rwanda’s opening panels (7). 
There is a sense of anxiety and waiting encapsulated within this panel due not only to its 
suspension in time but also to its suspension in visual duality. The particularity of the moment 
before the plane’s takeoff is at odds with the expansive landscape featuring the massive Mount 
Kilimanjaro. Indeed, while three sides of this panel bleed all the way to the edge of the page, so 
that the sunset extends outward and creates a sense of expansion, the bottom edge of the panel is 
framed and cuts the crowd of people off. Even a portion of the crowd is covered by the intrusion 
of the panel below into the space of this first panel. Thus the first panel contains within it a series 
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of contradictory or conflicting elements: the natural scene and the manmade; the Rwandan plane 
in the Tanzanian capital Arusha; the expansiveness of most of the panel and the abrupt boundary 
of the lower edge; the brightness of the sun-streaked landscape with the darkness of the tarmac. 
These doubled contradictions hint at the likewise doubled connection between land and humanity 
in the novel: the purportedly “civilized” human will destroy and/or manipulate the natural 
landscape for its own violent purposes, but the land also can offer protection and redemption to 
those who respect it and remember its pre-colonial past (I will return to this latter point later).  
This conflict between the human and the natural returns as the family finds shelter in the 
nearby forest after their abandonment at the hands of the UN. On one page, the first panel depicts 
the forested countryside; the two panels set inside the first and on the right show Paul, Marie, 
and Mathilde sleeping under cover of the vegetation during the day, and preparing to leave at 
night (figure 3.12, 23).  
 
Figure 3.12: the land as protection and shelter (23). 
There is thus a sense in which the landscape protects, covers, and resists the surrounding 
violence. However, the final panel, also a landscape, is much more ominous. As the tiny, brightly 
clothed figures make their way through the moonlit hills towards their hometown, the valley 
below is shrouded in mist, the river and the bridge crossing it hidden from view but the buildings 
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of town clearly visible (figure 3.13). The following panel— the first on the next page— reveals 
the same landscape in the daylight, devoid of human figures and pitting the nondescript, brown 
and gray landscape of town against the blue and green of the hills across the river. The night’s 
fog hides the “natural” landscape while keeping the manmade landscape visible; it is this 
manmade landscape that provides the threat rather than the safety and security that the three 
encounter in the earlier panel.  
 
Figure 3.13: The visible road, concealed river (24). 
These complicated landscapes demonstrate Rwanda 1994’s attempts to provide an 
alternative vision of the land, one that in some ways resists the colonial gaze: “Spatial 
arrangement thus becomes strategic and plays a determining role in the unequal economy of 
exchange between the observer and the observed. If, for the colonised, visibility is a trap, 
concealment and/or continual mobility become a strategy of escape” (Garuba 88). Garuba 
concentrates on structures of mapping as a geographical and ideological project of Western 
dominance; however, his point can extend to visibility across visual media, from maps to 
landscapes to portraiture.23 To be visible is to be controllable, to fit into a category, whether one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Think, for example, of Manet’s Olympia, in which the Black servant is both visible and 
hidden, with little differentiating her face from the dark background of the curtains behind her, 
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speaks of mapping land or imagining (that is, image-ing) it; thus to be invisible is to resist or 
escape those same authoritarian mechanisms. Mathilde’s hiding in the forest and, later, hiding in 
the reeds near the river are not only desperate acts of immediate self-preservation, but also the 
text’s attempt to demonstrate the fallibility of the authoritative gaze as it fails to see everything 
the land contains.  
Yet this representation of the land remains ambiguous. Hiding among the reeds from the 
Hutus who chased and wounded her the previous night, Mathilde slips into unconsciousness 
while calling for Paul, blending with the landscape to such an extent that in the penultimate 
panel, neither her nor her words are visible: the speech balloon reads “P...l?” (37). The panel 
depicts the landscape from a more distant vantage point, while Mathilde is so well hidden that 
she is now invisible (figure 3.14).  
 
Figure 3.14: Mathilde hides at the river’s edge (37). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
her gaze directed not boldly at the viewer, as the white woman’s, but at the other woman herself.  
Likewise has this servant’s role in the painting often diminished in critical, scholarly, and 
popular responses to the painting (an Internet search reveals a third as many scholarly references 
to “Manet Olympia Race” or “Manet Olympia Black” as to simply “Manet Olympia).   
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This panel embodies the tension between the privilege, distanced eye and the landscape that eye 
beholds. Viewing the landscape from afar means on the one hand that Mathilde remains hidden 
from those who would harm her, both Hutu and French. On the other hand, it also means a 
silencing of her voice and an invisibility, an erasure. To hide in the landscape is to be safe from 
physical danger, but paradoxically victim to the ideological danger of the colonial gaze. 
The landscape’s ambiguity is further heightened through the intrusion of traumatic 
memories into the safety of Mathilde’s hiding space. As Mathilde lies in these reeds by the river, 
a series of memories, visions, or flashbacks appear around her (38-39). This large, two-page 
spread is in a very different style to the rest of the book. The flashbacks—mostly wordless 
snippets of time—are all tinted red, and drawn in a sketchier, less refined mode than the rest of 
the graphic novel (figure 3.15). Paul and Marie play in the river as Paul pours gasoline on 
Marie’s head; the Hutu woman who murdered Marie talks to a rat; two hands draw a knife close 
to a man’s uniformed chest; a doctor leans over Mathilde as she gives birth; Mathilde and 
Jacques meet for the first time; and the lower central panels depict the newborn baby. Even the 
few captions on these pages are printed with a shaky, unstable lettering. Every visual mark on 
this page is unlike the rest of the text, emphasizing this moment’s departure from physical, 
temporal reality and our entrance into the realm of memories, dreams, and nightmares.  
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Figure 3.15: Mathilde’s dreams (38-39). 
These memories are not head-on confrontations with the traumatic event, but snippets, 
fragments that hint at, approach, allegorize, or stand in for the actual event. Most of these panels 
of fragments do not make much sense until one reads the rest of the novel. The hands rising to 
stab the man’s chest, for example, come from a later flashback when Mathilde recalls her rape by 
a French soldier. Mathilde is impregnated by this rape, and in the memory here, the doctor tells 
her “Il est beau ce bébé, Mathilde! Tu vois, tu vas pouvoir l’aimer, même s’il est un bébé d’un 
viol” (38).24 This is the first time that Mathilde’s youngest child appears in the narrative since 
Rose and Jacques’ escape with him in the UN convoy. Mathilde’s loss of her child goes 
unmentioned in the narrative and in Mathilde’s emotions, as if blocked from her conscious mind 
while she focuses on saving her remaining children. With Marie’s death and Paul’s 
disappearance, Mathilde is at last able to give some acknowledgment to the loss of her youngest, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 “He’s a beautiful baby, Mathilde.  You see, you’ll be able to love him, even if he is the baby of 
a rape.”  (All translations from French from Rwanda 1994 are mine.) 
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even if this acknowledgement is only the delayed, convoluted, and fragmented memory that 
returns unknowingly during her sleep.  
Mathilde’s memories, returning unbidden at a moment of crisis, function thus as 
allegories for reclaiming and restructuring the broader historical and national memories lost to 
time. Just as Mathilde disjointedly remembers her past, images of which appear over her own 
hidden body, so too the text itself remembers (that is, re-members, re-figures, restructures) the 
forgotten or ignored European intervention in recent Rwandan history, and especially in the 
genocide itself, in its obsession with vilifying the French. The blurred visions of the traumatic 
memories also coincide with the text’s ambiguous representation of the landscape as redemptive 
and dangerous: Mathilde’s rape—allegorical, one might say, for Rwanda’s violation—at the 
hands of the French nevertheless result in the “beautiful baby;” and the landscape, even while 
protecting Mathilde, allows space for the resurfacing of these memories and visions.  
While searching for Paul, Mathilde finds a child on the brink of death, arm nearly hacked 
off and bleeding from the head and mouth (46). She asks the child’s name, and the child 
responds, “amazi,” which the text translates as “de l’eau” (“water”). In this way the child, whose 
body is intertwined with the landscape, utters what might be a demand for water, and what 
simultaneously might be her name. Mathilde pours some water in her mouth, and then, crouching 
next to the river and the child’s silent body, prays to Nyabarongo, the river, addressing it as a 
god or a person: “Nyabarongo, toi qui bois le sang des hommes, dis-moi le nom de cette enfant. 
Rassure-moi, dis-moi que tu ne connais pas le gout de mon fils. Imana tout-puissant, faites que 
Paul ne connaisse pas la torture, faites qu’il meure vite, sans souffrances, ou qu’il vive sans avoir 
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rien vu...” (46).25 Unlike Smile Through the Tears, Rwanda 1994 makes explicit claim to the pre-
colonial religion of Rwanda; Mathilde’s entreaty is not to the Judeo-Christian god but to the river 
and to Imana, the creator-deity of pre-colonial Rwanda.26 It is the land itself that has the power 
over life and death, safety and danger, shelter and visibility. 
In this way the text tries to draw attention to the violence of the European gaze. The last 
sentence of Mathilde’s entreaty to the river captions a purple-hued landscape view of the river, 
still and quiet, save for a flock of birds rising from the bank to the left of the panel (figure 3.16).  
 
Figure 3.16: The landscape at dusk; the violence of vision (47). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 “Nyabarongo, who drinks the blood of men, tell me the name of this child.  Reassure me, tell 
me that you don’t know the taste of my son.  Imana the all-powerful, make it so Paul is not 
tortured, make it so he dies quickly, without suffering, or so he lives without seeing anything…”  
26 In contemporary Rwanda people sometimes use Imana to refer to the Christian God, but 
Rwanda 1994 specifies that Imana refers here to the “dieu des Rwandais” (“the Rwandan god,” 
44). 
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The river thus becomes the calm image of a possible savior, a link to the pre-colonized Rwanda. 
However, this landscape vacillates between savior and destroyer, between a space of peace and 
nurturing and a space of violence and disruption. Despite the calm appearance, the reader knows 
that this landscape conceals not only Mathilde and other victims of the genocide, but also the 
genocidaires themselves. Indeed, the flock of birds rising from the corner of the panel begs the 
question: what has disturbed these birds? What event or being has caused them to take flight?  
The next panel wordlessly depicts a close-up of the bird flock taking flight, followed by a 
smaller panel of one bird within a rifle’s targeting eyesight. Our eye— the reader’s eye—now is 
complicit and situated in the same position with the hunters’ eye. And the next page (48) reveals 
that this is indeed the eye of a French soldier, the colonial eye, the Western eye of the tourist, the 
ones complicit with and even responsible for the genocide as much as the Hutus, at least 
according to this text. This vision of both landscape and its inhabitants, human and animal, is 
thus revealed to be inherently violent and simultaneously determining: the target is a literal and 
visual enactment of the gaze that defines, and the gaze that threatens. 
Along with the inherent violence of the colonial eye, Rwanda 1994 also exploits the 
violence and trauma inherent in the act of reading its own text and images. At one point, as 
Mathilde and her children hide in town from their pursuers, one page’s uppermost panel depicts a 
nighttime vista, view of the road with a couple cars near the river (figure 3.17). The following 
panel reveals the horror not shown in the landscape: that one of the cars drags the bloodied and 
bound body (“the stiff,” as they call it, “le macchabée”) of Tutsi leader Senyoni through the 
street (32).  
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Figure 3.17: The violence concealed in the expanse of landscape. The body is barely visible in the first panel behind 
the first car (32). 
 
Returning to the first panel, the body appears only as a tiny black shadow or stain near the car, 
and it is visible only through close inspection; in fact, one only knows to look for it after reading 
the following panel. However this blot, this small dot of a corpse is still present on that page, 
even as the reader’s eye first ignores and then, a moment later, returns to it. In this way the 
landscape covers and nearly erases the violence, and yet the comics medium and its visual 
simultaneity forces the violence to resurface in that image as the reader returns to it. The act of 
reading Rwanda 1994 is thus itself an act of uncovering and recovering violence.  
Part of this violence of reading stems from Cécile Grenier’s own determination to atone 
for her postcolonial, post-genocidal guilt on behalf of France, as her demonization (perhaps 
rightly so) of the French feels like an ideological attempt to shock the reader into understanding 
the French role in the genocide. The question of the French role in the genocide is a source of 
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guilt for Grenier, the text’s primary author and the founder of the charity “Rwanda à la main” 
(“Rwanda in hand): “La question de la présence de la France au Rwanda reste délicate et encore 
sous embargo. Mais plusieurs enquêtes mettent certaines responsabilités au jour. Des militaires 
français commencent à parler et des documents sortent de leurs abris…”27 (136). Grenier’s 
ellipsis at the end of this sentence reflects both the uncertainties surrounding the historical 
narrative of France’s complicity and/or participation in the genocide and the author’s inability to 
articulate fully her own version of that narrative. 
The inclusion of the date in the title of Rwanda 1994 reveals some of the tensions 
between time and trauma at work in the narrative itself. On the one hand, the use of the year 
marker extends the genocide to last the entire year, rather than the extremely brief 100 days of 
genocide that actually transpired. On the other hand, marking the year also functions as a 
temporal punctuation mark, confining the genocide to a specific time and, perhaps, implying that 
the genocide is "over," not just temporally or historically but also in terms of its traumatic 
legacy. That is, in relegating the Rwandan genocide to a specific moment, the title also implies it 
is something "over," in the past. This paradoxical containing of the genocide to a specific time 
and its extension of that time into something longer than its actual 100 days is one way the text 
itself renders its own guilt over the genocide and France's involvement therein.  
Indeed despite its explicit claim against the privilege and power of the Europeans, 
however, Rwanda 1994 still reproduces those same structures of privilege and power in its 
insistence on equating Mathilde with the landscapes of Rwanda. The novel ends with Mathilde’s 
determination to be the nurturing mother to all who need her; Mathilde thus becomes the human 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 “The question of the French presence in Rwanda remains delicate and under embargo.  But 
numerous inquiries bring certain responsibilities to light.  Some French soldiers have begun to 
talk, and some documents are no longer protected…” 
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equivalent of the protective landscape, the redemptive mother ushering her fellow refugees 
home: “tous les enfants qui frappent à ma porte seront mes enfants”28 (126).  
 
Figure 3.18: the “white savior” plane leading the masses back into Rwanda (126). 
This declaration is sandwiched between two panels depicting the pastel and pastoral countryside: 
in the first panel, the unnamed orphaned Hutu boy who helped Mathilde sits in the foreground, 
presumably awaiting Mathilde’s return to Jacques’s airplane. In the final panel of the novel, the 
plane carrying Jacques, Mathilde, and the Hutu boy leads the crowd of Rwandan refugees back 
into their homeland (figure 3.18).  
Regardless of all its attempts to the contrary, then, the text ultimately reiterates the 
privileged seeing eye of the West in its representation of the trauma of the Rwandan genocide. 
Mathilde is figured as the nurturing mother/land, who welcomes not only the single orphaned 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 “All the children who knock on my door will be my children.” 
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boy but also “tous les enfants,” including all the refugees following her. Moreover, she has had 
to rely on the white savior, Jacques, who after nobly rescuing her youngest son returns to search 
for her and whose plane also ushers the crowd of refugees back home. And finally, this last panel 
retreats to the perspective of the dominant gaze, distanced and privileged, above both the crowd 
and the plane, taking in the sweeping vista of the land in need of healing and recovery. Such an 
ending indicates the ways in which, despite its explicit desire to work against the colonial 
imaginary, Rwanda 1994 cannot escape those same structures of power and nostalgia that so 
characterize the colonial gaze. 
 
Déogratias 
Déogratias, written and drawn by Belgian comics creator Jean-Philippe Stassen and first 
published in 2000 (translated in 2006), centers on the titular character after he finds himself 
swept up in the events of the Rwandan genocide of 1994. A teenaged boy, Déogratias is an 
ethnic Hutu, while his three objects of desire, prostitute Vedette and her two daughters 
Apollinaire and Bénigne, are Tutsis. Caught up in the genocidal regime, Déogratias participates 
in the Hutu violence against the Tutsis, including the rape and murder of the three women. 
Driven mad shortly thereafter, the panels depicting Déogratias’s post-genocide timeline show his 
quest for vengeance against those whom he views as responsible for the deaths of his friends and 
love interests, from the militia leader who executes his friend Augustin to the French soldier who 
failed to prevent the genocide. While on this murder spree, the text shows the full extent of 
Déogratias’s madness, as he wanders around the outskirts of Kigali begging for food and 
Urwagwa (Rwandan banana beer), and envisioning himself as a dog, whose enemy is the night 
sky that encroaches on his senses of self and space. Déogratias thus is figured, however 
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problematically, as both perpetrator and victim, exposing the precarious and ambiguous nature of 
the binaries on which the other texts so heavily rely. 
Stassen’s technical mastery of both the artwork and the comics medium’s possibilities 
reveal the processes by which the form of the graphic novel can represent trauma in startling 
ways. The text flows from scenes post-genocide to scenes from before and during the genocide. 
These two tracks move in roughly chronological order; that is, the post-genocide scenes move 
chronologically, and the pre/during-genocide scenes also move chronologically. The two 
temporal tracks, however, cross over one another and move back and forth throughout the text. 
To help distinguish between these two tracks, Stassen frames the panels of the post-genocide 
scenes, but leaves the pre/during genocide panels unframed. Thus there is a sense in which the 
pre-genocide narrative remains unbounded, free of constraint, a reflection of the traumatic events 
that bind Déogratias’s psyche so deeply after the genocide.  
This effect is a very subtle way of depicting to which temporal line a given panel 
belongs, even as the visual style remains virtually unchanged. Indeed, there are very few content 
and context markers to indicate time, especially during the transition from one time stream to 
another. Déogratias’s clothing is sometimes the only indicator within the panels to clue the 
reader in to the temporal situation: in the pre-genocide scenes, his clothing is clean, while post-
genocide he wears tattered rags and has a more disheveled appearance. Time, in this novel, is 
therefore a looser construct, losing its rigidity in the face of the trauma and violence of the 
genocide and Déogratias’s participation therein.  
Juvénal, the local Interahamwe (Hutu militia) leader, recruits Déogratias into his patrol. 
This group of men is apparently responsible for many deaths, including the rape and murder of 
Venetia and, a little later, Apollinaire and Bénigne as well. (If Juvénal is to be believed, 
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Déogratias himself raped both Vedette and Apollinaire; it is never made explicit who is directly 
responsible for their deaths.) Déogratias manages to leave the Interahamwe, but in doing so he 
encounters the horrifying pile of bodies, on top of which lie the bodies of Apollinaire and 
Bénigne, being eaten by dogs (figure 3.19).  
 
Figure 3.19: Déogratias finds the pile of corpses (75). 
Bosco, the Rwandan Patriotic Front officer, and his patrol arrive, shoot the dogs, and find 
Déogratias: “Another madman... All that’s left are corpses, madmen, and dogs...” (76). 
Déogratias apparently relates all this to Brother Philippe after taking revenge on Bosco, Juvénal, 
and the Frenchman. He then charges Brother Philippe to drink the poison as well, ostensibly for 
learning the truth of Déogratias’s actions both during the genocide and after.  
Each of the characters whom Déogratias poisons plays a role in Déogratias’s own 
dehumanization, and they reiterate to him his madness. Early in the text, Déogratias meets the 
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French ex-soldier in a café in town. The Frenchman regales Déogratias with his stories of 
meeting prostitutes, and then says, “A propos, Déogratias, tu te souviens de Vedette?” (7).29 As 
he says this, the panel depicts a close-up of a cockroach on the table (figure 3.20). The next panel 
is at table-level, facing the cockroach but looking up at the Frenchman and Déogratias, as if the 
reader is situated in the position of another cockroach. In the following panel, the perspective 
shifts to above the shoulder of the Frenchman as he says “sale bête!” and tries to squash the 
roach, while Déogratias says “non!” and blocks his hand, spilling the beers on the table.  
 
Figure 3.20: Déogratias’s attempt to save the cockroach (5). 
The transition between the dialogue about Vedette and the image of the cockroach recalls the 
Hutu racial slur against the Tutsis, a dehumanizing vision of the Tutsis as roaches and vermin. 
The Frenchman’s attack against this roach is a condemnation not only of the soldier’s allowing 
of Vedette’s murder, but of France’s complicity in the attacks on the Tutsis more broadly 
(though not quite as vehemently as in Rwanda 1994).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 “By the way, Deogratias, do you remember Venetia?” (trans. Siegel 5). 
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Déogratias’s thwarting of the Frenchman is a belated resistance, a belated act of saving 
Vedette, when, as the text reveals at the end, Déogratias actually is at least somewhat responsible 
for her death. However, stopping the Frenchman’s attack on the roach seems to trigger 
Déogratias’s madness, as in the following panel he responds to the Frenchman’s surprise with 
“les chiens… ils mangent les cadavres…” (7).30 Déogratias’s words, like the attack on the roach, 
do not make sense until the climax of the story is revealed near the end (see again figure 3.18). 
The belatedness of Déogratias’s attempt to save the cockroach and his ensuing failure of 
language refer again to the shifting temporality at play in the text, creating a sense of narrative 
destabilization that mimics, in some small way, the chaos of Déogratias’s experiences. 
It is not until later in the text that Déogratias begins to literally morph into a beast, 
however. Déogratias becomes that image he saw earlier, upon first seeing the victims after 
fleeing Juvénal, of the dogs consuming the dead bodies of the victims, paralleling the way he 
consumed Vedette and her daughters (figure 3.21). His madness is thus a mirroring of the trauma 
of the genocide, and of Déogratias’s failure to comprehend his own role in the violence until it is 
too late. Significantly, when Déogratias turns in to a dog, it is not a hallucination. Déogratias 
transforms before the reader’s eyes from one panel to the next; his transformation is both visible 
and literal within the panels. The reader can see his hands and feet shift into paws, his body 
contract and his face elongate, and his posture move to being on all fours. Either Déogratias’s 
transformation is literal, not figurative or not merely symptom of his madness, or the reader is 
equally as mad and destabilized.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 “The dogs... they're eating the corpses..."  (5). 
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Figure 3.21: Déogratias transforms into a dog (52). 
Déogratias’s use of landscape likewise shifts the visual emphasis away from the 
authoritarian gaze of the Westerner and towards a postcolonial vision. One of the dominant and 
recurring images in this text is of a starry night sky above a minimalist landscape. The sky is so 
full of stars as to feel crowded, even threatening or overbearing (figure 3.22). Apollinaire 
explains to Brother Philippe and his parents that the ‘primitive’, precolonial Rwandans “believed 
the spirits of the dead filled the underworld, where they schemed spitefully against the living; 
and at night they lit up the sky over Rwanda” (Siegel 44). The starry sky, therefore, is a kind of 
reference to the thousands of dead, including the recent victims of the genocide. The terror that 
this sky incites in Déogratias—”j’ai peur de la nuit,” he admits frankly—is thus a fear not only of 
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the night but of the dead, and particularly, a dead signified through a pre-colonial mythology 
(29).31  
 
Figure 3.22: one of the images of the night skyscape (29). 
This image of the sky complicates the dominating gaze of the colonial. Although 
distanced, the panels depicting the sky are more threatening than inviting, especially as the sky 
takes up the bulk of those panels. When Déogratias admits his fear of the sky, too, there is also a 
shift from seeing Déogratias’ words in speech bubbles, as if coming from some internal or 
diegetic location, to the text being outside the frame of the image. This second viewpoint 
removes both Déogratias and his words from the image itself, placing the reader in the position 
of Déogratias; we see what he sees, but his voice is disembodied, as if it cannot connect with the 
image before us. Therefore the text itself cannot be a part of this image of the sky, which remains 
separate from language and which, in its vastness, encroaches on Déogratias’s consciousness. 
The graphic novel as a literary medium allows for such a destabilization of word and image, 
content and form. In this instance, the words and image are in fact separated, disjointed, marking 
a break between the two forms of representation. The sky itself comes to function like both a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 “I’m afraid of the night” (Siegel 27). 
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picture and a window—a terrifying and overwhelming image, and an indication of the boundary 
with the Real, which is ever further encroaching on Déogratias’s psyche.  
Déogratias attempts to fight off this encroachment of the sky and his transformation into 
a dog by drinking Urwagwa (traditional banana beer), which serves several narrative and 
metaphorical purposes. On the one hand, Déogratias uses the beer to poison his enemies; it 
therefore serves a very practical purpose in the novel. However, Urwagwa is also what keeps his 
insanity at bay. Instead of using language to express his trauma—which he is unable to do until 
his “confession” at the end of the novel (and once again, only with the help of his beer)—he 
instead wanders the town begging for this Urwagwa. Functioning similarly to Derrida’s 
pharmkon, that is, as both poison and cure, the beer simultaneously staves off his complete 
madness, and keeps him from healing or coming to terms with his trauma: it is both inhibitor and 
liberator.  
After receiving some beer one night, Déogratias proudly proclaims, “Hey dogs, you don’t 
scare me! You can laugh all you want! / My Urwagwa… I am not a dog” (figure 3.23, Siegel 
49). The second half of this statement is accompanied by an image of a vast expanse of starry 
sky—the same sky that overwhelms Déogratias earlier, the same sky that is a representation of 
the Real, that “pulsing of the pre-symbolic substance in all its abhorrent vitality” (Žižek 19). Yet 
here he denies his identity as a dog, or as one who is responsible for his crimes. With the help of 
his Urwagwa, Déogratias is able to fight off the encroachment of the threatening space of the sky 
and remain human, although he then must also remain incapable of facing his traumatic 
experiences.  
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Figure 3.23: “I am not a dog” (49). 
Urwagwa and intoxication thus function much like a dream, keeping reality at bay by 
prolonging a kind of “sleep” or altered state, which prevents Déogratias from fully confronting 
his trauma. In “Tuché and Automaton” Lacan discusses Freud’s reading of a particular dream—
that of a father dreaming of his child, whose dead body in the next room is burning from a fallen 
candle. Lacan emphasizes the act of awakening as perhaps more important than the act of sleep, 
which Freud says is a two-fold response to the pleasure principle. Discussing both Freud and 
Lacan’s treatment of this dream, Caruth claims that “[a]wakening… is itself the site of a trauma, 
the trauma of the necessity and impossibility of responding to another’s death” (Caruth 100).32 
For Déogratias, this impossibility is two-fold: he cannot save Apollinaire and Bénigne’s lives; 
nor can he admit that he is (at least partially, if not totally) responsible for their deaths. Sobriety 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 See again the earlier discussion in the introduction of this dissertation about Neil Gaiman and 
Sam Keith’s manipulation of comics in Sandman to illustrate this movement between waking 
and sleeping as a site of trauma. 
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is like the traumatic awakening, which reveals these impossibilities and allows his madness to 
overwhelm him. 
As mentioned earlier, Urwagwa is also a carrier of poison, a means for Déogratias to 
eliminate those who know his crimes. The same instrument used to keep the past and its horrors 
from overtaking his consciousness is used to eliminate the people who would be able, 
theoretically, to confront Déogratias about his crimes. Moreover the poison Déogratias employs 
is “the product farmers use to fight parasites on cows’ hides,” a kind of allegorical condemnation 
of those who feed off of Rwanda and its people as parasites (Stassen 77). This actually situates 
Déogratias’s murders not only as acts against those who know of Déogratias’s guilt, but as 
revenge against all who participated in the systems of institutional racism and violence. Stassen 
includes scenes of rural farmers raising cows for European businessmen who reap the profits.  
This dual function of Urwagwa is further complicated by Déogratias’ last (and 
unsuccessful) murder attempt against Brother Philippe. Brother Philippe is a Belgian priest who 
arrives in Rwanda just before the genocide. When he first arrives in Rwanda, Philippe is taken to 
a bar by Déogratias to sample Urwagwa, because “[y]ou really have to taste banana beer if you 
want to understand our culture” (Stassen 9). Urwagwa becomes a kind of double for Rwandan 
culture, to be experienced by the new and naïve Belgian presence. And it is Brother Philippe who 
hears Déogratias’ “(non)confession,” the only time when Déogratias is able or willing to talk 
about the events of the genocide. However, even here the reader remains unaware of how much 
Déogratias says; instead his confession is interrupted—like the rest of the novel—by flashbacks 
to the night of Augustin’s death.  
In bringing in the Belgian missionary, Stassen moves the genocidal catastrophe into a 
larger framework of colonial violence, institutional racism, and perpetrator guilt. Brother Philip 
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has the last words of the comic, placing the agency of speech firmly within the colonial voice, 
rather than the African. As such Rwanda remains entrenched in a system of institutionalized and 
global violence, the passive space into which racist violence is written. The other major 
European figures are the uncouth French soldier mentioned above and the lecherous Brother-
Prior Stanislas, both of whom exploit, sexually and otherwise, the Rwandans they claim to serve. 
These figures of the colonial legacy—one religious, the other military, but both responsible for 
different forms of the same cultural and racial discrimination—are so despicable as to be near 
caricatures of the Europeans involved in Rwanda.  
Acting as a figure who is someone largely overlooked by both Rwandans and the colonial 
regime, Augustin encapsulates the racial dynamics at work between Rwanda and Belgium. 
Augustin is Twa, or “pygmy,” the third quasi-outsider race within Rwanda, and as such belongs 
outside the constructed Hutu-Tutsi binary. He is also the only African father figure in the text. At 
one point, he is with Brother Philippe, the brother’s parents, and Apollinaire at a museum of 
Rwandan artifacts. The cultures of Rwanda are thus exoticized and displayed for the (white) 
tourist’s gaze— after all, why are the parents of Brother Philippe at this museum, rather than out 
in Kigali, “experiencing” the current Rwandan cultural tableau?  
Augustin troubles this well-ordered gaze, however, by noting the land’s resistance to 
conform to the white colonial vision of Rwanda as exploitable soil hiding untold riches: “Ici, 
nous n’avons pas d’or, pas de cuire, pas de diamants mais nous avons des blancs. Il suffit de se 
baisser pour ramasser l’argent qui tombe de leurs poches… Le problème, c’est précisément que 
nous avons à nous baisser” (47-48).33 Rather than defining the land as something the Europeans 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 “Here we have no gold, no copper, no diamonds, but we have whites.  You just have to bend 
down to pick up the money falling from their pockets... The drawback, of course, is the bending 
down part” (Siegel 45-46). 
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can exploit, Augustin inverses this dynamic, transforming the whites themselves into resources 
for the Rwandans, with the “only drawback” to this source of wealth being the personal 
debasement it means to be subservient to another person. 
Déogratias thus tries to undermine the colonial gaze and to provide for a space that is not 
pre-colonial, as in Rwanda 1994 and especially Smile Through the Tears, but decidedly 
postcolonial. Déogratias’ actual transformations (not hallucination), the reader’s failed vision in 
the face of Déogratias’s murder attempts, the parasite poison, the whites as resources, and so on, 
all contribute to a visual encounter that is disorienting and unstable, rather than authoritative and 
categorical. Even with all these manipulations, though, Déogratias cannot fully escape the 
problematic construction of Rwanda as inheritor of a colonial legacy. After all, Déogratias is 
arrested not for the murder of Juvénal or Bosco, but for the murder of the Frenchman; likewise 
the final words of the novel belong not to a Rwandan but to Brother Philippe.  
 
Figure 3.24: “une créature de Dieu.” Note also Stassen’s self-inscription into the landscape in the lower left (78). 
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As the police take Déogratias away, one of them asks Brother Philippe: “c’était un ami à vous, ce 
fou?” to which Brother Philippe responds on the following page, “C’était une créature de Dieu” 
(79-80).34 Willingly or not, Déogratias is at least reinscribed into a Western religious and cultural 
system, in which the murder of a white man is more punishable than those of a black man, and in 
which the last dialogue belongs to a white man—dialogue that reduces a man to a “creature.” 
Perhaps most telling of all, however, lies barely visible within the final panel (figure 
3.24). After Brother Philippe’s regretful lamentation of Déogratias, the following two panels 
depict the sun setting behind the hotel where the characters last gathered; with the setting sun, 
the stars begin to reveal themselves in the sky. The final panel of the text is another vast starry 
night sky, a panel so immense that it overwhelms the rest of the page. There is a sense in which 
that threatening sky overtakes the page and the narrative, signaling perhaps the Rwandan spirits’ 
victory over Déogratias. However, in the lower left corner of the panel against the black 
background of the landscape, reads the author’s inscription: “Jean-P. Stassen. Goute d’Or. Août 
2000” (80). Thus Stassen actually insinuates himself into this landscape, writing the European 
gaze into the landscape and undermining in part its resistant power.  
 
Conclusion 
The use of extended panels with broad, sweeping landscapes in all three of these works 
gives the sense of these being moments in which time slows down, as we pause, view the scene, 
take in the vista, play the awestruck tourist or Romantic painter. “Landscape… doesn’t merely 
signify or symbolize power relations; it is an instrument of cultural power” (Mitchell Landscape 
1-2). The continuing obsession with landscape in these texts shows just how embedded notions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 “Friend of yours, that madman?” “He was a creature of God” (Siegel 77-78). 
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of colonialism remain within the conceptualization of Africa, even in such a small nation and at 
such a contemporary moment.  
Moreover, using the landscape in this manner often underscores the traumatic reality of 
the genocide, whose effects cause a kind of undoing of time, leaving characters and spaces 
temporally adrift and causing memories and present moments to become intertwined. It is 
problematic, then, that the visual and temporal pause we as readers take as we view the 
landscape is a kind of domination over that same traumatized arena that the genocide presents. 
The graphic works here allow for the tensions between time, trauma, memory, and visuality to 
come to the fore, as the networks of the colonial, the traumatic, and the visible intersect within 
their panels. 
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Chapter 4: The Falling Man: Resisting and Resistant Visual Media in Art Spiegelman’s In 
the Shadow of No Towers 
 
The previous chapter outlined some of the ways that the act of seeing can be negative and 
even violent in its tendencies towards an authoritarian, determining gaze. Building on that 
notion, this chapter addresses the inverse of this dynamic, examining the role of images 
themselves and their reception within graphic narratives of trauma. In moving to talk about Art 
Spiegelman’s work, this dissertation moves away from the frenzied superheroes and the 
fictionalized madmen of the previous chapters to individual lived experiences and the realm of 
autobiographical graphic memoirs. However, as we will see, this generic shift does not mean the 
use of the comics medium is itself any less frenetic.  In the Shadow of No Towers, an oversized 
and unconventional work of comics centering on Spiegelman’s experiences with and reaction to 
the terrorist attacks on New York of September 11, 2001, is a chaotic, problematic book. It is 
disjointed, overworked, difficult to follow, and perhaps dissatisfying in the end, but 
Spiegelman’s35 experience cannot allow it to be otherwise, as No Towers exposes the intricate, 
often disavowed, bonds between instances of personal trauma and public disaster.  
Although he claims throughout the text to use No Towers to “work through” his 
responses to 9/11, what the text actually demonstrates is Spiegelman’s deeply conflicted and 
complex position between individual and collective experience, a position negotiated through 
competing mediated images. No Towers draws together the trauma of Spiegelman’s experience 
during 9/11 with Holocaust postmemory, working within and against the legacy of his earlier 
magnum opus, Maus (1986, 1992), a comics memoir of his father’s experiences in the Polish 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 As with all the comics memoirs discussed in this dissertation, I distinguish between 
“Spiegelman,” the author, artist and narrator, and “Art,” the character and avatar. 
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ghettoes and the Nazi concentration camps during World War II. In so doing, the text 
demonstrates the complicated network of trauma and memory within the multiple layers of 
visual representation in the text.  
The visual elements of No Towers both create and resist the transformation of trauma into 
narrative. Spiegelman uses many different visual styles and “interpictoral” (like intertextual) 
references in a messy, nonlinear framework. Rather than pursue a conventional or linear 
narrative, Spiegelman creates No Towers as a way to “sort out the fragments of what I’d 
experienced from the media images that threatened to engulf what I actually saw” (“Sky” n. 
pag.). Thus the text lingers in its own fragmentation, as the pieces of Spiegelman’s memories rub 
against the “Master Narrative” of terror that emerged in the days, months, and years following 
the attacks—a narrative created with and through a variety, even an overabundance, of images. 
No Towers demonstrates the very ways in which those “engulfing” media images inform 
Spiegelman’s reactions to and understanding of the events of 9/11. Moreover, he situates these 
experiences in relation to his father’s experiences of the Holocaust, forcing a comparsion— 
though not necessarily an equation— between the two events, and between direct experience and 
what Marianne Hirsch calls the “postmemory” of experience. 
The overarching problem in No Towers, therefore, lies in the convergence of multiple 
traumatic moments and experiences, which results in a confounded, confusing, disorganized, 
nonlinear text whose very physicality makes for an uncomfortable reading experience on the 
level of materiality, narrative, and subject matter. Indeed, the act of reading Spiegelman’s text is 
itself a complicated, uneasy affair. The book is oversized, measuring the same as a tabloid 
newspaper spread. Unlike a newspaper, however, this book has thick cardstock “pages” (I refer 
to “plates” rather than “pages” in this chapter, because the text’s pagination refers to the two-
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page plate rather than to the individual page; each plate was originally published individually 
before being collected as a single volume). Each plate is oriented so that the spine of the book 
runs horizontally, rather than vertically, shifting again the standard reading approach from one of 
right to left page turning to bottom to top. Reading No Towers requires space, patience, and 
adaptability. 
This unorthodox presentation is a physical corollary to the thematic interventions of 
Spiegelman’s work. No Towers brings together multiple traumatic elements into a single, if not 
cohesive, work: Holocaust postmemory; Spiegelman’s immediate (as in, un-mediated) lived 
traumatic experience of 9/11; the secondary trauma of the US government’s co-opting of the 
attacks for its own agenda; the tertiary pain of the hypermediation of the attacks through the 
overabundance of imagery played out in television, newspapers, films, billboards, etc; and 
ultimately the impossible act of creating comics out of this event. The visual and the traumatic 
are thus intimately bound up with one another, as Spiegelman navigates both media images and 
his own visions and artistic creations, weaving them into a patchwork medley of visible 
fragments. 
 
Sorting the Fragments of Memory and Narrative 
In his introductory essay to No Towers, “The Sky Is Falling,” Spiegelman writes that in 
the aftermath of 9/11, “I was slowly sorting through my grief and putting it into boxes” (n. pag.). 
He frequently refers to the act of creating No Towers as an artistic response to his experiences, 
his trauma, and his political ire. Thus the act of “putting [his grief] into boxes” works as a 
metaphor not only for processing his own memories but also for creating comics, where the 
panels are like boxes containing the narrative of those memories. These “boxes,” however, do 
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little to make narrative sense of the 9/11 terrorist attacks or of Spiegelman’s own trauma; the ten 
plates of the work display a kind of frantic choppiness, a fragmentation of both image and 
memory.  
This fragmentation and lack of linearity creates an almost tangible experience of temporal 
suspension and confusion on the page. As earlier chapters have discussed extensively, the 
experience of time is often suspended in representations of trauma. The first series of panels 
across the top of the first plate, under the heading “The New Normal,” depict three people 
watching a television (figure 4.1). In the first panel, a calendar behind them reads “Sept 10” and 
the family lolls on the couch disinterestedly, expressions blank. In the second panel, the calendar 
reads “Sept 11” and the family stares at the TV screen, hyperbolic shock and disbelief on their 
faces, with their hair standing on end. The final panel in the series includes the family, with hair 
still remaining standing on end, returning to their earlier catatonic states in the exact same 
lethargic poses from the first panel. In this final panel, the calendar has been replaced with an 
American flag, whose white stripes are tinted bluish from the television screen’s glow. This off-
colored flag becomes its own panel, half hidden by another panel depicting the orange “glowing 
bones” of the second tower that permeate the text.  
 
Figure 4.1: “The new normal” (1). 
While this blue-tinted flag is undoubtedly a reference to the ubiquitous presence of the Stars and 
Stripes after 9/11, it has also quite literally replaced time (the calendar) in this panel. That is, in a 
“post-9/11” world—a world whose very verbal designation marks a temporal and conceptual 
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break with a “pre-9/11” world—time seems to cease to progress linearly. Instead the world of the 
text—Speigelman’s world—is now suspended in a kind of timelessness, where uncritical 
patriotism and hypermediated images reside alongside the trauma of the terrorist attacks.  
Spiegelman’s response to this timelessness, to his traumatic experiences, is both to resist 
the co-option of 9/11 images by insisting on his own memories and their distinctly visual nature, 
and to overemphasize the fragmentary nature of these images. Doing so leads to a major 
disruption of a more traditionally linear reading experience. Hillary Chute notes that “the 
publication of ‘No Towers’ as a serial comic strip, appearing in print at irregular intervals, 
reflects the traumatic temporality Spiegelman experienced after 9/11, in which a normative, 
ongoing sense of time stopped or shattered; he feels that these pages represent what he calls ‘a 
slow-motion diary of the end of the world’” (“Temporality” 230).  
The layout of the plates heightens this feeling of suspended time. Instead of a 
traditionally linear panel-to-panel approach (see, for example, Maus, or most of the other works 
examined in the other chapters here), the plates in No Towers are instead chaotic, jumbled and 
confusing, and they complicate the traditional approach to reading comics. For example, the first 
plate is a jumbled mess of panels, reading both horizontally and vertically, often without any 
visual cues telling the reader where to go next (figure 4.2). 
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Figure 4.2: Plate 1. 
The digitally created image of the North Tower as it disintegrates appears in a series of 
five panels falling along the right-hand side of the plate, but also appear in two panels on the 
lower left of the plate (figure 4.3). The captions’ extensive use of ellipses and em-dashes lend 
even more confusion— to which elliptical phrase does a given caption belong: the phrase 
following, or the phrase to the right?  
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Figure 4.3: Detail from plate 1. In what order should we read these panels? 
In terms of appearance, there are at least six different visual styles employed on this 
single plate: the “standard” contemporary cartoon style in the first panels; the 19th century 
cartoon style of a series labeled “etymological vaudeville;” the digitally altered and overly 
pixilated image of the Twin Towers, drawn to mimic a television screen; the orange-colored, 
digitally created image of the North Tower collapsing; the horror movie poster-esque, brightly 
colored, central panel below the fold of the page depicting a crowd running in panic; and finally, 
the superimposed photograph of a shoe inside that lower middle panel. This mismatch of styles 
coupled with the nonlinear and non sequitur page layout indicate not only Spiegelman’s 
experience of trauma as a kind of psychic shock and unmooring, but also his attempt to navigate 
visuality in the aftermath of the event’s over-mediation (a point to which I shall return later). 
However, the fragmented narrative of No Towers is not limited to the visual; it finds a 
textual equivalent in the shifting use of perspective. The second plate and most of the following 
plates switch between first and third person, as if the only way for Spiegelman to narrate the 
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actual events of 9/11 is to distance himself from them pronominally. For example, the third plate 
alternates between third and first person narrative, as rows of panels alternate between depictions 
of Art Spiegelman and his wife, Françoise Mouly, trying to find their daughter Nadja at her high 
school at the foot of the Towers, and Art as a Maus mouse speaking to the reader while smoking 
and reflecting on the poor air quality and negative health conditions in New York City following 
the attacks. Running the length of the plate lie two columns bordering these two narrative arcs: 
the left column is the orange tower, grainy and pixilated; the right is an oversized cigarette, 
equally grainy; from both images rises a plume of orange smoke (figure 4.4).  
 
 
Figure 4.4: Plate 3. 
194 
 
The third-person narrative series of this plate follows Art and Françoise as they arrive at 
Nadja’s school: “They were the only parents allowed inside. Hysteria has its uses…” (3). The 
captions’ insistence on the third person throughout this narrative and visual arc reflect 
Spiegelman’s distance from his memories, his need to retell the story of what he saw and did on 
9/11 as if it occurred to someone else. Just as Art and Françoise are the exception among a crowd 
of parents, “the only parents allowed inside” and separated into some other space, so too does 
Spiegelman’s reaction to 9/11 separate him from himself. Paradoxically, this distance actually 
brings the text and the images closer together, as the reader always sees the avatars of Art 
(whether in human or mouse form) as visual objects, rather than from a first-person 
perspective.36 In this way the reader and the author mimic one another’s positions as outsiders 
looking in on one man’s memories. The problem with this distanced perspective is that it actually 
undermines to a certain extent Spiegelman’s insistence on presenting his memories as a personal 
narrative that resists the “Master Narrative” of terror and patriotism. 
Spiegelman uses a similar distancing technique on the following plate, where a third-
person narrative in two linear strips sandwiches nine scattered panels in a different style, 
depicting the children and onlookers at Nadja’s school and culminating in the fall of the North 
Tower (figure 4.5). The captions in these panels are written in script, as if in Spiegelman’s own 
handwriting. The artwork in these panels is less cartoony, lacking the black borders around 
figures and done in a more “painted” style; with their white frames inside black frames, and with 
the captions written directly onto the images rather than contained within boxes, this series of 
panels feels more like a representation of a collection of photographs than the comic book 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 There are indeed works in which the artwork in panels is depicted from a first-person 
perspective, wherein the viewer occupies the supposed position of the character in the narrative. 
Alison Bechdel uses this technique fairly extensively, as I will discuss in the next chapter. See 
also the earlier discussion of Laurie Juspeczyk’s memories in Watchmen.  
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narrative surrounding it. These panels thus function as snapshots of Spiegelman’s experiences 
during his search for Nadja— the computer screen with Nadja’s information, the children crying 
or talking in the hallways, the tower’s collapse. In trying to capture and hold on to his own 
memories, Spiegelman transforms them into stylized photograph-like snapshots, mirroring both 
the construction of narrative from memory and the fragmented nature of memory itself. These 
memories become objects on a page, just as the use of third-person narrative in the captions of 
the other narrative arc emphasizes the object-ness of Art as a character, a figure in this 
fragmented narrative. 
 
Figure 4.5: Plate 4. Note the photographic and handwritten quality of the images in the center of the plate. 
196 
 
Even slightly more conventional-looking plates, like plate 10, disrupt standard reading 
patterns. Starting as a reader of English naturally would, in the upper left, the reader then moves 
from left to right through the first set of panels in the first column (figure 4.6). The thick black 
line indicating the end of the column might indicate that the reader at this point should move to 
the next set of panels in the first column. The artwork in the next column, however, carries with 
it the same motifs—the same figure of Spiegelman holding his patriotic alarm clock—as in the 
first set of panels in the first column. Is the reader therefore supposed to jump across the gap 
between the columns and read the first set of panels in the second column? Or, as stated before, 
should the reader instead move from the first set of panels in the first column to the second set of 
panels in that same column? Either approach might actually work for the first few sets of panels, 
until it eventually becomes apparent that the two columns actually contain two different 
narratives, and therefore each column is to be read separately.  
 
Figure 4.6: No Towers’s confusing layout makes for a disruptive reading experience (10). 
The ambiguity and confusion here stem from Spiegelman’s revisions and manipulations 
of the traditional ways comics function. As Scott McCloud illustrates, the gaps between panels 
indicate usually that something in the narrative has happened—something the reader cannot see 
or read—between the first and second panel (94-98). Continuity in artwork and in text helps lead 
the reader to make certain conclusions about what has happened in the lacunae or the gutters 
between panels (cf. McCloud, chapter 4). This process of navigating the black spaces of the 
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gutters is what McCloud calls “closure.” In this instance, however, continuity in artwork does 
not indicate continuity in narrative; in a way the text resist the very act of both graphic and 
narrative closure.  
No Towers intentionally disrupts conventional comics form as an expression of 
Spiegelman’s experiences. In fact, many of the panels do not actually have a traditional gutter of 
blank white space. Instead they appear on a background image, as in plate two—the shadows 
cast from the towers at the top right of the page fill in the spaces between panels across the rest 
of the page (figure 4.7).  
 
Figure 4.7: Plate 2. Note the shadows from the upper right filling in the gutters. 
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Thus the spaces between panels, the necessary gaps in narrative, do not exist. The text attempts 
to fill in (or even overfill) the blanks, so to speak, with earlier images and shadows. One might 
even read the use of the towers’ shadows as background as a kind of attempt to force the reader 
in a particular direction, toward a particular image of simultaneous disaster and absence. This 
obligation to return to the towers actually undoes the insistence on the towers as the moment to 
which we should return. Like Freud’s patient loudly proclaiming that his dream is “not about his 
mother,” the text’s stubborn insistence that this narrative is about the towers seems to conceal 
rather than reveal. Rather than allowing the reader to return on her own to that moment, as one 
might do within an empty gutter, the filled gutter actually leads one to wonder what the shadow 
itself is covering. 
This manipulation of traditional comics narrative devices emphasizes again the fractured 
nature of Spiegelman’s personal narrative of trauma, as well as his rejection of the use of a 
traditional narrative to look at these events. In her article “Collateral Damage,” Marianne Hirsch 
maintains that “[c]omics highlight both the individual frames and the space between them, 
calling attention to the compulsion to transcend the frame in the act of seeing. They thus 
startlingly reveal the limited, obstructed vision that characterizes a historical moment ruled by 
trauma and censorship” (1213). The traumatized narrator cannot help but relate his story in a 
disjointed fashion; likewise, the comics creator shapes the structure of his text to reflect this 
“limited, obstructed vision” caused by the traumatic moment. Spiegelman simultaneously resists 
and embraces this “compulsion to transcend the frame” by disrupting the narrative flow of the 
pages, and by disfiguring, expanding, filling in or otherwise shifting the spaces of the gutters. 
The fourth plate, for example, contains practically no room for closure, no visual “rest” or pause 
between panels, since the gutters are filled with the Lichtenstein-esque oversized newsprint 
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pixels that form an image of one of the “Tower Twins,” Spiegelman’s parody of 19th-century 
newspaper cartoons (see again figure 4.5). This pixilated background represents both the Towers 
themselves and their overabundant media presence haunting the page and the narrative, making it 
impossible to escape the presence of the Towers at any moment, even between the narrative 
moments. 
At other moments the text renders itself semi-invisible as it covers its own panels, 
indicating both Spiegelman’s insistence on a story that cannot (or should not) fully be told, and 
his troubled relationship with the comics medium itself. For example, as he and Françoise wait 
for Nadja in the school, “they couldn’t see the maelstrom outside, but they could hear the guard’s 
radio,” which reports in Spanish on the attack on the Pentagon of that morning: “un aeroplano 
acaba de estrellarse en el Pentágono!” In the following panel the guard translates the radio’s 
transmission (“They saying a plane just bomb into the Pentagon”), but a Mars Attacks 
bubblegum card covers up whatever image might have been accompanying this translation 
(figure 4.8). 
 
Figure 4.8: No Towers covers its own panels and narrative (3). 
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Art and Françoise’s responses to the guard are unclear and, perhaps more significantly, 
invisible and silenced: one of them, presumably Art, “speaks” an exclamation point in a speech 
balloon, while the other (Françoise) “thinks” “Nadja?” in a thought balloon. These two image-
texts symbolize real-life responses but do not signify them. They indicate to the reader that the 
two characters respond in some non-verbal way to the news of the Pentagon attacks, but they 
relegate that knowledge to the realm of the unseen and unarticulated. Mirroring the distance 
between Art and the attacks on Washington, this series of panels distances the reader from Art. 
The Mars Attacks card depicts “Washington in Flames” and under attack from an alien 
flying saucer. “When I was Nadja’s age, in 1962, I loved those Mars Attacks cards published by 
TOPPS GUM, INC. Funny how things turn out. I worked for Topps for 20 years, from the time I 
finished high school till Nadja was born” (3). Spiegelman’s career as an artist and the terror 
attack on Washington come to a visual convergence here, through the bubblegum card and its 
covering up of Art and Françoise. Spiegelman visualizes the attack on Washington as a cartoon-
y, alien event, despite his firsthand experience of the attack on New York, and thus he uses this 
card as the replacement for his own reaction to and understanding of the attack on the Pentagon. 
In the panels below, Spiegelman muses, “He figured the Martians had invaded, that Paris 
was burning and Moscow was vaporized […]. It was hard for puny human brains to assimilate 
genuinely new information… and it remains just as hard now, these many months later…” (3). 
This last panel contains the principal’s announcement coming from the intercom: “Due to 
today’s unusual conditions, absolutely no students will be allowed outside for lunch” (3). The 
disconnect between the principal’s announcement and the events of the day parallels the 
disconnect between Spiegelman’s understanding of the attack on Washington and that event. In 
both cases, moreover, Spiegelman relies on comics and cartoons to visualize the events, but in 
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both cases these visualizations fall short of representation: the intercom and the bubblegum card 
act as intermediaries of the dissonance of that day’s events. 
Another “external” image covers a panel on this lower half of the third plate. This image 
hides both the caption and the image of the underlying panel, creating a sense that the reader is 
missing an entire section of the narrative. The mouse-Spiegelman in the final row of the plate 
holds a protest sign that extends up into the preceding panels. It reads “NYC to Kids: Don’t 
Breathe!” and features an image of two young children from the 1940s or 1950s wearing massive 
black gas masks. This poster, which Art designed for a protest at the school after 9/11, appears as 
if it is layered over or covering the panel beneath it, allowing just a corner of a caption and a 
piece of the loudspeaker to show. In this instance, the emphasis is not on the attacks themselves 
interrupting and disrupting narrative and vision, as above, but rather on Spiegelman’s own need 
for artistic and political expression. The poster, he explains, was not used at the air-quality 
protest at the school, because “some parents protested my poster for being too shrill” (3). In this 
instance, Spiegelman’s own creation gets in the way of his narrative, covering up a panel, 
keeping the reader at a distance, echoing the way that Spiegelman’s outspoken political views 
are met with reluctance in the public arena after 9/11. No Towers thus illustrates the complicated 
ways in which personal narrative and memory work with and against one another, drawing the 
reader and the narrator together while simultaneously insisting on their distance from both the 
text and one another. 
 
Memory and Image Construction 
Comics critic Douglas Wolk describes No Towers as “a god-awful mess”: “Its ten 
tabloid-sized pages pastiche the iconography and style of early-twentieth-century comic strips as 
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a response to the fall of the World Trade Center, but Spiegelman’s drawing is overworked and 
overcomputerized, and there’s no sense of drive or closure to it—it just kind of ends after a 
while” (346). Part of the disjointedness so disliked by Wolk comes from Spiegelman’s attempt to 
reject absolutely the images of 9/11 that pervade the mainstream media and are appropriated by 
the government and the media to serve their own purposes. As he writes in the introduction, “I 
[Spiegelman] had anticipated that the shadows of the towers might fade while I was slowly 
sorting through my grief and putting it into boxes. I hadn’t anticipated that the hijackings of 
September 11 would themselves be hijacked by the Bush cabal that reduced it all to a recruitment 
poster.”  
Hirsch endorses Spiegelman’s view of the widespread photographs—Spiegelman’s 
“recruitment posters”—from 9/11, saying: “In the work of cultural memory, their [photographs’] 
multiplicity may be overwhelming, and thus the archive of atrocity photos is quickly limited to 
just a few emblematic images repeated over and over. In their iconicity and repetition, they may 
lose their power to wound” (1212). The well-known images of 9/11—the burning World Trade 
Center towers with smoke billowing from their wounds—have begun to lose their power, 
according to both Hirsch and Spiegelman, due to their prevalence in the mainstream media and 
in most other representations of the attacks since.  
Spiegelman therefore tries to actively work against such images in his work; his trauma 
will not allow him to accept the proliferated images and the desensitization they provoke. His 
insistence on other, more marginal images also tries to place emphasis on the person rather than 
the public sphere. Moreover, this insistence also indicates Spiegelman’s attempts to distance 
himself from the Bush administration and its appropriation of those images for its own political 
agenda. Instead, Spiegelman creates and obsesses over a new image—the disintegrating orange 
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tower—that stands for his personal experience at Ground Zero (figure 4.9). He writes: “The 
pivotal image from my 9/11 morning—one that didn’t get photographed or videotaped into 
public memory but still remains burned onto the inside of my eyelids several years later—was 
the image of the looming north tower’s glowing bones just before it vaporized” (“Sky”). That 
this particular representation of the Twin Towers was not captured by photography or video 
camera reinforces the personal nature of this image for Spiegelman. It is what he saw, personally, 
not what was presented to him through the media, and his explicit, adamant claim to this image 
serves, at least superficially, to reclaim 9/11 not as a national disaster, but as local and personal.  
 
Figure 4.9: Detail of the orange tower that repeats throughout the text (1). 
The repetition of the image of the glowing orange tower indicates the ways in which this 
image continues to haunt Spiegelman. It is a marker of that which he cannot escape and yet 
cannot fully express. That the tower is present on each page is a kind of repetition that serves to 
further emphasize Spiegelman’s trauma. Furthermore, in insisting upon this image, Spiegelman 
also insists upon the moment of trauma itself, on the instant “the world ended” rather than on 
whatever happened before or after the attacks (1). In fact, Spiegelman himself defines his own 
trauma: “I insist the sky is falling, they roll their eyes and tell me it’s only my Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder… That’s when Time stands still at the moment of trauma…which strikes me as a 
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totally reasonable response to current events!” (2). The representation of the orange tower 
indicates precisely “Time stand[ing] still at the moment of trauma;” it freezes one instant—
literally mid-eruption—and repeats it, so that the instant becomes fixed and repeated, rather than 
a fluid movement forward in time. In addition, as Karen Espiritu writes, “the ‘obsessive’ labor 
involved in creating a graphic novel parallels the harrowing interminability not only of grief 
itself, but also of attempting to ‘master’ or understand—though never completely—a particularly 
traumatic experience” (182). In obsessively recreating this image, Spiegelman is attempting to 
work through his trauma, but the repetition of the image also indicates the “interminability” of 
such work. 
Katalin Orbán interprets the repetition of the orange tower as a representation not only of 
trauma, but of the nearly unrepresentable sublime: 
This oversize and at times fragmented image shows the tower at a particular moment of 
lightness that Spiegelman tries to reproduce visually in an admittedly manic and 
obsessive way: at the moment when the tower is poised on the border of material being 
and abstract nothingness, glowing and almost floating translucently before collapsing into 
itself—an image Spiegelman did see and found “awesome.” (81) 
The orange tower appears at least twenty-seven times across all ten plates, echoing Spiegelman’s 
compulsive attitude toward this image. 
Spiegelman’s creation of this orange tower speaks to the visual nature of memory in this 
text; Spiegelman relies on the use of images to resist the co-option of other images. The orange 
“glowing bones” of the tower come to stand for Spiegelman’s personal memory, his own 
experiences, to which he clings desperately in the face of the mainstream media barrage and the 
US government’s co-option of the disaster for its own ends. The image of the disintegrating 
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tower that so disturbs Spiegelman haunts also his work; one can find the digital representation of 
the tower’s glowing bones in each of the ten plates that comprise No Towers. In emphasizing this 
image—one not captured by camera, nor appropriated by mainstream media—Spiegelman 
actively rejects the now-iconic images of the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Whether or not this tower 
actually disintegrated in the manner Spiegelman depicts is a moot point, as Orbán argues: “the 
issue is not whether the visual representation of the subject can be appropriate and authentic at 
all, but rather whether there can be a visual alternative to the infinitely light and repeatable 
mediatized images, imitating overly familiar film scenes and intimating presence as a convention 
of genre” (72-73).  
For Spiegelman, the “alternative to the infinitely light and repeatable mediatized images” 
is the image he creates of the orange tower; he “came close to capturing the vision of 
disintegration digitally on [his] computer” (“Sky”). The orange tower is thus admittedly a 
construct, without the presumed authority of a recorded or documented image, like those 
proliferated in the mainstream media. Instead the image is intensely personal, one that reflects 
Spiegelman’s position in relation to the collapse of the Twin Towers, his own traumatic 
experience. 
 
Media Images and Mediated Terror 
Despite Spiegelman’s obsession with his own created image of the “glowing bones” of 
the Towers, the profuse media images that Spiegelman tries to resist also appear throughout the 
text. Plate 10, for example, is organized into two different columns of panels. These columns are 
outlined in black; one has a spire extending up into the white border of the page (figure 4.10). A 
proportionally small plane flies between them, just entering the black border of the right-hand 
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column. The layout of the page here very deliberately corresponds to the Twin Towers, and the 
inclusion of the small plane echoes those very images against which Spiegelman acts. In spite of 
his insistence otherwise, Spiegelman is haunted not only by the image of the disintegrating 
orange tower, but by those now-iconic media images that, to quote Hirsch again, lose “their 
power to wound.”  
 
Figure 4.10: Plate 10. 
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Early in the work Spiegelman describes his reaction to the now-iconic media images of 
the burning towers:  
Those crumbling towers burned their way into every brain, but I live on the outskirts of 
Ground Zero and first saw it all live—unmediated. Maybe it’s just a question of scale. 
Even on a large TV, the towers aren’t much bigger than, say Dan Rather’s head…. 
Logos, on the other hand, look enormous on television; it’s a medium almost as well 
suited as comics for dealing in abstractions. (1)  
Spiegelman thus argues that the images of the Twin Towers have become smaller, less 
impressive, and less powerful through their overexposure on television (they are now the same 
size as Dan Rather’s head, for example). Moreover, most people in the United States and 
elsewhere experienced the 9/11 attacks through these mediated images. “Mediated” here has a 
double sense—the images reach us indirectly, through the television, newspapers or the Internet; 
and they are images appropriated by the media (the mainstream media, at least). In the first panel 
in this series, Spiegelman presents a pixilated image of the Twin Towers billowing smoke (see 
plate 1), as if to reinforce this double mediation of images like this.  
Using these hypermediated images might also be one way for Spiegelman again to claim 
to be moving past his trauma in the very act of creating these comics, as he maintains in the 
introduction. After all, as Patrick Bray shows, the media images of 9/11 also freeze and repeat 
the trauma of that day: 
These mass-distributed images, broadcast the world over at the speed of light, managed 
to shock and awe while the only information they transmitted was the continual 
disappearance of the Twin Towers. The towers were hit, fell, and reappeared in an eternal 
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return…. The image of the Twin Towers as icons of world capitalism were never more 
present than after their physical destruction. (4) 
As images, then, of both disaster and the conservative capitalist approach he attacks so 
vigorously, it is little wonder that Spiegelman might explicitly define his own work in opposition 
to these images. 
Even so, various versions of these iconic images appear in four panels in the first two 
plates alone; the mainstream images penetrate Spiegelman’s work even as he rails against them. 
Perhaps, then, the final panels of the text indicate not only some kind of personal or 
psychological response in Spiegelman, but also his eventual surrender to the imposition of 
mainstream images. On the same page, several panels show Spiegelman holding a kitschy green 
clock depicting an eagle hovering over the Twin Towers, with a policeman and a fireman 
standing at their base (figure 4.11).  
 
Figure 4.11: “on 9/12 the clock began to tick again” (10). 
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In two later panels, the towers become sticks of dynamite, which then blow up in the narrator’s 
face. The text accompanying these images reads, “Still, even anxious New Yorkers eventually 
run out of adrenaline and—BOOM! …You go back to thinking that you might live forever after 
all!” (10). Spiegelman thus appears to be struggling between remembering the attacks of 9/11 as 
he would like to remember them (the orange tower), and acknowledging the fact that the iconic 
images in the mainstream media construct his memories and his relationship to the events just as 
much as his personal vision. 
Indeed, as Bray points out, the orange tower that Spiegelman insists is his personal 
traumatic vision of 9/11 is also the “overworked and overcomputerized” creation so disliked by 
Wolk:  
[The tower] calls attention to itself as visually different from the surrounding hand-drawn 
comics. At the same time, within the image itself, its own status as representation of lived 
memory is undermined by the exaggerated size of its pixels, which guarantee the 
readability of the image’s technical origin. The fleeting memory of the moment just 
before the collapse of the north tower, a memory threatened by the devastating force of 
media images, can only be represented by an image that exposes the danger of vision 
machines. The computerized illustration offers a vision of disintegration (of the tower 
and of memory), which itself disintegrates into pixels. (Bray 15) 
Thus both the mass media images and the personal images offer a doubled disintegration of the 
towers: once as the moment of the attack fixed in time, and once through the pixilation of the 
images themselves, indicating a disintegration (and dis-integration) of those images as 
representations of the event. In this way, the tension between the public and personal images of 
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the disaster becomes blurred, causing the individual and collective experiences of 9/11 to come 
into contact with one another. 
Perhaps the most problematic of these over-mediated images occurs on the sixth plate, in 
a panel that runs the entire length of the plate. This panel depicts what the reader recognizes as 
the “glowing bones” of the North Tower, the image discussed above, but here its color palette is 
muted (figure 4.12).  
 
Figure 4.12: the falling man (6). 
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The tower appears brown instead of orange, set against a slate gray background. As the reader 
moves down this panel, we see Art’s avatar tumbling along its length, as if he is falling out of the 
tower. Spiegelman here conflates memory with a kind of haunting, drawing parallels between his 
own personal experiences and the images he did not see: “He is haunted now by the images he 
didn’t witness… images of people tumbling to the streets below… especially one man 
(according to a neighbor) who executed a graceful Olympic dive as his last living act” (6).  
The “falling man” image is perhaps one of the most controversial images coming from 
the days immediately following 9/11. One image in particular, taken by photographer Richard 
Drew, juxtaposes a man who looks almost vertically suspended in air against the vertical lines of 
one of the towers behind him (figure 4.13).  
 
Figure 4.13: Richard Drew’s “Falling Man.” 
According to Tom Junod’s 2003 article in Esquire magazine, this photograph appeared in 
numerous newspapers around the country on one day, and never appeared again, due mostly to 
public outrage: “In the most photographed and videotaped day in the history of the world, the 
images of people jumping were the only images that became, by consensus, taboo—the only 
images from which Americans were proud to avert their eyes” (n. pag.). Spiegelman’s inclusion 
of himself as the falling man points to an anxiety over co-opting this image and over becoming 
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this image. Even the muted brown of Spiegelman’s tower mimics the coloring of Drew’s 
photograph. That is, in a link between “falling man” and “sky is falling”— the title of his 
introductory essay and a line he repeats throughout the ten plates of No Towers, Spiegelman 
worries about his own work becoming like those very images he despises and by which he finds 
himself simultaneously trapped.  
Moreover, his own memory of the orange bones of the North Tower is here muted—both 
literally, in the color palette, and figuratively, in its position as background— and layered 
underneath the haunting image of what Spiegelman never saw himself. One of the central crises 
of the text, then, is not the exclusive encroachment of horrifying yet overabundant, desensitizing 
images, but the battle for memory itself, its visibility in tension with the imagined but invisible—
paradoxically rendered visible in Spiegelman’s own work—narratives of catastrophe. Indeed, the 
image of the “Falling Man,” particularly Drew’s photograph, actually attests to the mutability of 
images, their fallibility, their constructedness— that is, the ways in which they undermine 
themselves in the confrontation between fixity and fluidity.37  
 
Post Maus, Postmemory 
No Towers situates Spiegelman’s individual experiences among larger public and 
collective experiences not only of the same event, but also of the transgenerational trauma of the 
Holocaust. The mouse icon from Maus appears in six of the ten plates, indicating both the 
convergence of Spiegelman’s Holocaust postmemory and his primary experience of 9/11, and 
Maus’s enduring legacy and even inescapability. The mouse imagery first appears as early as the 
second plate, not coincidentally alongside a brief shift from first to third person narration in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 For a more detailed analysis of photography’s subjective qualities, see chapter 4. 
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captions, where Spiegelman muses, “Equally terrorized by al-Qaeda and by his own 
government…. Our Hero looks over some ancient comics pages instead of working. He dozes off 
and relives his ringside seat to that day’s disaster yet again, trying to figure what he actually 
saw…” (2). Art, wearing a mouse mask, sits slumped over a table, with a comics sheet dangling 
from his hand, as caricatures of a terrorist and an American politician (looking somewhat like 
George Bush, with a dash of Ronald Reagan) leer over him from either side (figure 4.14). The 
Maus reference brings this moment into a complicated network of perceived victimization, as the 
lethargic and passive Art looks as if he has given up under the doubled weight of this “equal 
terrorism,” the convergence of two historical traumas (9/11 and the Holocaust), and the doubled 
legacy of Maus and early comics.  
 
Figure 4.14: “issues of self-representation” (2). 
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Alongside this first image of the artist-as-mouse is a vertical series of panels, in which 
Spiegelman openly wonders about “issues of self-representation” as he looks in a mirror, and 
which culminates in the figure of the smoking Art-mouse from Maus: “I was clean-shaven before 
Sept. 11. I grew a beard while Afghans were shaving theirs off. But after some ‘bad reviews’ I 
shaved it off again. Issues of self-representation have left me slack-jawed!” (2). As Art shifts 
from bare-faced to bearded then back to clean-shaven and ultimately to mouse, the text reveals 
the repeated intrusion of the Holocaust in Spiegelman’s contemporary moment. Unable to decide 
on how to represent himself both within and without the text, Spiegelman ultimately falls back 
on the mouse—an avatar and uneasy metaphor of the victim.  
Using the Maus iconography creates a kind of transgenerational victimhood in which 
Art’s own trauma comes into contact with the legacy of his father’s trauma, and with the 
“postmemorial,” intergenerational trauma of living under the Holocaust’s shadow as the child of 
a survivor. That is, individual experiences—Spiegelman’s experiences—rub up against and try to 
find their places within a larger social and historical network. Yet the particular influence of the 
Holocaust on this narrative points to the problematic notion that the Holocaust is often 
considered the trauma par excellence of the 20th and early 21st centuries, the standard against 
which other catastrophes are measured. However, Spiegelman’s references to the Holocaust are 
less in terms of defining 9/11 in relation to the concentration camps themselves—though he does 
perform that connection to a certain extent—and more in terms of navigating the interstices of 
individual, familial, and social networks of trauma and catastrophe that converge in this 
particular image. 
One way this conflation between the historical and the individual occurs through the 
motif of the cigarette. In well over half the panels in which Spiegelman appears, he is smoking a 
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cigarette, and this addiction takes a central role in the third plate, in which the smoke from the 
cigarette is linked with both Auschwitz and Manhattan. On that page, a cigarette runs the entire 
length of the right side of the plate, and mirrors the orange tower running the length of the left 
side (see again figure 4.4). At the top of both of these images, orange smoke curls from the 
objects (cigarette and tower). Thus a visual equation is made between the public attacks and the 
individual addiction (though choice) of the narrator. This equation is furthered near the end of 
the page, when Spiegelman laments the New York air quality: “I’m not even sure I’ll live long 
enough for cigarettes to kill me,” he states fatalistically as the smoke from his cigarette fills the 
panel. 
Near the top of the page, Spiegelman appears in Maus form, saying “I remember my 
father trying to describe what the smoke in Auschwitz smelled like…. The closest he got was 
telling me it was ‘indescribable.’” Spiegelman then “pauses” for a panel to smoke his cigarette, 
and then looks out to the reader in the following panel, saying, “That’s exactly what the air in 
Lower Manhattan smelled like after Sept. 11!” (3). The Holocaust and 9/11 are brought together 
in extra-textual sensory ways at this moment in No Towers, as Versluys notes, with the smell of 
the air during both catastrophes mingling in the cigarette smoke-filled air above Art’s head 
(figure 4.15).  
 
Figure 4.15: Art smokes while talking about smoking (3). 
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This caption also pulls the Holocaust and 9/11 into the same zone of contact precisely through 
their unrepresentability; it is not that the smoke from the camps and the smoke from the Towers 
smell alike, but that they are both “indescribable,” outside of representation and language. 
Visually, moreover, these panels bring together multiple points in the past, as the Maus-mouse 
pulls both the Holocaust and Spiegelman’s earlier work into the present, while filling the panels 
with the smoke from his cigarette. With the smoke and ash of 9/11 mingling with the smoke of 
Auschwitz and the smoke of Spiegelman’s cigarettes, the text seems to imply that Spiegelman is 
in fact inhaling the smoky remnants of historical moments themselves—and that any one of 
those moments or choices might prove fatal. 
The “private” act of smoking cigarettes combining with the “public” smoke of the 
Holocaust and 9/11 thus ties Spiegelman’s precarious position within both private and public 
spheres with his familial and Jewish heritage. In fact, in the introduction he notes, “In those first 
few days after 9/11 I got lost constructing conspiracy theories about my government’s complicity 
in what had happened […]. Only when I heard paranoid Arab Americans blaming it all on the 
Jews did I reel myself back in.” Indeed, the act of publishing No Towers in the Jewish newspaper 
Forward is labeled as a “Right of Return” in that same essay—”it’s ok, you’re Jewish,” the 
editor says when Spiegelman warns the series may not be explicitly concerned with Jewishness. 
The tenuous position as both victim and as “special interest” coincides with Spiegelman’s 
similarly precarious position between survivor and only peripheral survivor—as some critics 
point out, he was not actually in the towers—and between individual and collective experience. 
This tension between the personal and the public is further complicated in Spiegelman’s 
inclusion of visual rhetoric from Maus, the autobiographical comics masterpiece of Holocaust 
postmemory for which he is best known. Spiegelman’s father’s experiences in the concentration 
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camps during WWII inform Spiegelman’s own understanding and interpretation of his 
psychological responses to the fall of the towers. Indeed, Spiegelman makes the connection 
explicit from the very beginning, citing his parents’ advice to always keep a suitcase packed in 
case a disaster strikes in the opening paragraph of the introduction. No Towers thus accents the 
circulation of traumatic events in terms of the familial and the individual coming up against and 
inside the larger historical context. 
Interwoven with this troubled navigation of traumas is a meditation on Spiegelman’s 
“issue of self-representation” in terms of representing himself as more than the creator of Maus—
which is in and of itself a definition in terms of Maus. As I discussed, Spiegelman’s self-
representation and his conflation of the personal with the historical are not a “working through” 
of trauma itself, so much as a labor of reclaiming that trauma as both personal and historical. 
Kristiaan Versluys calls No Towers “a narrative that serves to reintroduce trauma into a new 
network of signification without normalizing or naturalizing the event,” an apt description that 
might include collective and individual aspects (980). This network, however, is tightly bound to 
Spiegelman’s position vis-à-vis the medium of comics and its potential for reproducing those 
very mechanisms against which he struggles. 
In the opening series of panels in the second plate, Spiegelman’s avatar addresses the 
reader directly as he laments his “post-traumatic stress disorder” while an eagle wearing an 
Uncle Sam hat hangs from Art’s neck (figure 4.16). The first panel in this series is a standard, 
flat panel, but the following panels shift or rotate to reveal a three-dimensional aspect, eventually 
themselves forming an image of the Twin Towers, complete with fire streaming from the top of 
the North Tower in a visual echo of the iconic, overly circulated images of the disaster in the 
media. More significantly, however, the transformation of the actual panels of the narrative into 
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the Towers creates a sense in which the act of creating comics, for Spiegelman, is linked with 
and a product of disaster; creating comics and narrating the experience actually fixes the moment 
of trauma as such. Moreover, as apparently three-dimensional objects and not flat two-
dimensional panels, the shifting frames themselves trap Spiegelman inside both the comic and 
the tower. Just as he feels trapped by 9/11, and by its cooption by the Bush administration, so 
does it seem comics themselves trap Spiegelman. 
 
Figure 4.16: panels become the Towers (2). 
That comics as a medium here visually ensnares Spiegelman echoes his inability to 
escape the artistic and historical legacy of Maus—that is, not only the legacy of the Holocaust as 
postmemory, but also the legacy of a groundbreaking, Pulitzer-winning work, and the legacy of a 
medium so frequently sensational and sensorial. As the panels on plate two shift from panels to 
towers, Spiegelman displays his discomfort with the idea that this form is becoming as overdone 
as the media images he tries to resist. There is thus a twofold concern with the possible disaster 
of creative response, and with artistic creation out of disaster.  
The text itself, then, is a conflation of public and private, despite Spiegelman’s continued 
verbal claims that he rejects the public and dominant narrative of 9/11. The inescapable 
comparisons with Maus and the very fact of the text’s initial serial publication in international 
presses attest to Spiegelman’s involvement—reticent or not—in the public arena. While clinging 
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almost desperately to his personal vision and experiences, Spiegelman’s text nonetheless 
demands he situate those experiences in conversation with the larger national and historical 
framework of the catastrophe. No Towers itself thus presents comics as a means of survival in a 
world that demands both personal and public responses. Mixing text and image, presence and 
absence, it is the perfect medium for also expressing the tensions between subject positions. In 
the introduction, Spiegelman writes that “the unstated epiphany that underlies all the pages is 
only implied: I made a vow that morning to return to making comix full-time despite the fact that 
comix can be so damn labor intensive that one has to assume that one will live forever to make 
them.” While it does appear to trap Spiegelman, this is a trap consciously chosen as a means to 
reclaim his experiences and as a way of remaining in the in-between space. The very act of 
creating No Towers, then, becomes an act of survival, of both “sorting out” and remaining 
fragmented, of remaining invisible and simultaneously of rendering visible.
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Chapter 5: The Photograph Looks Back: Agency, Vision, and Loss in Alison Bechdel’s Fun 
Home 
 
While one of Art Spiegelman’s main concerns lies in the ways others use the images of 
tragedy and disaster for their own agenda, this chapter argues that the power of images in and of 
themselves lies at the heart of Alison Bechdel’s38 Fun Home. Bechdel’s graphic memoir is an 
intricately structured narrative examining her relationship with her closeted gay, manic, 
obsessive father, Bruce. Bechdel’s first autobiographical long-form work grapples with profound 
issues of gender, sexuality, memory, and family in intertwining, convoluted ways. Fun Home 
nonlinearly narrates Bechdel’s childhood and her relationship with her father, who took up the 
family mortuary business after his father (the title comes from the family’s macabre nickname 
for the Bechdel Funeral Home). Drawn mostly in a heavy-lined, cartoonish style in black and 
white and lightly colored with a grey-green wash, Fun Home’s sparse appearance belies the 
intricacies of the visual and textual narrative. The text weaves together references to literature, 
art, and historical events with the intensely personal and private stories of Bruce, Alison, and 
their respective sexualities. 
When Alison was nineteen, Bruce was hit by a truck; Bechdel insists this act was a 
suicide, although others in Fun Home call it an accident. Bruce Bechdel’s death occurs just a 
short while after Alison comes out as lesbian to her parents, an event somewhat eclipsed by the 
ensuing revelation that Bruce had a series of gay affairs. His death thus ensures that Alison can 
never have the chance to fully engage with him about their shared aspects of identity; Bruce’s 
past and his death remain mysteries around which Fun Home circles. Bechdel’s investigation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 As with the other graphic memoirs studied in this dissertation, I use “Bechdel” to refer to the 
author/artist, and “Alison” to refer to the character/narrator within the text. 
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into Bruce’s life and death illustrates the fluid, shifting nature of memory, as the past takes on 
new meaning with each new discovery. This kind of “retroactive memory,” that is, changes the 
way that Alison Bechdel remembers certain moments from her past, like family vacations, once 
her father’s double life comes to light. The prolonged suffering under which both she and Bruce 
lived as a result of this double life, and Bruce’s unending attempts to hide or quell his 
homosexuality, also changes meaning as Alison looks back on her life often with something 
more like compassion than accusation. Fun Home’s relationship to images is also a relationship 
to memory, loss, and suffering, as the past retroactively takes on new emotions and new forms 
through the now adult Bechdel’s perspective. 
In tracing Bruce’s and Alison’s personal and familial histories, Bechdel relies heavily on 
an archive of memorabilia redrawn by hand: diary entries, personal letters, newspaper clippings, 
and, perhaps most significantly, family photographs. Layered along with these objects and her 
personal memories are Bechdel’s intertextual references, retellings of Bruce’s childhood, and 
Alison’s own journey of identity formation through childhood and adolescence into young 
adulthood. Bechdel weaves together these many formative threads of her past to create a 
cohesive narrative not only of her father’s life but also of her own development as a subject; Fun 
Home is equally concerned with Bruce’s life and relationship with Alison, as it is with Alison’s 
own coming-of-age and her development of gendered and sexual identities.  
In this chapter I argue that Fun Home’s anxiety over who looks, who is seen, and how 
much is available to sight reflects a larger problem in the comics medium itself, of the agency 
and power of images with and against text. Pictures and words both act as agents on the 
audience, as W. J. T. Mitchell writes in What Do Pictures Want?: “Vision is as important as 
language in mediating social relations, and it is not reducible to language, to the ‘sign,’ or to 
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discourse.” (47). Fun Home concretizes the “complex field of visual reciprocity” and its ability 
to constitute social relations, particularly, in this case, through the relationship between memory 
and image (Mitchell What Do Pictures Want 47).  
Memory itself therefore becomes an unstable category of experience, as Bechdel’s visual 
representations of her past function as Proustian re-visitings through different lenses. Bechdel’s 
memory, aided by the archival evidence she presents, thus continually shifts and re-imagines 
itself, presenting a zone of contact between self and other, visible and hidden. Obscured or 
partial vision in both the structure and content of the panels, as well as the emphasis on redrawn 
archival elements, thus play an essential role in developing the text’s anxiety about who looks, 
and who is the object of the gaze— an anxiety closely linked not only with photography and 
memory, but also with the power and agency located within images themselves. 
 
Agency In and Through Images 
In her book Graphic Women, Hillary Chute defines what she terms the “idiom of 
witness” in graphic memoirs as “a manner of testifying that sets a visual language in motion with 
and against the verbal in order to embody individual and collective experience, to put contingent 
selves and histories into form” (3). Jennifer Lemberg, too, maintains that Fun Home “makes a 
strong and explicit claim for the power of graphic narrative as witness” (129). Fun Home’s 
fundamental anxiety about the visual and the visible, however, forces us to ask what happens 
when this “idiom of witness” becomes mutable, partially hidden, or withheld. The verbal and 
visual modes in Fun Home each offer only a partial representation of Alison’s memories and 
experiences, in part due to the complex nature of Bruce and Alison’s processes of identity 
formation. 
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From the beginning of the text, Alison and Bruce both struggle with a surface appearance 
at odds with what is “underneath.” For Bruce, a closeted gay man, this anxiety is almost tangible, 
as he obsessively restores the Gothic-style family house. In the first chapter, Bechdel enumerates 
the ways in which her father’s fixation with the ornate and ornamental reflects the same artificial 
covering-over of his secret desires: “He used his skillful artifice not to make things, but to make 
things appear to be what they were not” (16). Bechdel, herself openly gay since age 19, appears 
opposed to her father’s aesthetic taste as well as his affinity for appearing impeccable. However, 
while working against this artifice in her work, she also explores moments in which Alison’s 
exterior appearance and demeanor contrast with her interior wishes, desires, and emotions.  
Yet Alison often appears to be Bruce’s “inversion,” as Bechdel herself notes: “While I 
was trying to compensate for something unmanly in him… he was attempting to express 
something feminine through me” (98). The two characters acknowledge the “open secret” of the 
other’s desires, even while themselves struggling to maintain the illusion of another desire under 
the other’s gaze. Even the expression of these desires is inverted: while Bruce tries to keep his 
homosexuality a secret, Alison wants to express that desire; while Alison wants to reveal her 
desires but feels she should not under the gaze of the other, Bruce wants to conceal his own 
desires from that gaze, but ultimately cannot. Fun Home continually pivots around the anxiety of 
who is looking, who is being looked at, and what is shown to or by both parties: what might one 
discover if one looks hard enough? The act of looking itself becomes a menace to the established 
public identities of Bruce and Alison. 
The act of looking is bound up with desire, especially in Fun Home.39 In one scene, for 
example, Bruce and Alison both look at a magazine ad, occupying what Bechdel calls “a slender 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 See also the above chapters on Batman and Watchmen. 
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demilitarized zone— our shared reverence for masculine beauty. But […] the objects of our 
desire were quite different” (99). Accompanying these captions, we first see Alison reading a 
copy of Esquire magazine while Bruce takes a book off the shelf behind her (and a humorously 
placed copy of Kenneth Clark’s The Nude rests just below a phallic obelisk on the lower shelves) 
(figure 5.1). The following panel, in a kind of cinematic shot-reverse shot, shows the magazine 
ad as if the reader is now in Alison’s position, with her hand holding the lower corner of the 
magazine. The ad is of a male model, torso bared underneath an unbuttoned suit jacket, vest, and 
shirt, with a woman’s hand caressing— or undressing— his chest. The final panel is another 
cinematic move, this time zooming out, so that the reader now positioned above Bruce’s 
shoulder and we see him, in turn, looking over Alison’s shoulder at the magazine.  
 
Figure 5.1: “our shared reverence for masculine beauty” (99). 
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Bruce and Alison’s actual conversation focuses on the suit, although the aesthetic 
pleasure of the man himself is the focus of both the advertisement and the gaze of Bruce and 
Alison. In this kind of mis-en-abyme of looking, Alison’s and Bruce’s desires are manifest. Yet 
as Bechdel notes, these desires enacted within the gaze are different: while Bruce wants to have 
the object (the man) in the image, Alison wants to be the object. Neither Bruce nor Alison 
verbalizes their underlying desire; instead, Fun Home relies on the reader’s own involvement in 
this exchange of looking in order to reveal what is hidden. 
In the very act of reading Fun Home, then, the reader is pulled into this complex dynamic 
by engaging in the act of looking. Valerie Rohy notes, “Even its [the archive’s] aesthetic is 
evidentiary: objects are displayed in their panels like museum exhibits under vitrines” (342). The 
logical, if extreme, extension of this claim is that all the panels in Fun Home act as “museum 
vitrines,” displaying their content to the eyes of the visitor-reader. The physical objects, spaces, 
and characters that Bechdel draws are indeed framed and displayed for our viewing pleasure, as 
if they are museum exhibits or even evidence entered in a courtroom; however, these objects are 
always only partially displayed, obscured not only through their framed and flat two-
dimensionality, but through Bechdel’s own interpretation.  
The museum metaphor, however, fails to take into account the agency within the images 
themselves. Consider Zizek’s reading of the Bates’ house in Alfred Hitchcock’s Psycho as the 
terrifying object that looks back at the subject (Looking Awry 117-119). In the same way, at one 
point the Bechdel home looks back at Bruce, as he carries a post in a manner similar to Jesus 
carrying a cross (figure 5.2). It is as if the house is saying, “I am looking back at you, Bruce; if 
you let the exterior (the house) slip, I will betray your secrets.” If objects—both inanimate and 
human— can look back, they can also reveal the subject’s own fears and imperfections, the 
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fractures in the subject’s smooth exterior appearance of a unified identity. The image of the 
house acts upon both Bruce and the reader, beckoning both to look and to be looked at. This 
active imaging resists the presumed passivity of images as evidence underneath the museum 
glass, and instead calls our attention to the ways that images create, act, and enter into networks 
of vision and memory. 
 
Figure 5.2: the house looks back (7). 
 
Photographic “Proof” 
The power of images as agents is manifest most prominently in the redrawn photographs, 
particularly the central photograph of the text: Roy’s centerfold. As I have written elsewhere,40 
photography enjoys a peculiar position among the arts; both impartial and subjective, it has 
become a journalistic necessity and an artistic mode of expression. Photographs can show the 
existence of a specific physical object in a particular temporal moment, yet the existence 
recorded on film (or, today, digitally) is not necessarily a perfect reflection of “reality” as such. 
Though usually proof that something was there in front of the camera lens to be photographed in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40Jennifer Anderson Bliss, “Writing as Flat as a Photograph.” 
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the first place, the photograph also distorts the relationship between object, time and place, 
creating a reference to and reflection of reality, but not reality itself.  
Concerned with the uncanny feelings associated with viewing photographs and with 
being photographed, Roland Barthes claims, “[t]he Photograph… represents that very subtle 
moment when, to tell the truth, I am neither subject nor object: I then experience a micro-version 
of death (of parenthesis): I am truly becoming a specter” (14). The conflation between life and 
death, and between subject and object, creates the feelings of the unheimlich that penetrate both 
the viewer and the photographed object. The reality of the photographed object corresponds to an 
emotional response in the viewer provoked precisely by the recognition of the objectified and 
distanced past, which photographs attempt to render static and enduring. Photographs signal the 
past and its reality, while simultaneously drawing our attention to our exclusion from that 
photographed moment. 
The redrawn archive in Fun Home allows for Bechdel to represent a Proustian 
understanding of the past, because the temporal fracturing produced by the photographs 
simultaneously allows for a cohesive narrative. The cross-hatching style that Bechdel uses to 
draw the photographs as simultaneously abstract and realistic is also a carefully constructed 
visual ambiguity onto which Bechdel writes her own narrative. Drawn in a more abstract yet 
paradoxically more “realistic” style than the overt cartoon of the main narrative, the photographs 
and other realia of the redrawn archive speak across time and space to their role in Alison’s life 
and in Bechdel’s reimagining or reinterpretation of her past. 
At the center of the text lies a photograph Alison found after her father’s death in a box of 
family photographs: “It’s low-contrast and out of focus. But the subject is clearly our yardwork 
assistant / babysitter, Roy. It appears to have been taken on a vacation when I was eight, a trip on 
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which Roy accompanied my father, my brothers, and me to the Jersey shore while my mother 
visited her old roommate in New York City” (100). In an uncanny echo of a Wyeth or a Collier 
Schorr portrait, Roy lies half-naked on his back on a hotel bed, facing the ceiling, with his hips 
turned toward the camera, and the picture (or at least Bechdel’s redrawing of it) is so blurry that 
Roy’s face lacks sharp detail (figure 5.3). The photograph and Alison’s oversized hand holding it 
are the only images on the page; behind them, a washed background color bleeds to the edge of 
the page, so that these dark pages are visible as a line down the center of the closed book edge. 
 
Figure 5.3: the centerfold (100-101). 
In an interview with Chute, Bechdel reveals: 
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In fact the whole story was spawned by [this snapshot of Roy]…It was a stunning 
glimpse into my father’s hidden life, this life that was apparently running parallel to our 
regular everyday existence. And it was particularly compelling to me at the time because 
I was just coming out myself. I felt this sort of posthumous bond with my father, like I 
shared this thing with him, like we were comrades. I didn’t start working on the book 
then, but over the years that picture persisted in my memory. It’s literally the core of the 
book, the centerfold. (Chute, “An Interview with Alison Bechdel” 1005-1006)  
This “posthumous bond” serves as the catalyst for Fun Home, which presents Bruce and Alison 
as simultaneously opposing and converging force. While critics like Anne Cvetkovich argue that 
“one of the biggest representational challenges for Bechdel is not so much the mystery of her 
father’s suicide as the secret of his sexual attraction to young boys and the messy question of his 
sexual identity,” Fun Home actually explores the mysteries of Bruce’s death and sexuality as 
fundamentally intertwined (Cvetkovich 114). Rather than the “unsettling” image that Cvetkovich 
reads, Bechdel presents the photograph of Roy more as an uncanny object through which she and 
her father can belatedly share an appreciation for masculine beauty and “unconventional” 
desires, even if Alison’s desire is mimetic while Bruce’s is erotic. 
Positioned as it is at the center of the book, visibly demarcated even when the book is 
closed, Roy’s photograph is indeed a major pivot point in the text. It acts as a kind of hub from 
which the rest of the narrative seems to radiate. The photograph is a centerfold in both a literal 
and erotic sense: it is in the middle of the book, spanning two pages with a fold down the center; 
and it is an erotic image of a partially nude man, a secret image hidden from Bruce’s 
“respectable” world, an intimate moment on display for the viewing public. The erotic power of 
centerfolds more generally is bound up with the process of a present absence; Hugh Hefner, 
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whose success depends on Playboy’s own centerfolds, defines the form as an image where “‘a 
situation is suggested, the presence of someone not in the picture.’ The goal was to transform ‘a 
straight pinup into an intimate interlude, something personal and special’” (qtd. in Young, 
“Playboy: the Hugh Hefner Story” n. pag.).  
The photograph of Roy fits this definition of the centerfold precisely, even as the 
photograph both implicates the reader in the father’s sexual “deviance,” and, in its mediated, 
redrawn form, presents Bechdel’s interpretation and experience of the photograph as an aesthetic 
and evidentiary object. The subject of the photograph—its content—crosses between the 
categories of family memento and erotic photograph; it also demonstrates Bruce Bechdel’s own 
double life of heterosexual family man and closeted homosexual. And in its stature as redrawn 
photograph, it also bridges the gap between evidence and experience, between truth and 
interpretation.  
I choose here to focus, for the most part, on areas other than the problem of Roy’s age. 
Although authors like Cvetkovich have misguidedly interpreted Roy as a young adolescent, he is 
actually seventeen (and there is a difference—though not legally—in the taboos around sexual 
relations with a thirteen-year-old and a seventeen-year-old). Since Bechdel’s interest in Roy lies 
more in what he signifies for Bruce’s double life and less in his age, I will also largely ignore the 
“pedophilic” aspects here; however, the relationship between Bruce and Roy does raise problems 
of age, authority, and advantage along with Bruce’s closeted sexuality. Fun Home does not 
attempt to solve any of these problems, but instead foregrounds them as knots around which the 
narrative turns.  
Alison holds in her hand visual proof of her father’s thrice-illicit relationship with Roy: 
Roy is male and legally underage, and Bruce is married. With the photograph in front of her, it 
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seems Bruce and Roy’s relationship is no longer in the realm of hearsay; the photograph acts as 
evidence, a record of time and of presence. However, Bechdel complicates Roy’s photograph by 
redrawing it in a larger scale and offering her own interpretation of it, visually and verbally. The 
size of Alison’s hand holding the photograph indicates the manipulation of the photograph away 
from “reality” and toward a representation of Alison’s experiential truth— her interpretation of 
the photograph, and its enormous impact on her and her understanding of her father. 
Additionally, this photograph embodies multiple temporal moments; as discussed earlier 
with Watchmen, photographs are physical objects that metaphorically travel backward and 
forward in time simultaneously. They are objects from the past in the present, while their content 
hearkens, if not transports, back to the past, to the moment of the photograph’s taking. The 
photograph of Roy here is like a temporal prism through which multiple timestamps are 
refracted. The photograph is stamped with the development date along one edge, so the physical 
object is marked with the time of narrative / content (the moment frozen on the film) and the 
development time. Bruce’s futile attempt to blot out the year is a third temporal marker, 
indicating Bruce’s act of viewing the image. Alison’s hand holding the photo—a visual echo of a 
similar moment in Art Spiegelman’s Maus—is yet a fourth temporal marker of her discovery of 
the image in the shoebox. And finally the photograph’s appearance in the text is due to Bechdel’s 
act of redrawing the photograph, of constructing the narrative as a whole as she looks back on 
multiple instances of her past (the childhood vacation with Roy and moment she discovered the 
photograph).  
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And yet, because this composite image is the only panel of the page, narrative time also 
freezes at this moment.41 Indeed, because Bechdel includes multiple captions on this one single 
image, the reader is forced to slow down, to contemplate the single image as she reads through 
the narrator’s commentary. Not only does the photograph itself “capture” time and hold it 
hostage, but the text likewise necessitates a different temporal approach at the site of the 
photograph’s reproduction. While these redrawn objects do allow for a kind of access to the past, 
Fun Home shows that these visual markers serve Bechdel’s speculative narration rather than 
deepen our understanding of a factual past. The photographs bring the act of looking to the 
foreground, highlighting that perpetual anxiety about who looks at the photographed object, and 
what that object reveals under the gaze. 
Bechdel draws her hand holding this photograph; it is larger than life, and it is positioned 
so that the reader’s hand might fall into the same position, superimposed over Alison’s hand. 
While Julia Watson notes that this superimposition implicates the reader as voyeur to Bruce’s 
“intimate glimpse,” the reader is voyeur to both the photograph of Roy and to Alison’s discovery 
of it (41). Moreover the position of the hand implies that the reader is in fact embodying Alison’s 
position; we stand as she does, see what she sees, we hold the photograph as she does. The 
photograph is presented as the material object of truth (of Roy’s relationship with Bruce) and as 
acts of interpretive experience (Bruce’s attempt to blot the date, Alison’s reactions to the 
photograph, Bechdel’s redrawing of it, the reader’s reception of the page). Alison’s hand, 
meanwhile, is presented as the material object of experience and interpretation: “Alison’s hand 
holding the photograph as a reminder that there is a witness here, for whom this photograph 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Thus this photograph in Fun Home is unlike, say, when one reads a panel in a series, which, as 
I discussed in the chapters on Batman, Watchmen, and No Towers, makes past, present, and 
future coexist simultaneously on a single page. 
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leaps out of the past in an odd version of Benjamin’s notion of history as that which ‘flashes up 
at a moment of danger’” (Cvetkovich 115-16). The power of this page, however, rests on the 
shock of twice-occupying the space of the gaze: Alison looks from the position of her father, the 
looking and photographing subject, and the reader looks as if from Alison’s position. 
The size of the photograph and its style complicate the power relations at work in and 
through this image. Although the photograph is larger-than-life, and the cross-hatching style 
more “realistic” than the thick, monochromatic lines of the cartoon hand, the closer we approach 
the photograph the less is actually revealed. Although the photograph might initially appear to be 
more realistic, it is paradoxically more abstract than the style of the rest of the book. The 
“painterly” quality of the photograph as Alison sees it is reconstructed through the cartoon 
version’s use of a different style. The visual dimension of this moment is thus destabilizing, as 
the photograph resides in the space between the “reality” and the “impression.” This optical 
illusion reflects the problem of not knowing who took the photographs, of not seeing the person 
seeing—that is, of needing to rely on (invented) verbal narrative so that the images can “speak.” 
Even though Hefner’s “presence of someone not in the picture” here is understood to be Bruce, 
the fact remains that Bruce is absent from the content of the image, although not in its 
production. 
Bechdel must therefore invent the presence of the photographer, of the person looking at 
Roy, in the gap of the camera’s gaze. Bechdel’s captions and images work together to reveal her 
own interpretive acts as she presents us with this archival evidence: “Perhaps I identify too well 
with my father’s illicit awe. A trace of this [awe] seems caught in the photo, just as a trace of 
Roy has been caught on the light-sensitive paper” (101). What Bechdel narrates is not Roy’s 
emotions but Bruce’s (his awe), not Roy’s experience posing for the photo but Bruce’s emotional 
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experience taking it, and developing it. Indeed, Roy remains a purely physical, aesthetic object; 
part of Roy becomes the photograph, the paper itself.  
Meanwhile Bruce’s awe is caught in the narrative that Bechdel creates for the 
photograph, not in the object of the photograph itself. Bechdel admits she identifies with Bruce, 
with the viewer, with the one who gazes, and not with the object of gaze (the subject of the 
photograph). This identification leads to a doubled interpretive act: Bechdel interprets how Bruce 
felt while looking at Roy, and she reinterprets the photograph by redrawing it in her work. “The 
blurriness of the photo gives it an ethereal, painterly quality,” she tells us, and this quality is 
mimicked in her cross-hatched style that she employs when recreating many of the photographs 
in the text (100). The object of the camera’s gaze is constructed as essentially “other” both 
visually and in terms of the desire implied in the photograph itself. Bechdel’s redrawing of the 
photograph is thus a third kind of “trace,” this time of Alison’s reaction to and interpretation of 
the original photograph upon its discovery.  
The “otherness” of this photograph comes into sharp relief on the following page, where 
in a series of film negatives, the negative of Roy follows three images of the Bechdel children 
playing on the beach on the bed (figure 5.4). This negative strip is a series of inversions: “bright” 
photos of the children on the beach appear dark, while the “dark” photograph of Roy appears 
very light. Roy’s image simultaneously breaks and belongs to the chronology of the family 
vacation; the public beach space moves to the private space of the bedroom. Bechdel lists a 
series of qualities associated with Proust’s “Swann’s way / Guermantes way” metaphor: 
“Bourgeois vs. aristocratic, homo vs. hetero, city vs. country, eros vs. art, private vs. public. But 
at the end of the novel the two ways are revealed to converge—to have always converged—
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through a vast ‘network of transversals’” (102). In Fun Home, what appears to be divergent 
eventually converges, mimicking this “network of transversals.”  
 
Figure 5.4: the negatives along the top of the page, the collection of vacation photographs, the drive through the 
tunnel between New York and New Jersey (102). 
 
Through the inclusion of the negatives at the top of the page, Bechdel simultaneously 
establishes and collapses the dichotomies of public/private, hetero/homo, open/closeted—the 
very dichotomies her father so artfully kept in place for most of his life. Trying to make Roy’s 
negative fit in with the family narrative of this vacation is similar to making Roy fit in with the 
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family narrative of Alison’s experience, and it parallels the act of making Roy’s centerfold fit 
with the text itself: “the proximity of these ostensibly disparate images offers evidence of her 
father’s capacity to inhabit different worlds simultaneously” (Cvetkovich 116). Indeed, the 
inclusion of the negatives reflects not only Bruce’s fluid identity but the text’s own movements 
between dichotomies. 
Without ceremony, Bechdel’s musings on Proust and his transversals switch to her 
memory of this beach vacation: “After a few days at the beach, we drove to New York to pick 
Mom up” (102). The lower panel depicts the family—plus Roy, minus Helen—driving through a 
tunnel connecting (and dividing) New York to (or from) New Jersey (see again figure 5.4). This 
panel captures the moment of the car approaching the line literally in between states, a literal 
instantiation of Bruce’s seemingly dichotomous life. New York is where his wife and mother of 
his children signifies Bruce’s superficial but heteronormative life; New York is also connected 
seamlessly to and yet divided from New Jersey, where he and his lover shared a room. Roy, 
meanwhile, occupies Helen’s position, as both Bruce’s lover and as caregiver for the children; as 
babysitter, he fills something resembling a maternal role. This scene in the tunnel exemplifies the 
notion that the supposedly fixed borders—in Bruce’s life, between states in all senses of the 
world, between memory and present, between fiction and reality—are permeable; like Proust’s 
novel, the dichotomies on this page converge into one tunnel both between and dividing places 
and identities.  
Between the negative strip and the panel of the tunnel, Bechdel draws a pile of printed 
photographs from the negative strip; the reader can recognize the brothers bending down in the 
surf and Alison adjusting the straps of her suit. But the topmost photograph of this pile is not 
included in the negatives at the top of the page. This central photograph shows Bruce lying on 
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his side on the beach, propped on his elbow, reading a book (figure 5.5). The pose is reminiscent 
of a photograph at the end of this same chapter, where Bruce leans on his elbow while on a 
rooftop (120).  
 
Figure 5.5: different photographs of Bruce, same pose (102, 120). 
The inclusion of Bruce’s picture here is an instance of Thierry Groensteen’s “braiding,” or the 
visual echo of one image or panel in another, unrelated or distanced panel. Although the two 
photographs of Bruce are not placed next to each other, nor are they referenced directly, the 
visual similarities in the pose forces the reader to retroactively reinterpret the beach photo of 
Bruce. In the second photograph, Bechdel explores the similarities between her father and herself 
both aesthetically (in the photos) and personally (in their relationships to the photographers). 
Including the first photograph of Bruce brings that same questioning to the page, the same 
wondering about his relationship to the photographer.  
The final page of this fourth chapter (entitled “In the Shadow of Young Girls in Flower,” 
after Proust’s work), contains two large panels, both of which contain redrawn photographs, 
which in turn function like smaller, interior panels (figure 5.6). One is of the photograph 
described above; the other, of Alison in a robe outside a brick building. Bechdel’s anxiety over 
who is looking at the photographed subject comes to the fore: “In another picture, he’s 
sunbathing on the tarpaper roof of his frat house just after he turned twenty-two. Was the boy 
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who took it his lover? As the girl who took this polaroid of me on a fire escape on my twenty-
first birthday was mine?” (120).  
 
Figure 5.6: photographs of father and daughter (120). 
She (verbally) forms a connection between the photographs, even as the photos themselves do 
not—cannot— speak to the narrative link of the photographer. There is no textual reference to 
the second young man in the rooftop photograph; Bechdel’s narration ignores him entirely, 
focusing instead solely on her father and what his face might express.  
What Bechdel does here is, again, read her own memories and emotions into the 
photographs, demanding that the facial expressions be read a certain way: “The exterior setting, 
the pained grin, the flexible wrists, even the angle of the shadow falling across our faces— it’s 
about as close as a translation can get” (120). One might ask, for example, what makes the grins 
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on Bruce’s and Alison’s faces “pained?” With their impressionistic cross-hatching, Bruce and 
Alison do look like they are smiling, but any more information requires an interpretive act; I am 
not sure that I would have read their faces in this way without Bechdel’s instructions to do so. 
The impressionistic quality of the redrawn photographs add to this confusion, since the 
imprecision and the blurring of the details in the photographs mean we must rely on Bechdel’s 
verbal authority to understand the photographs. In their redrawn states, the images do not stand 
alone or speak for themselves; rather, they take on specific meanings according to Bechdel’s 
interpretations. In fact, Bechdel acts as the translator of these images, putting their meaning into 
a new language (that is, into the verbal over the visual); Bechdel as narrator tells the reader how 
to interpret the photograph. 
In the first panel of this page, Bechdel reproduces the same photograph that appears on 
the chapter’s title page, a photograph that only now takes on meaning for the reader due, once 
again, to Bechdel’s narrative intervention (figure 5.7). Above this photo, a caption reads: 
“What’s lost in translation is the complexity of loss itself. In the same box where I found the 
photo of Roy, there’s one of Dad at about the same age. He’s wearing a women’s bathing suit. A 
fraternity prank? But the pose he strikes is not mincing or silly at all. He’s lissome, elegant” 
(120). 
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Figure 5.7: Bruce in a woman’s bathing suit (120). 
In this panel, Bechdel repeats the layout of the centerfold: her hand holding the 
photograph at the same angle, thumb on top, with the contrasting drawing styles marking the 
photograph as archive and the hand as cartoon imagining. However, the size of this panel is 
closer to a one-to-one ratio corresponding to a life-sized hand. Bruce, posing in the women’s 
bathing suit, is drawn in the now-familiar cross-hatching, giving us the impression of details 
while simultaneously rendering them more abstract, less precise. Like the photo of Roy, the 
closer we get to the image, the less is actually revealed; facial details are blurred, foreground 
blends into background. Indeed, when it reappears in the following panel (the final one of the 
chapter), the photograph is even smaller, even less clear, and Bruce’s face looks more like a 
religious icon than a “lissome” young man in drag. 
Unlike the “centerfold,” however, this photograph does not dominate the page in the 
same way. This is connected to the final panel of the chapter, in which Bechdel examines the 
similarities between herself and her father. The image of Bruce in drag acts as a structural bridge 
between the two other photographs, even as it remains in the background. Bruce’s 
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uncharacteristically playful performance of gender acts as a posthumous link between father and 
daughter— a bridge that both joins together and divides, like the tunnel between New York and 
New Jersey, like the centerfold marking the book itself, like Proust’s “network of transversals” 
that seemingly pull apart while in actuality draw closer together. 
One is therefore left with the question: of what are these photographs evidence? After all, 
Bechdel’s work is explicitly, obsessively, preoccupied with archival evidence, with circling 
around a moment or a situation from multiple angles until the most complete picture appears. 
The redrawn photographs as individual, independent images do not necessarily contain the 
facticity to demonstrate any kind of truth about Bruce or Alison in and of themselves. Rather, the 
rooftop photographs are evidence of the effect of subjective memory and experience in creating 
narratives to understand the images. They speak to Bechdel’s own anxiety, her need to know 
who is looking, her desperation to make sense of her father’s life, death, and sexuality as well as 
her own identity. While this photograph “reaches out,” as it were, across time and space, 
ultimately it is only Bechdel’s reading of the photograph that we receive in Fun Home. The 
power of this image, then, rests in its impact on Bechdel and in her emotional reaction to and 
interpretation of it. 
 
Looking and Feeling  
Beginning with the early image of the family’s house mentioned above,42 Bechdel 
visually encodes the act of looking through the use of the black-filled silhouette as a menacing 
act and a signifier of repression. More than just drawing attention to the act of looking, as Chute 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 I should add, however, that the use of the silhouette with the house really only takes on this 
associated meaning of the look once the visual code is repeated later in the text, in another 
example of Groensteen’s “braiding.” 
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explores, this technique is also a visual indicator of a studied indifference or emotional 
blankness, one that often occurs at moments of confrontation during which Bruce’s or Alison’s 
emotional reactions are repressed and the threat of the gaze becomes tangible (Chute 197). For 
example, Bechdel illustrates her father’s short fuse with a Christmas scene: her brother holds the 
Christmas tree while Bruce observes him and Alison, in the foreground, polishes furniture and 
watches It’s A Wonderful Life. As her brother lets the tree fall— “the needles are sharp!” he 
says— Bruce approaches him aggressively, shouting “God damn it!” Her brother then cries, 
“don’t hit me,” and rushes past Alison, jostling her as she carries a tray of glass bottles. 
Bechdel’s accompanying captions read, “But in the movie when Jimmy Stewart comes home one 
night and starts yelling at everyone… it’s out of the ordinary,” implying, of course, that Bruce’s 
violent outbursts are routine (11).  
In the first panel on the next page, Alison is caught holding the stopper to one of the 
bottles, which broke off when it hit the others as her brother bumped into her (figure 5.8). 
Bruce’s blacked-out silhouette looms over her threateningly as Alison cowers in fear; he is the 
one who sees her, who catches her in the act of destruction and imperfection— and however 
accidental that destruction might be, (in Bruce’s eyes) it warrants punishment, as the previous 
page demonstrates. The threat in this panel is contained entirely within the act of looking and 
being seen (no physical punishment follows this particular incident).  
 
Figure 5.8: Bruce’s silhouette looms over Alison (12). 
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On the page following, however, the blackened silhouette is repeated in what might at 
first seem like a much more benign manner: Bruce stands back, looking at his three children 
seated at the base of the illuminated Christmas tree (figure 5.9). However, Bechdel’s narration 
once again shifts our understanding of this idyllic scene: “Sometimes,” Bechdel writes, “when 
things were going well, I think my father actually enjoyed having a family. Or at least, the air of 
authenticity we lent to his exhibit. Sort of a still life with children” (13). Thus Bruce’s act of 
(active) looking is linked with the affirmation of “normalcy,” with the repression of his 
homosexual desires in favor of the superficial tableau of heteronormativity. Bruce’s gaze 
constitutes the children as objects in this tableau; the children, especially Alison, are now 
positioned within the normative family structure.  
 
Figure 5.9: “a still life with children” (13). 
Moreover, Bruce’s gaze also constitutes the scene itself as what he aesthetically desires 
while simultaneously erasing his other libidinal desires, which would disrupt, even negate, the 
image before him. These two moments in silhouette, then, are both about the threat of looking 
and of being seen, as Bruce represses what he can in order to maintain the superficial appearance 
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of the ideal nuclear family.43 The underlying threat of looking, for Bruce and for Alison, is that if 
one looks carefully enough, one might discover the surface is artifice, as Bechdel so artfully 
demonstrates in her depiction of her father’s behavior throughout the first chapter. Looking itself 
thus takes on a dual role: of ensuring the appearance of normalcy, which in turn requires a 
studied repression of the “abnormal” underneath. 
At key moments Alison also appears as a silhouette, internalizing this dual role of 
looking as Bechdel simultaneously conceals and reveals her own experiences and emotional 
reactions. In the second chapter, Bechdel depicts an encounter between Alison and Bruce in the 
embalming room, where Bruce is working on the cadaver of a dead man, “bearded and fleshy, 
jarringly unlike Dad’s usual traffic of desiccated old people” (44). Fun Home presents this 
encounter as if this is Alison’s first time seeing a dead body on the examining table: “I didn’t 
normally see the bodies before they were dressed and in a casket. But one day Dad called me 
back there” (43). The sight of the dead man is shocking multiple times over: Alison rarely sees 
the dead; the man is young and unlike the “usual” cadavers she has encountered; the man’s 
genitalia is on full display; and “what really got [Alison’s] attention was his chest, split open to a 
dark red cave” (43). Alison’s reaction to this spectacle is really no reaction. Her face, when 
visible, remains neutral, and when her father asks her for scissors, she hands them over without 
comment (figure 5.10).  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 These seemingly dichotomous modes of looking (the threatening look over and against the 
“satisfactory” but repressed appearance) encoded in the same visual sign (the blacked-out 
silhouette) repeats frequently in Fun Home.  I will not enumerate all of them here, but suffice it 
to say that the same occurs on page 18 (Bruce’s threatening look demanding the children look, 
too, at a vase too close to the table’s edge) and page 21 (Bruce’s benevolent singing to Alison).  
While part of Bechdel’s use of this visual code is aesthetic, coding foreground and background 
actions occurring simultaneously as somewhat cinematic in nature, the fact that this visual mode 
occurs at moments of crisis between looking and identity make it notable. 
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Figure 5.10: visual confrontation with death (43). 
In the first panel of this page, however, Alison appears at the bottom right as a black 
silhouette. This panel stretches across the whole of the top of the page, the cadaver on the 
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examining table spanning most of the panel, with Alison’s silhouette in the corner as if to 
highlight her act of looking at the scene before her. Bruce’s face, meanwhile, is covered in a 
surgical mask and glasses, and the frame of the panel cuts off the rest of his face from view. 
While the panel presents the gaping cadaver as a whole, unbroken vision, Bruce’s and Alison’s 
faces, the spaces on which emotion might be read, are hidden from sight. Alison takes in the 
tableau before her, reflected in the stretched-out panel size and the diagonal lines that the body 
and the table form along the same trajectory as Alison’s assumed sightline.  
Underneath her silhouette lies the caption for the third panel of the page, in which 
Bechdel explains that she “studiously betrayed no emotion” during this encounter. Due to its 
position between the panels, the caption is visually linked to the image above as well, so that the 
blacked-out silhouette mirrors the repression of whatever emotion she may have been feeling. 
The blankness of the silhouette, its erasure of interior details, leaves only the surface-level 
outline of Alison, echoing other moments when the act of looking means also an act of hiding, of 
repressing, as when Bruce looks at the Christmas tree.  
Chute reads the open chest cavity as a kind of empty yet horrifying signifier indicative of 
a similar gap in representability: “Bechdel identifies the most terrifying aspect of the body as not 
the penis but its split-open chest (this “cave” creates a wobbly triangular shape evocative of 
Alison’s curvy circumflex symbol). The absence at the center of the body— its gapingness— is 
what shocks” (Chute 198). However, the completely solid blackness of Alison’s silhouette is far 
less visually complex than even the dark, horrifying chest cavity, which is not precisely an 
absence but rather contains the shadowy traces of inner organs. On the following page Bechdel 
acknowledges that “the emotion I had suppressed for the gaping cadaver seemed to stay 
repressed,” and Alison’s silhouette is even emptier than the “gaping” emptiness of the body—
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that is, the cadaver holds more visible complexity that she does at this moment, a visual indicator 
of the forced “neutrality” of Alison’s look (45). Moreover, the cadaver itself is displaying what is 
literally, corporeally the most interior of physical existence. That which is normally contained 
and hidden within the confines of the body— the intestines and other organs— actually appears 
in (shadowy) view. The physicality of the body finds its inverse, then, in the visually and 
emotionally erased figure of Alison’s silhouette. 
As the page continues to display this cadaver and the interaction between Alison and 
Bruce, Bechdel also speculates on Bruce’s reasoning for visually “testing” her in this unexpected 
and seemingly emotionless way: “Maybe this was the same offhanded way his own notoriously 
cold father had shown him his first cadaver. Or maybe he felt that he’d become too inured to 
death, and was hoping to elicit from me an expression of the natural horror he was no longer 
capable of. Or maybe he just needed the scissors” (44-45). Bechdel places Alison within a 
genealogy of emotional distance (and just a few panels later, she discusses her own vicarious 
living-out of emotion in others), but she also underlines the ways in which the visible does not 
necessarily show the truth, nor does it reveal a complete understanding. Bruce’s motives are as 
hidden as his face behind the mask and glasses, and it is up to Bechdel to create— or impose— a 
narrative upon this scene.  
In fact, throughout Fun Home, the silhouettes are never whole, complete figures. Just as 
Bruce’s face is hidden in this scene, and just as the silhouettes do not display the figure’s 
complexity, they are also always fractured in or by the panel and its frames. The reader’s view of 
the silhouette is therefore as obscured or as incomplete as narrative’s representation of the scene. 
Not only must the reader “fill in the gaps” of the gutter space when reading from one panel to the 
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next, one must also take the fragmented pieces of figures within the panels, and from these 
fragments, form a coherent vision.  
Alison’s own diaries ultimately work with this notion of a present absence, a blankness 
that both produces and conceals. The final panel of Chapter Six centers on Alison’s blank diary: 
“By the end of November, my earnest daily entries had given way to the implicit lie of the blank 
page, and weeks at a time are left unrecorded” (186). Yet these empty pages are contextually 
related to Alison’s coming of age story. The blankness of the diary—its omissions and 
repudiations—are linked with femininity, Alison’s changing body, her closeted desires, and her 
strained relationship with both parents. Unable or unwilling to speak her desires even once she 
learns the words “orgasm” and “lesbian” (apparently through casual perusal of the dictionary), 
Alison’s diary entries exhibit hesitation, even willful omission. 
Toward the end of Chapter Six, which chronicles Alison’s first menstrual period and the 
Watergate scandal alongside Bruce’s encounter with the law after buying beer for underage boys, 
Bechdel notes, “My narration [in the diary] had by this point become altogether unreliable” 
(184). The accompanying panel features a diary entry reading “Um… er… We went to church. I 
wore a dress… YERK! We got the men’s fashion section in the New York Times. So what? Big 
deal. I forget what else we did.” Drawn next to that final disavowal in the diary is a cartoon 
profile of a man. Bechdel goes on to say that her “forced nonchalance about the men’s fashion 
supplement… was self-repudiation of the basest kind,” and she depicts Alison and her father 
shopping for a man’s suit together. The visual narrative thus maintains that Alison’s verbal 
negation of her interest in menswear is a lie. Even the diary page contradicts itself, as the young 
Alison draws the profile of a man in a suit next to her supposed disinterest in men in suits, so it 
appears that pictorial elements speak to the desire hidden under the verbal repudiation.  
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This blankness extends to the visual as well: the penultimate panel of the chapter depicts 
the reserved discussion of Alison’s menstruation between her and her mother, while the image is 
of the exterior of the family home. The panel’s visuals move away from the characters, 
excluding them from the images, precluding the reader from seeing Alison and Helen interact. 
Instead the panel depicts the house’s exterior, giving the scene a sense of remoteness, exclusion. 
Even on the preceding page, the panels focus on Helen’s studied expressionlessness; Alison 
appears from behind or in silhouette, with the barest hint of her own facial expression (figure 
5.11). The visual is therefore equally implicated in the blankness Bechdel laments, just as 
previously the silhouetted Alison showed no emotion when confronted with the cadaver.  
 
Figure 5.11: Alison’s stilted conversation with her mother (185). 
Alison’s silhouette here again encodes the act of looking, and again the verbal narration 
accompanying the visual is more speculative than certain; for example, Bechdel wonders if her 
mother’s hands were shaking when Alison finally tells her mother she began to menstruate. 
Moreover, in this series of panels after Alison’s confession, Helen refuses to look at her 
daughter, even while Alison’s silhouette implies her own invested act of looking. When the text 
then moves outside on the following page, it is as if Alison and her mother are now equally 
engaged in acts of repression and avoidance: the reader can no longer see the characters nor 
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where those characters might be looking. At this moment, when her mother’s gaze might 
constitute Alison’s subjectivity, Helen instead studiously looks away, leading to the text’s similar 
shift away from the personal, interior, potentially intimate moment to the public, faceless exterior 
of the house. 
 
Figure 5.12: Alison and Helen’s conversation “moves” outside (186). 
And yet, in moving from the characters to the house, Bechdel’s work in fact reveals 
Alison’s feelings behind this moment (figure 5.12). As I mentioned above, throughout Fun Home 
the house stands as an object representative of the family’s simultaneous unity and splitting, the 
tension between external appearance and internal experience. So when Bechdel shifts from 
Alison and her mother to the house, what we get is a reflection of a personal moment (Alison’s 
admission that she’s started to menstruate and Helen’s reaction) rendered cold through the stilted 
interactions of the characters. The house takes us from the interior to the exterior, from the 
intimately personal to the forced public. In so doing Bechdel gives us an impression of the 
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distance enacted between herself and her mother; therefore although the panels visually preclude 
knowledge of the physical details of the scene, the reader still retains an impression of the nature 
of the relationship between mother and daughter. The image of the house simultaneously 
obscures the visible reality and evokes or reveals Alison’s emotional experience. 
The use of this fragmentation along with the visual absence within the silhouettes 
indicates Bechdel’s position vis-a-vis the crisis of representation. Through highlighting these acts 
of looking, Bechdel hints at both the instability of a subject’s experiences, memories, and 
reactions, as well as the impossibility of fully representing those experiences. What is visible 
within the panels does not necessarily reflect a visible truth, so much as a visual encoding of 
experience. The visual thus becomes an unstable, uncertain form of representation, adding to the 
verbal skepticism that permeates Bechdel’s text. 
 
Facing Death  
The skepticism with which Alison approaches her experiences, and with which Bechdel 
approaches the act of artistic creation, reflects her uneasy relationship to the image of death as a 
signal of both trauma and loss. Bechdel uses the visual possibilities in comics to represent the 
experience of being alive, but facing the death of another. In a scene in which Alison’s father 
shows her and her siblings the body of a dead child, the obscured vision of the reader echoes the 
limited understanding Alison experiences as a child facing mortality and impermanence (figure 
5.13). In this panel, Alison and her brother stand in front of the dead child, blocking part of the 
body from the reader’s view; likewise, a caption partially blocks the Bechdel children from view 
(148). The panel’s arrangement thus hinges on inhibiting the view of the dead child at the center 
of the panel. Using the captions and panels in this manner is therefore a way of representing—of 
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re-presencing—death through the obscuration of vision. This panel literalizes the process of 
transforming experience through memory into an incomplete narrative: the dead child is 
mediated through Alison’s experience (Alison looking at the child and simultaneously blocking 
the reader’s view of the body), which in turn is mediated through language in order to convey a 
cohesive if incomplete meaning to the reader (the caption blocking the reader’s view of Alison).  
 
Figure 5.13: Obscured image of death (148). 
At the knotty center of what is blocked from both the reader and from Alison, then, is 
death itself. Fun Home circles around death many times, unable to fully represent what is, in 
essence, always unknowable. Fun Home’s essential problem is not just a question of Bechdel 
reflecting on her own life, but on her encounters with death, facing the once-living bodies of 
others that lie in contrast with her own still-living body. The mystery of her father’s death is not 
solely the mystery of how he died, but also the enigma of death itself. The dead child in Chapter 
Five brings the mystery of death to the foreground; Alison sees the body of a once-living subject 
now reduced exclusively to an object. That this person is “a distant cousin of [hers], a boy 
exactly [her] age” serves as a concrete encounter with Alison’s own mortality; because he is so 
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like her, his death implies that she, too, could be an object, a motionless body on an examining 
table— that she someday would both understand and experience the enigma of death (147).  
In the face of this death, Bechdel notes simply that her trademark circumflex nearly 
obliterates her diary entries for that weekend; language again, to use Bechdel’s earlier phrasing, 
cannot “bear the weight” of this encounter. The panel with the dead child is one of only two 
panels on the page; the other is of the blotted-out diary entries. Bechdel’s accompanying captions 
give no indication of Alison’s emotional reaction to the sight: “Dad explained that he had died 
from a broken neck. His skin was gray, which gave his blond crewcut the effect of yellow tint on 
a black-and-white photograph. My diary entries for that weekend are almost completely 
obscured” (148). Unlike other moments in Fun Home, here Bechdel does not offer an 
interpretation of the scene through her narration. Not only is Alison’s face turned just enough 
away from the reader as to render her expression unreadable, Bechdel does not tell us how she 
felt or what she thought. The description of the scene rests at the level of the surface, 
withholding Alison’s emotional response to the scene. 
This panel illustrates—literally— the failure of both verbal language and visual forms as 
one encounters death. As Chute notes, the form of the sheet that Bruce pulls up to reveal the 
corpse is similar to the inverted V Alison scrawls in the diary; the mirroring of this shape hints at 
the uncertainty within the visual scene (Chute 193). That is, if the written circumflex indicates 
Alison’s skepticism at language’s ability to represent reality, the shape of the sheet combined 
with the incomplete, obscured visual layout of the panel might likewise indicate skepticism at the 
image’s ability to represent reality. What is excluded from this panel both verbally and visually 
is Alison’s reaction, her experience— how she understands death when she looks at it before her. 
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Therefore when Bechdel says that she “represses” her feelings for the dead man on the 
examining table in the earlier Chapter Two, I would argue that what she is actually repressing are 
her feelings for the dead child from Chapter Five. She does not narrate her reaction— or even her 
lack thereof— in the same speculative manner as she does with the dead man (as I discussed 
above). In fact, in that scene from Chapter Two, this chronologically earlier encounter with death 
goes completely unmentioned, as if Bechdel is unaware of or unwilling to acknowledge her own 
memory. While the dead man is on full display for both Alison and the reader, here the dead 
child is mostly hidden; while the scene in Chapter Two contains Bechdel’s admission that she 
represses her own emotions, in Chapter Five, there is no recognition of her repression. 
Although Bechdel avoids clearly defining Alison’s reaction to the dead child, doing so 
only serves to bring presence and absence together in both structure and narrative. While the 
image of and the reaction to death are obscured from view, their absence profoundly creates the 
sense of repression and loss that so characterizes Alison’s experiences throughout Fun Home. 
Bechdel circles around these moments of death— her father’s and the child’s— creating a sense 
of continually approaching and then retreating from the unknowable instances of death. In doing 
so, however, Bechdel does not seek to smooth out or cover up death’s mystery, but she instead 
draws attention to its incomprehensibility: “all the years spent visiting gravediggers, joking with 
burial-vault salesmen, and teasing my brothers with crushed vials of smelling salts only made my 
own father’s death more incomprehensible” (50). Fun Home does not seek to erase this 
incomprehensibility but to represent it as such. 
While these earlier instances of death are significant, the loss threading all of Fun 
Home’s chapters together is Bruce Bechdel’s death. The text situates Alison in a chain of events 
culminating in her confronting her father’s death: Alison first sees the dead child, when she looks 
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at but understands neither death nor her emotions; she then sees the dead man with his chest 
open, when she deliberately masks her reaction, mimicking her father’s literal mask. Finally she 
sees her own father in his casket, and cannot mourn: “Dry-eyed and sheepish, my brothers and I 
looked for as long as we sensed it was appropriate… The sole emotion I could muster was 
irritation” (52). 
When Alison looks at Bruce in the casket, the sight of him looking so unlike himself 
leads to a kind of misrecognition not only of Bruce but also of Alison and her emotions: “I 
wasn’t even sure it was him until I found the tiny blue tattoo on his knuckle,” Bechdel notes 
(figure 5.14, 52).  
 
Figure 5.14: Alison misrecognizes her father’s body (52). 
Unsure that the body-object before her is her father, structured within a long history of careful 
avoidance of emotional displays, Alison’s emotional response here seems again to illustrate the 
repression that occurs at the moment of looking. The man who so often and so threateningly 
constituted Alison as the object of his gaze is now himself reduced to an object laid out in a 
casket for Alison to view. The image of Bruce in the casket and Alison looking at him with her 
back to the reader is split in half by the gutter between two panels, emphasizing not just Bruce’s 
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splitting from life to death, and his postmortem appearance so unlike him while alive, but 
Alison’s own fracturing. She does not outwardly grieve in part due to this misrecognition, but 
also in part due to her complicated relationship with the sometimes-tyrannical Bruce as well as 
her lifetime spent hiding (consciously or otherwise) her emotions.  
Fun Home’s conclusion does not bring us any closer to understanding the mysteries 
contained within its narrative, or to bridging the distance of misrecognition; rather, the text 
embraces these mysteries as a kind of necessary gap in knowledge. The final page “provides an 
aesthetic feeling of wholeness and circularity, but does not solve the mystery of her father’s long 
silence or his suicide” (Freedman 138). The penultimate panel depicts the front of the Sunbeam 
Bread truck head-on, as if from Bruce’s (imagined) perspective just before the fatal accident. 
Contained within the frame of the panel, the truck that killed Bruce is endlessly fixed and 
endlessly bearing down on him and, in its ominous head-on perspective, on the reader (figure 
5.15). 
 
Figure 5.15: the truck, head on (232). 
Echoing photography, this panel suspends death and life atemporally through the act of looking. 
Bruce’s mysterious death will never be understood fully, yet including this panel forces Bechdel 
and the reader to occupy his position, to face oncoming death from his perspective, even while 
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we never see the accident (the event) itself. Ultimately, in Fun Home, the act of looking lacks the 
power to bridge the gaps in individual experience and representation.
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Chapter 6: A Spectrum of Embodiment: Disability, Identity, and Suffering in David B.’s 
Epileptic 
 
This chapter brings together the three forms of visuality developed in the previous 
chapters—the problem of looking as an act of categorizing, the problem of images as themselves 
traumatic, and the power of images to act on the viewer—and offers a way of synthesizing those 
forms into a new and productive way of imagining the possibilities for comics. David B.’s 
memoir L’ascension du haut mal (Epileptic, trans. Kim Thompson), originally published in six 
volumes from 1996-2002, uses the comics medium as a vehicle to represent a nonlinear spectrum 
of experience that can avoid a conventional and hierarchical understanding of memory, trauma, 
and identity. This memoir follows David (né Pierre-François Beauchard) from age 5, in 1964, 
through adulthood into the late 1990s / early 2000s, intertwining his relationship with his brother 
Jean-Christophe, his family history, and his development into one of the most prominent 
contemporary French comics artists. Jean-Christophe’s epileptic seizures begin at the age of 7, 
and from that point on his disorder simultaneously disrupts and structures both Jean-Christophe’s 
life and the lives of his family.  
As it depicts the family moving from one possible cure to another, B.’s work in turn 
becomes more and more surreal and sophisticated, mirroring both his inability to fully 
understand his brother’s illness, and his increasingly complex view of the world. This chapter 
argues that Epileptic’s central tension lies in the movement of the text between representations of 
disability and historical trauma, and the witnessing of those various kinds of suffering that 
ultimately result in a sense of fractured and fragmented subjectivity. In presenting the rhizomatic 
nature of disability, the text suggests that rather than considering individuals and their bodies 
along a linear scale between two extreme points (e.g. the normal and the abnormal), we can 
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reformulate our understanding of “normalcy” through a nonlinear, multivalent spectrum of 
experience. 
The physical and social realities of epilepsy figure prominently in the structure of the 
Beauchard family’s lives. Jean-Christophe experiences only brief moments of remission, and 
throughout most of his life he endures multiple seizures per day. The seizures scare away the 
boys’ childhood friends, who say he’s “nuts” and “violent” (35); the neighbors, meanwhile, “are 
concerned about his seizures. They want my parents to keep him indoors” (63). In an effort to 
lessen the stress on Jean-Christophe, the family moves to an isolated house in the country, away 
from prying eyes. They then embark on a seemingly endless search for relief for Jean-
Christophe, from Western medicine and hospitals to macrobiotic communes to Ouija boards to 
Swedeborgian analysts to countless other emotionally intrusive, disruptive treatments, most of 
which could be qualified as quackery and none of which are successful long-term.  
Under such isolating and perplexing circumstances, it is little wonder that David finds 
solace in the violent, the bizarre, and the surreal. The epilepsy afflicting his brother is 
incomprehensible, but so too are the reactions of the people around him, from strangers in public 
spaces to his playmates to his own family. Pierre-François finds solace in drawing and 
fantasizing about warriors and battles; as he grows older, he turns more toward surreal fiction 
and artwork. At one point he admits: “If the whole world is going to reject us, then let this 
[fantasy genre fiction] be my world” (186). One can clearly see the influence these stories have 
had on David, as B.’s artwork throughout the memoir is characterized by its surreal qualities. 
Entirely in black and white, the text consists of heavy line work in most of the panels, which are 
usually framed in regular, straight-ruled rectangles. B. employs images of the fantastic 
throughout, in order to represent the emotional conditions of his life, his experiences as helpless 
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audience to his brother’s illness, and the more subtle project of situating disability within a 
nonlinear spectrum of experience.  
In addressing these issues, B. manipulates the comics medium to convey and reflect a 
particular autobiographical perspective— that of someone who is relegated to the position of 
passive observer to an overwhelming, disabling illness. Surreal imagery alongside disorienting 
formal and narrative structures reflects the Beauchard family’s desperate situation, and more 
particularly David’s feelings of helplessness and confusion in the face of an incomprehensible, 
uncontrollable, and enduring illness. Jean-Christophe’s epilepsy contorts not only his body, but 
also his mind, and his relationships with his family and with the public more broadly. Likewise 
B. contorts and manipulates both the historical and familial contexts of the boys’ lives, and the 
medium of comics itself, in order to defamiliarize and destabilize certain categories of identity 
and experience. This chapter thus attempts to answer the following questions: in what ways does 
the text represent Jean-Christophe as disabled, and in what ways does he resist that? To what 
extent is that disability socially imposed? What role does the visual play in the confrontation 
with the fragmented body? And finally, how does David B. situate himself and his brother within 
a wider web of fragmented subjects, and what are the implications of doing so? 
To adapt the words of gender and sexuality scholar Judith Butler, one of the underlying 
currents of Epileptic is “the recasting of the matter of bodies as the effect of a dynamic of power, 
such that the matter of bodies will be indissociable from the regulatory norms that govern their 
materialization and the signification of those material effects” (2). Because of disability’s 
inherently trans-categorical nature, Butler’s work on gender and bodies is just as applicable to 
representations of ability and bodies. As David T. Mitchell and Sharon L. Snyder note, disability 
studies is in an exceptional position among such areas of identity studies, since disability is both 
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a quality that can apply across other identity boundaries, and because “[t]he question put to the 
representation of disability differs from that of other identity-based studies: can one possess a 
physical or cognitive anomaly that does not translate into a belief in one’s social inferiority?” (4). 
Thus disability is distinctive paradoxically in its potential universality, and in its 
acknowledgement that anomaly exists. To explain this last point further, much of the work in 
gender studies, for example, was not exclusively done with the aim of proving that women are 
equally as capable as men, but also to dismantle ideas of gendered hegemony in which the 
masculine is the standard and the feminine is the deviant from that standard. And similarly, 
disability studies works at dismantling the notion of “normalcy,” embodied in the idealized 
notion of the able-bodied, as the standard against which other bodies are measured. This 
dismantling tendency is particularly suited to the comics medium, whose intersections of the 
visual and the textual and simultaneity of presence and absence likewise undermine the tendency 
toward narrative normalcy. 
Following this project of dismantling the conception of the normal, Epileptic situates 
Jean-Christophe and his disease within a nonlinear spectrum of experience, in which the 
materiality of the disabled body (usually Jean-Christophe’s) is both an embodied and a socially 
created “deviance.” Epileptic shows both the very real and lived physical constraints that Jean-
Christophe must live with, but it also shows how some of those constraints are socially 
constructed and externally imposed limitations. Moreover, B. includes his brother’s particular 
experiences within a wider network of embodied and social experiences, from David’s own 
socially formed limitations to the coincidence of disability with historical trauma. While 
Epileptic does not present a way of overcoming the social limitations of disability, the text does 
depict tensions between the bodily limitations and the social. B.’s work shows, as Susan M. 
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Squier writes, “not only the seizures that leave Jean-Christophe impaired by bruises and 
disorientation, but also the social response to those seizures that render his epilepsy a pervasive, 
intractable disability” (Squier “So Long” 75). In responding to and representing his brother’s 
experiences of impairment and disability, B. creates a text that actually offers an alternative 
model for understanding many forms of embodied difference. 
 
Envisioning Embodiment: Witnessing and Representing Jean-Christophe’s Physical 
Disability 
Epilepsy is indeed a physical affliction, one that remains in some ways a mystery to 
contemporary medicine, and Jean-Christophe’s case is particularly severe. Save a few periods of 
remission, Jean-Christophe experiences on average three seizures a day. The text opens with the 
two adult brothers meeting in the bathroom at their parents’ house in 1994, and the physical 
effects of epilepsy are manifested in Jean-Christophe’s bodily form (figure 6.1): “There are scars 
all over his body. His eyebrows are crisscrossed by scabs. The back of his head is bald, from all 
the times he’s fallen. He’s enormously bloated from medication and lack of exercise” (2).  
 
Figure 6.1: the brothers as physical opposites (2). 
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This description and the accompanying images, however, focus on the secondary physical effects 
of epilepsy, that is, on the damage inflicted as a result of the seizures, not the seizures 
themselves.  
While the very first page of the memoir sets up the brothers as near-total opposites, with 
Jean-Christophe as a huge, slow, almost monstrous-looking bulk next to David’s “normal” 
frame, the text immediately switches on the following page to the near-identical appearance of 
the brothers as very young boys. It thus appears that the central project of the memoir is to 
explain how the image of the brothers on the first page came to be, given their similarities in the 
second page. B. offers a complicated and conflicting view of his brother, at times rejecting Jean-
Christophe’s disability entirely, while at others portraying with a deep sensibility the limitations 
and frustrations he encounters, along with David’s utter disgust with the “outsiders’” reactions to 
his brother. B. resists the idea that a disease or disorder— in this case, epilepsy— reflects the 
inherent spiritual, mental, or emotional qualities of a person.   
Describing Jean-Christophe’s epilepsy as a disability is somewhat problematic— and that 
very problematic nature is something B. addresses explicitly in the memoir. Today, in 2013, 
epilepsy is considered not a disease (which connotes contagion) or an illness (which connotes 
weakness and lifelessness) but a disorder.44 The following section outlines the mechanics of 
epilepsy from a contemporary medical standpoint, followed by a very brief explanation of the 
historical understanding of epilepsy as a spiritual ailment made physical. This section provides a 
context for understanding Jean-Christophe, whose epilepsy is a disorder that does not limit itself 
to the moment of seizure but creates a host of attendant biomechanical and psychological 
processes.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 I use the term “disorder” to refer to Jean-Christophe’s epilepsy throughout this chapter 
because, while it is negative, it is at least slightly less problematic than “illness” or “disease.”   
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The term “disorder” still has some negative implications, most notably its 
characterization of normalcy versus deviance and its associations with chaos (literally, a lack of 
order), and to re-label epilepsy as a disorder is to situate it within a spectrum of both physical 
and psychological anomalies. “The word ‘epilepsy’ has a long history of social stigma. But 
epilepsy is nothing more than a brain disorder caused by uncontrolled, excessive synchronous 
electrical activity” (“What is Epilepsy?”). The actual biomechanical processes of a seizure are 
understood as too many axons in the brain becoming “excited” (that is, neuro-electrically 
charged) at once, causing falls, spasms, muscular contractions, or broadly speaking, a lack of 
fine and gross muscle control. During the post-ictal phase (that is, the moments directly 
following the actual seizure), the brain [accent?] is in a state of recovery from its excessive 
excitation. As a result, the individual may be tired, sluggish, disoriented, depressed, or angry as 
their brain recovers; “a person’s level of awareness gradually improves during the post-ictal 
period (“What Is Epilepsy?”). 
 In a video intended to help newly diagnosed patients or people who are just beginning to 
learn about epilepsy, a doctor calmly explains that “although these seizures are distressing to 
watch, the person having them is unaware. We don’t believe that seizures are painful” 
(“Understanding Generalized Seizures”). While the doctor is undoubtedly very calm and well-
meaning, his words still indicate the peculiar position epilepsy holds in the medical community 
and in social arenas more broadly. Seizures remain within the realm of mystery, at least to some 
extent, as those who have seizures cannot describe them; they can only describe their feelings 
before and after to varying degrees, depending on the seizure’s severity and type, and the 
person’s experiences in the post-ictal phase. Moreover, the doctor’s insistence that “we don’t 
believe” seizures are painful actually implies “but they might be.” Treatment of epilepsy is 
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equally convoluted, as we can see from the long list of treatment options in the contemporary 
Handbook of Epilepsy Treatment, Third Edition by Simon Shorvon (2011), intended primarily 
for use by medical practitioners and clinicians treating patients diagnosed with epilepsy. Anti-
seizure medication has varying degrees of success and a vast range of side effects, both physical 
and psychological; the Handbook spends over 300 pages detailing treatment options. 
Epileptic seizures still remain within the realm of mystery, at least to some extent, as 
those who have seizures cannot describe them; they can only describe their feelings before and 
after to varying degrees, depending on the seizure’s severity and type, and the person’s 
experiences in the post-ictal phase. Thus one of the fundamental stumbling blocks for B.’s work 
is the necessary distance between his position as a spectator to his brother’s disorder and his 
brother’s actual experience. Of course distance always exists between lived and narrated 
experiences, as I discussed above in the chapter on Fun Home. However, epilepsy’s physical and 
psychological realities render this distance even more pronounced. Jean-Christophe cannot 
remember his seizures, much less describe them to someone else, keeping his disorder 
mysterious and unspeakable.  
Due in part to this enigmatic nature of the disorder, Epileptic simultaneously works 
within and against the historical and stereotypical understanding of epilepsy. Harriet Murav 
describes the historical conception of epilepsy as divided between a spiritual ailment, like the 
demonic possession that Jesus cures, and a reflection of the individual’s personality:  
Medical literature in the 1860s and 1870s developed a profile of what was thought of as 
the epileptic personality. The intervals between seizures became subject to medical 
investigation, since it was believed that as a consequence of repeated attacks, the 
epileptic patient underwent a profound change in his character and moral convictions… 
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[Dr. A. U.] Freze noted abrupt mood changes in his patients, from gloomy silence to 
cheerful expansiveness. Pervading these mood changes is an undercurrent of violence…. 
Epileptics were characterized as deceitful, sly, and hypocritical. (78) 
This historical understanding of epilepsy creates a kind of epileptic “type” or “personality,” an 
indicator of an underlying violent or depressive disposition. 
Contemporary medical thought now believes the inverse relationship is true, and the 
Handbook does in fact acknowledge the social and psychological effects epilepsy may have on 
an individual. It briefly addresses the increased suicide rate among sufferers of epilepsy as well 
as the vastly increased likelihood of psychological comorbidity (that is, the likelihood of having 
or developing a psychological disease like depression or psychosis in addition to one’s epilepsy). 
And while earlier medical literature characterizes epilepsy as caused by these underlying 
psychiatric or psychological maladies, contemporary medicine notes that some factors— both 
medical, like side effects from therapeutic drugs, and social, like employment and driver’s 
license restrictions— can increase a patient’s likelihood of developing psychosis, depression, or 
anxiety (Shorvon 75-80). Even so contemporary experts remain unclear on the exact nature of 
the relationship between the seizures themselves and psychological comorbidity. 
The unknown and uneven relationship between the psychological and the physical vis-à-
vis epilepsy plays a substantial role in Epileptic. While today’s understanding and treatment of 
epilepsy seems daunting and reflects a complicated intertwining of the physical and the 
psychological, in 1964, when Jean-Christophe has his first seizure, medical practices were even 
less straightforward. B.’s depiction of Jean-Christophe’s seizures early on is clinically detached 
(figure 6.2): 
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Suddenly [Jean-Christophe] stops talking and freezes up. He turns all red, a foolish grin 
spreads across his face, and his eyes seek us out, as if to cling to us. Suddenly, he falls off 
to the side, whimpering. His limbs go taut, his eyes roll back in his head, he drools a 
little. Sometimes the seizure ends there. Sometimes he comes back, relaxes, but his eyes 
remain unfocused. It looks like he’s pausing on the frontier between the two worlds. Then 
he falls again. When he comes out of it, he looks surprised. (33)  
The language and the image here are both straightforward, factual, without emotional 
involvement, as if B. is playing the role of clinician. 
 
Figure 6.2: First full description of Jean-Christophe’s seizure (33). 
Despite this early straightforward depiction of epilepsy and what his brother endures, B. 
often questions the extent of Jean-Christophe’s physical and mental faculties, by turns convinced 
of his brother’s able-bodied-ness, and suspicious that there is a deeper underlying condition that, 
if treated, would ameliorate Jean-Christophe’s condition. And yet B. also, in subtle ways, echoes 
his understanding of Jean-Christophe’s experiences through various characters’ visual 
encounters with social and historical hardships. That is, B. enacts what Mitchell and Snyder call 
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“the disruption of a reader’s identification with fictional ideals of normalcy through encounters 
with ‘transgressive disabilities’” (40). Jean-Christophe’s body and mind present us with an 
image of an “unwhole” body, a subject in pieces, and this image reflects back to us our own 
versions of fragmentation. In proposing a nonlinear spectrum of embodied and visible human 
experience, B. undermines those problematic categories of “normal” and “disabled.”  
As Squier writes, “In its juxtaposition of narrative to a range of realist and surrealist 
images, this graphic memoir conveys both the terrible facticity and the nearly-mythic nature of 
Jean-Christophe’s epilepsy and treatment” (“Literature and Medicine” 132). The text moves 
between these two poles: the reality, or the embodied experience; and the “mythic” or the 
mysterious nature of the illness that takes away from Jean-Christophe’s own sense of self. As 
noted earlier, Jean Christophe’s epilepsy is severe and debilitating. Beginning at age seven, he 
starts experiencing seizures, which routinely become more and more regular, until he has them 
about three times a day, “like clockwork, imposing a rhythm on our lives” (79).  
 
Figure 6.3: “the endless round of doctors” (11). 
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With his first seizure “begins the endless round of doctors, for my brother and my 
parents,” literalized as a chain of doctors dancing and holding hands forms a menacing ring 
around Jean-Christophe and his parents (figure 6.3), a visual representation of the encroaching 
and confusing Western medical approach to treating the disease with little regard for the 
“associated” patient (11). The family first turns to their French doctors and standard Western 
medicine, and within the rapid space of three short panels the family has already visited three 
different doctors, each of whom is unequipped to treat Jean-Christophe and refers him onward. 
One of these doctors even determines that Jean-Christophe’s epilepsy is a result of his being a 
“bad boy,” seemingly a holdover from nineteenth-century belief in the “epileptic personality” 
(11).  
In 1969, at the age of thirteen, Jean-Christophe’s parents bring him to the hospital for 
testing under a neurological specialist. There, “[the doctors] perform gaseous encephalograms on 
him. They shoot gas into his brain to inflate it so they can take photos, in which they hope to find 
traces of a lesion or a tumor. When my parents tell me about it, I visualize my brother in the 
clutches of mad scientists” (41). Pictured with his head shaved and dozens of tubes and pieces of 
machinery encircling him, Jean-Christophe appears a passive victim of an intrusive procedure 
(figure 6.4).  
 
Figure 6.4: Jean-Christophe as body and symptom (41). 
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His bald head, visibly signifying Jean-Christophe’s change from “normal” to “patient,” occupies 
the center of the elongated panel, with only the crown of the head to the bridge of the nose 
visible. This panel thus presents Jean-Christophe as body and symptom—and therefore the focus 
of medical intervention— rather than as an individual, an image that reflects the doctors’ 
attitudes towards him. Indeed, the specialist (Professor T.) does not even answer the parents’ 
questions; “It’s always a brusque doctor who answers for him” (41). 
The attitude of this doctor perfectly encapsulates the cavalier manner with which the 
medical establishment treats Jean-Christophe. When asked if the encephalograms cause him 
pain, the “brusque doctor” responds: “They injected gas into his brain. Of course it hurts!” (41). 
This disregard for the pain of the patient is an indication of the doctors’ general lack of feeling 
for the patient as an individual; to them, he is not Jean-Christophe Beauchard but “the case”: “He 
will allow Professor T. to perform a brilliant operation. What do the results matter so long as the 
surgeon cuts with elegance and precision under the admiring gaze of his assistants?” (44). 
Indeed, the original French is even more damning: “Jean-Christophe est le ‘cas.’ Il va permettre 
au professeur T. de réaliser une brillante opération” (43). The pronoun “il” could be either “he,” 
referring to Jean-Christophe, or “it,” referring to “le cas,” “the case”, thus further removing 
agency and personhood from Jean-Christophe. 
Surgery— and even the discussions about surgery— thus become a kind of performance 
of “elegance and precision,” and in this respect B. draws parallels between the practice of 
medicine and the more esoteric and alternative methods of treatment the Beauchards explore in 
their quest to heal Jean-Christophe. Many of the paths the Beauchards explore involve a 
performative aspect, from chewing one’s food a certain number of times in the macrobiotic 
commune, to the “magnetization” rituals in which each family member must shake and turn a 
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small canister every half hour, to the Catholic exorcism, and so on. All of these treatments have 
several common aspects: they all rely in some way on the exploitation of the Beauchard family 
for their own gain (be that financial gain or, as with Professor T., a gain in reputation and 
prestige), and they all involve a visible act that corresponds with an invisible treatment for an 
invisible disease. Illness or disability becomes not only a bodily affliction to be normalized and 
rectified at any (financial or emotional) cost, as the memoir depicts the family’s desperate search, 
but the treatments are a means of bridging the visible gap between the disabled body and the 
“normal” one.  
The very medium itself is thus a way of echoing this performance, as Squier notes: 
“Comics can show us things that can’t be said, just as they can narrate experiences without 
relying on words, and in their juxtaposition of words and pictures, they can also convey a far 
richer sense of the different magnitudes at which we experience any performance of illness, 
disability, medical treatment, or healing” (“Literature and Medicine” 130). By performing— 
importantly, for an audience— a given act of healing, the family and the treatment practitioners 
also perform acts of defining Jean-Christophe’s illness as disruptive and therefore as “abnormal” 
and inferior.  
Indeed, the doctors seem far more concerned with the prestige and the success of the 
specialist than with the safety and well-being of their young patient. After a long discussion of 
the procedure they propose to perform, which would entail cutting into a removing a small 
portion of Jean-Christophe’s brain, they nonchalantly reel off the potential side effects of the 
surgery:  
With the help of slides, he shows us how he’s going to open his skull and take away the 
‘thing’ that, according to him, is causing the epileptic seizures. He goes into a big 
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medical show-and-tell. He explains that this is a very delicate operation, that if his scalpel 
is off by so much half a millimeter, my brother will be blind. He lists all the possible 
outcomes if his knife slips. If he cuts here, my brother loses the use of all his limbs. 
There, he loses the use of his right arm, there, he’ll be deaf. My mother faints. Professor 
T. reassures her: None of this will happen because he’s a man of such exceptional skill. 
(43)  
Again, B.’s artwork heightens the feeling of anxiety and the traumatic visual encounter at the 
hospital (figure 6.5). The first three panels depict Professor T. pointing at the enlarged images of 
Jean-Christophe’s brain, with the silhouettes of the parents as captive audience. The parents—
and by extension, the reader—are now viewing the images acquired through the painful 
encephalograms, the process that transforms Jean-Christophe into the traumatized victim. So on 
the one hand the sight of these slides is horrifying, as evidenced by the mother’s fainting; yet on 
the other hand the text is still, perversely, participating in the same system of visual violence. 
 
Figure 6.5: Dissecting Jean-Christophe (43). 
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Equally important are the ways in which Jean-Christophe is also caught in a visual 
exchange during this same visit to the hospital. Jean-Christophe “finds himself in a room with a 
boy who’s been operated on by Professor T. It’s his third operation. He’s got a 105-degree fever 
and his right side is paralyzed. Professor T. has claimed that the paralysis is temporary. But he’s 
been like this for fifteen days” (40-41). Bald, emaciated, and sweating profusely in striped 
pajamas, the boy presents a disturbing image of the specialist’s results (figure 6.6).  
 
Figure 6.6: the patient as prisoner (40). 
In an image that contains a number of visual echoes with the victims of the Nazi concentration 
camps—a point I will return to in more detail later—the striped pajamas and shaved head recall 
the Nazi persecution of the disabled. B. draws our attention not only to the victimization of 
disabled bodies in modern medical practice, but to the intersections of this victimization with 
specific historical moments. The young patient is, in a way, a prisoner of the hospital, and the 
doctor’s cold demeanor mimics, to a certain extent, the extreme detachment and dehumanization 
of concentration camp medical practices. Like Watchmen and No Towers, in Epileptic, the 
Holocaust functions as an aesthetic and thematic touchstone employed in order to emphasize 
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both individual suffering and the historical context and implications for this kind of 
victimization. 
At this moment in the hospital, the narrative slows down as both reader and characters 
linger on the image of the young patient; the five short sentences cited above appear as captions 
above four panels, as each panel shows the boy lying in the hospital bed, the image rotating from 
“west” to “north” to “east” to “south.” It is as if the narrative slows down and spins around the 
boy and his weak, incapacitated body, a portent of what Jean-Christophe might become. This 
sense is heightened as the first two panels of this series are larger than their preceding panels, 
creating a sense of time slowing and space expanding. The third and fourth panel—with the 
patient pointing “east” and “south”—is the first panel on the following page, so the reader’s eyes 
must travel from the bottom of one page, across the binding seam of the book, and up to the top 
of the next page to continue this scene. (In the original version, the reader must actually turn the 
page to continue this scene, creating an even slower reading experience and affecting the sense 
of time, since the impression of the whole scene is blocked.)  
The larger panels echo and enhance Jean-Christophe’s act of watching the patient—made 
even more complicated as the reader also watches Jean-Christophe in that first panel. Indeed, in 
the first panel of this scene, Jean-Christophe stands in the background, staring at the boy (see 
again figure 6.6). B. presents no hint at what he might be thinking as he watches. Interestingly, 
then, Jean-Christophe is here put in the same position of viewer that David occupies throughout 
most of the text. The patient is a visible and visual indication of what Jean-Christophe’s body 
might become, in much the same way as the disabled body is often configured as confronting the 
viewer with one’s own lack of bodily whole-ness. John Berger summarizes the reciprocal 
relationship between viewer and object of the gaze: “We never look at just one thing; we are 
  275 
 
always looking at the relation between things and ourselves” (Berger 9). Jean-Christophe’s 
visual encounter with the other young patient is therefore an encounter between the two boys, in 
which Jean-Christophe and the patient are visually and metaphorically associated with one 
another. This section of Epileptic’s opening chapter thus reveals the paradox of Jean-
Christophe’s illness: the visual shock of encountering another sick body reveals that body as 
simultaneously powerless and threatening. 
The scene in the hospital further exemplifies David’s own response to Jean-Christophe’s 
illness. He can only visualize his brother, making sense of the unexplainable through visual 
imagination. Just as the doctors examine Jean-Christophe, so too the memoir examines him, 
dissects him— sometimes literally as the panels break his body into pieces (43, 226, 317). 
Although it may seem that the text exoticizes and medicalizes Jean-Christophe’s body, rendering 
him disabled and limited even while B. proclaims to be working against this, B. is actually 
creating a reflection of the medical establishment’s approach in order to emphasize its horrific 
qualities. While such panels do indeed dissect Jean-Christophe’s body, they do so not from a 
place of morbid fascination or performative healing, but to move feelings of shock away from 
the sight of the disabled body and on to the sight of the medical and social mechanisms by which 
that body is constructed.   
B. seems to want to reclaim this notion of disability, using it to complicate the notions of 
“normal” and “abnormal,” but the text nonetheless offers a complicated relationship between the 
body and the self, a notion bound up with the act of looking. Like Alison Bechdel’s Fun Home, 
looking, gazing, and watching form the acts of identity formation interwoven with moments of 
shock, violence, and sometimes trauma. Although B. seems to want to resist the categorization of 
his brother as disabled, much of the memoir is dedicated to showing the ways that Jean-
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Christophe, David, and the family are indeed socially limited by the disease (or, inversely, the 
ways that the family is limited by society’s understanding of the disease).  
 
Disorder in Drawing: Destabilizing Images to Represent Disability 
Paradoxically, from his position of witness, B. cannot portray Jean-Christophe from any 
other perspective than that of the outsider examining the patient. However, B. does try to find 
ways to resist overly stereotypical literary depictions of disability while still employing visual 
and literary devices. For example, B. concretizes the “unseeable” disease by depicting a dragon 
or a monster simultaneously springing from and attacking Jean-Christophe as he has a seizure. 
Alongside the actuality (the lived experience) of this disease portrayed in the panels described 
earlier, then, B. also anthropomorphizes it and makes it fantastic. At one point, Jean-Christophe 
goes to a boarding school for handicapped students, where “they show him a locker where he can 
put his stuff” (141). The accompanying panel image shows him literally stuffing the epilepsy-
dragon into the locker; epilepsy is thus rendered as a physical object that he must carry with him 
(figure 6.7). Doing so both depicts epilepsy as concrete and tangible—the dragon endures long 
after the seizure has passed—and emphasizes its incomprehensible, uncontrollable nature.  
 
Figure 6.7: “a locker where he can put all his stuff” (141). 
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David understands through visual metaphor the experience of his brother’s illness: 
epilepsy is figured as both a monster emerging from and attacking Jean-Christophe, and a 
mountain that Jean-Christophe and the family must climb up with every seizure (figure 6.8, 78). 
Both of these visual metaphors represent different aspects of the brother’s epilepsy: on the one 
hand, the dragon is the disorder’s paradoxically ephemeral physicality, a bodily affliction hidden 
inside the brain that cannot be pinned down and cured— its mythos, its incomprehensibility, its 
mutability, its viciousness, and its disruptiveness. On the other hand, the mountain is epilepsy’s 
insurmountability, its largess, and also its naturalness, its lack of surreality, its concreteness, its 
real and normal, un-alien appearance.  
 
Figure 6.8: epilepsy as dragon and mountain (78). 
Although both of these images—the dragon and the mountain— clearly function as 
metaphor, in his visual depictions B. turns these metaphors into something more tangible, 
making his interior interpretations into the visible exterior experiences of the family. Through his 
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particular use of metaphor, B. resists the overdetermination of epilepsy as something that stands 
for all experience of difference or abnormality. He subtly points to the ways in which David is as 
flawed as his brother, rather than enacting what Susan Sontag calls “punitive notions of disease:” 
Nothing is more punitive than to give a disease meaning— that meaning being invariably 
a moralistic one. Any important disease whose causality is murky, and for which 
treatment is ineffectual, tends to be awash in significance. First, the subjects of deepest 
dread (corruption, decay, pollution, anomie, weakness) are identified with the disease. 
The disease itself becomes a metaphor. Then, in the name of the disease (that is, using it 
as a metaphor), that horror is imposed on other things. The disease becomes adjectival. 
(58) 
B.’s use of these metaphors functions, in part, as a kind of resistance to the stereotypical use of 
disability in literature: that is, rather than using disease and disability as a metaphor or allegory 
for something else (e.g. political commentary, emotional or moral stances, etc), here metaphor 
works in the service of the illness itself, making its widespread effects more concrete and, 
paradoxically, more obscure.  
Likewise the very form of the graphic memoir allows for a way of representing disability 
and its effects, while also maintaining a necessary (visual) ambiguity. Epileptic thus foregrounds 
the potential within the comics medium to undermine conventional narrative limitations and 
represent trauma and memory through its ability to function in between spaces of vision, text, 
and image. Near the end of the book in particular, B. designs several panels with the body or the 
head of Jean-Christophe or himself as the frame (figure 6.9, 301). On this page, for example, 
Jean-Christophe’s body is twisted around the set of images in the center of the page. The body-
as-frame depicts Jean-Christophe in one of the stages of a seizure, recognizable from earlier 
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passages in the text that depict such scenes within panels (see, for example, page 235). B.’s 
normal pattern of orderly, regularly spaced and framed panels does not exist here; instead, the 
panels within the frame of Jean-Christophe’s body themselves have rough, wavy edges set 
against a black background. It is as if Jean-Christophe’s body contains these panels—or this 
narrative—within itself, indicating the inescapability, both narratively and physically, of the 
body, especially the disabled body. The body appears to literally bind and contain the narrative.  
 
Figure 6.9: Jean-Christophe’s body as frame (301). 
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Here, moreover, the narrative that this body contains indicates the kind of emotional, 
unpredictable, and unstructured (or differently structured) experiences of both Jean-Christophe 
and David. The black background and the ill-defined boundaries between panels (see, 
particularly, the two panels in the center) give the impression of a loss of order and structure, 
pointing instead to the lack of distinction between episodes and discrete units. Indeed, as the text 
becomes increasingly chaotic and B. begins drawing his own dreams, his fantasies, and his 
brother’s “prophecies,” these moments remain confined within the physical body, as on pages 
278-279, where David’s head forms the border around panels depicting the subjects of his short 
stories that he wrote in the 1970’s.  
The physicality of the body thus plays a central role in B.’s complex depiction of 
disability. B. in some ways does exoticize the disabled body, thereby maintaining the 
normal/disabled binary, yet he is simultaneously complicating this binary, demonstrating its 
failures and nuances, especially as he uses his own head as the frame of some panels. Thus even 
his own body becomes the limit of the narrative, just as Jean-Christophe’s is the limit at other 
points. And yet, in using Jean-Christophe’s body as the frame of the panel, B. paradoxically 
resists the characterization of Mitchell and Snyder that “[t]he effort to narrate disability’s myriad 
deviations is an attempt to bring the body’s unruliness under control” (6). Rather than bringing 
Jean-Christophe’s body under narrative control, the comics medium allows a representation of 
that which the body itself controls and contains. 
However, Epileptic does not make either Jean-Christophe or epilepsy itself more 
understandable, but rather both concretizes and communicates David’s own experiences as the 
one relegated to the position of a passive viewer. At several different points, David wonders 
what goes on in Jean-Christophe’s mind: “What happens to my brother when he has a seizure? 
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Does he depart from his body and go somewhere else? Or does he instead plunge deep down 
inside himself? Does he float into the fourth dimension? Or does he visit other worlds ruled by 
geometries unknown on Earth…?” (226). These questions are never resolved; David (and, it 
appears, Jean-Christophe) remain ignorant of the exact mechanisms that occur in the mind during 
a seizure. Epilepsy remains unknowable and enigmatic, or, to be overtly Lacanian, within the 
realm of the Real, that which exists outside of language and comprehension. 
In an effort to resist our becoming accustomed to its tricks, B. employs these ever-
changing techniques to destabilize and disorient the reader. Epileptic thus places us in the same 
position as David, watching a seizure and being helpless to do anything, and searching for an 
impossible cure for an incomprehensible disease. As Michael Chaney proposes: 
The narrative positions readers as epileptics by forcing us to see chaotically, frenetically, 
wildly… the narrative design of Epileptic may leave readers feeling overwhelmed by 
panels teeming with inky, overwrought visual details of marauding samurai and prancing 
chimera. The urgency of reading is not for the cure, however, but for a stable paradigm (a 
sinthome) that will help us to make sense of and perhaps find pleasure in the disorienting 
surplus, hyperreal in its signifying yet garbled plenitude. As we strive to distinguish the 
miniature effects of weapon-brandishing warrior hordes, or the yin from the yang 
elements in various panels, so too must Pierre François (David B.) and his parents labor 
to distinguish hoaxes from healing, hypocrisy from hope. (141)   
The overwhelming visual aspects of the narrative serve this multifold purpose of mirroring the 
Beauchard family’s experiences searching for a cure on the one hand, as Chaney describes, and 
the impossibility of either curing or fully understanding Jean-Christophe’s disorder on the other. 
Relegated as he is to the position of external spectator to Jean-Christophe’s seizures, B.’s only 
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recourse are his fantastical pictures, his surreal imagery that can help him, and in turn the viewer, 
render the chaos of his life tangible.  
Thus when I say the text interrupts itself and becomes disorienting, I want to make it 
clear that I do not mean that these textual elements give us a similar effect to a seizure. Rather, 
the text employs various slips, symbols and structures to reflect B.’s own life experiences as the 
audience to the seizure. Using these techniques reveals again the propensity of the comics 
medium toward the possibilities for representing trauma—here, both familial and medical—
through the intersections of text and image and through the structure and ordering of panels on a 
page. The comics page allows for multiple images and notions to be present simultaneously, with 
each panel functioning both like a window onto David B.’s life and like a knot into which the 
various threads of the narrative are tied. The text’s propensity towards interrupting itself, then, is 
a function of its medium. Because comics allow for the space between image and text to become 
a tangible presence on the page, those ambiguous spaces become sites for potential narrative and 
representational instability and disorientation. 
Furthermore, these interruptions become one of the organizing principles of the narrative, 
again echoing the organization of the family and David’s identity around Jean-Christophe and 
his disease. Like the seizures that interrupt daily life, the text interrupts itself, disorients us, and 
leaves us as viewers momentarily stunned. The very structure of the panels themselves at times 
takes on a kind of visual agency, the result of which is at times disorienting and confusing. For 
example, when B. introduces the Swedenborgian church that their mother turns to after the Ouija 
boards fail to offer any relief for Jean-Christophe, he does so in a thoroughly confusing manner 
(figure 6.10, 155). If we begin reading this page along the standard trajectory for French and 
English readers, we become lost: the second “panel” does not logically follow the first. Linearly, 
  283 
 
the captions read: “Despite the séances, the memory of my grandfather continues to haunt my 
mother. Swedenborg is born in 1688 in Stockholm. He studies philosophy, algebra, engineering, 
and physics. He is accepted into the Royal Academy of Uppsala and writes a number of papers 
there. She contacts the pastor referred to her by Abellio. He is a member of the Swedenborgian 
church” (155). 
 
Figure 6.10: the disorientation of the Swedenborgian church (155). 
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Instead the reader must realize the “third” panel (the third sentence above) is actually the 
second, and the “second” panel belongs to the large image that takes up the rest of the page. 
Because the upper section of this page looks identical to the previous page, with a trio of 
uniformly spaced and sized panels, we assume these panels are to be read in the same manner as 
previously (and as is standard). B. then undoes our complacency, resisting the easy flow of 
narrative, by undermining this standard practice and leaving the reader momentarily disoriented. 
That is, formally speaking, the text deviates from “the norm,” the standard reading trajectory.  
In a similar fashion, B. employs a technique that borders on illusion for the layout of 
other pages, creating an almost Escher-like confusion in the viewer. At the end of book five and 
the beginning of book 6, for example, the panels visually perform in a way that resembles a 
blivet or the “devil’s tuning fork” illusion, or the rabbit/duck illusion (164-65). The devil’s 
tuning fork is an impossible figure, one whose position shifts as we look at it; at one end, it 
appears to have three tines, while at the other end, it can obviously only support two tines. The 
rabbit/duck illusion, meanwhile, is a single figure that contains two potential images (either a 
rabbit or a duck, depending on perspective and how one’s eyes focus).  
A similar illusory effect occurs here in Epileptic (figure 6.11). To look at these pages 
from one perspective, it seems that the central panel covers or obscures the two side panels; yet 
from another perspective it seems the two side panels cover up the outside edges of the central 
panel. The visual stability of the page layout is disrupted, mirroring the disorientation that David 
and Jean-Christophe experience. Destabilizing the reader in this way echoes David’s instability 
as the spectator to his brother’s disorder, a visual instability made possible through the comics 
medium. 
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Figure 6.11: the layout of the page echoes the “devil’s tuning fork” (164). 
 
Picturing Impairment: the Social Imposition of Disability 
The disorientation discussed in the previous section is not solely a physical experience 
for Jean-Christophe and, to a certain extent, David, but also a social one. Sontag notes “[t]here is 
a peculiarly modern predilection for psychological explanations of disease, as of everything else. 
Psychologizing seems to provide control over the experiences and events… over which people 
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have in fact little or no control” (Sontag 55). Epileptic’s form and content not only demonstrate 
how both characters encounter this kind of psychologizing, but they also illustrate the social 
construction of impairment and the resulting physical, social, and psychological limitations. 
David B. offers a complicated and conflicting view of his brother, at times rejecting Jean-
Christophe’s disability entirely, while at others portraying with a deep sensibility the limitations 
and frustrations he encounters, along with David’s utter disgust with the reactions of public 
spectators to his brother’s illness. In part because he views his brother as at times choosing to be 
ill, David sometimes ascribes moral and psychological reasons and causes to Jean-Christophe’s 
disorder (142, 213, 342). That is, David sometimes fulfills Sontag’s caution against 
psychologizing illness: “Illness is interpreted as, basically, a psychological event, and people are 
encouraged to believe they get sick because they (unconsciously) want to, and that they can cure 
themselves by the mobilization of will” (Sontag 56-57). In creating such a moral and 
psychological link to his disorder, Jean-Christophe’s epilepsy moves beyond a physical 
limitation and becomes a social impairment. 
Disability studies began early on by “distinguish[ing] between impairment—the 
individual limitation linked to a medically based problem that impairs one or more basic life 
functions—and disability— the individual limitation produced by society’s failure to 
accommodate to the impairment” (Squier “So Long” 73). Epileptic explores the lines between 
these approaches to illness within the character of Jean-Christophe, whose physical body as we 
have seen is in some ways able and whole, yet simultaneously fractured and limited, and who 
must also grapple with the socially imposed limitations of his situation. 
The text presents a split in the disabled person between the weak and the powerful, the 
victim and the perpetrator. Both Jean-Christophe and David enact this dualism, as each is victim 
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and perpetrator. Jean-Christophe is undoubtedly epilepsy’s victim, and by extension (although 
through very different mechanisms) so is David. However, B. also presents Jean-Christophe as 
an individual who perpetuates physical and emotional violence both intentionally and 
unintentionally. As he gets older, Jean-Christophe becomes more violent, at various points 
throwing hot soup at his mother, punching his father, threatening his siblings with knives, 
shouting angry heavy metal lyrics, attempting to destroy all of David’s artwork, and so on. B. 
portrays Jean-Christophe as sullen, awkward, and socially stunted; he cannot seem to make 
friends his own age, and near the end of the memoir David and his sister Florence have to leave 
their parents’ house, where they’re gathered for the holidays, because their presence upsets Jean-
Christophe too much. In addition, Jean-Christophe never finishes his high school degree, even 
after moving to a school for handicapped students after his seizures become too disruptive for 
“regular” classrooms. 
 
Figure 6.12: A crowd looking at Jean-Christophe’s seizure (107). 
Indeed, several other characters construe Jean-Christophe as other, and more than that, as 
inferior (though to be Othered is often also to be made less than or deviant). The boys’ own 
grandmother tells David at one point that Jean-Christophe “got the slows,” conflating the 
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physical disease with its associated but misunderstood psychological and mental issues (227). At 
one point the police even arrest Jean-Christophe as he has a seizure and then beat him, believing 
him to be on drugs rather than actually sick (299). Spectators who gather to watch Jean-
Christophe’s seizures in public offer such helpful advice as “He ought to be locked up!” and 
“He’s crazy!” (figure 6.12, 107). B. often draws these spectators with heavy emphasis on their 
eyes (see pages 107, 235-36, etc), accentuating their participation in the social spectacle of 
disability. That is, B. entwines their physical appearance and their part in constructing the 
disabled body as spectacle, making their own bodies as visible and legible as the body they 
disparage. 
Early on, Jean-Christophe’s seizures are treated with some success with a macrobiotic 
diet, massage, and acupuncture. However, after approximately six months of being seizure-free, 
Jean-Christophe experiences one while on a train with his mother; “the man sharing the 
compartment with them gets up to leave, furious... slamming the door behind him;” the man’s 
anger is visible on his face (71-72). Here B. presents us with one scene of public disgust and 
suspicion in the form of this man’s (over)reaction, literally depicting the social construction of 
disability as not just deviant or “abnormal” as a personal affront. 
The scene continues with a narration of the mother’s reaction: “My mother is devastated 
by this seizure, which comes after six months’ respite. In her mind, this sends us all the way back 
to square one. She has a vision of her son back in the hospital, his head shaved. It’s as if she’s 
being pulled backwards” (72). The text thus presents a convergence of public disgust and anger 
with the mother’s despair, but nowhere on these pages do we have Jean-Christophe’s feelings or 
reactions. While the mother’s reaction is obviously much more sympathetic, this particular scene 
emphasizes that Jean-Christophe’s family is indeed searching for that which will make him 
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“normal,” even while simultaneously trying to find a way to adapt their lives to include his 
difference. In addition, the total absence of Jean-Christophe’s reaction to this scene has a twofold 
effect: on one hand, it keeps epilepsy—and, unfortunately, by extension Jean-Christophe—in the 
realm of the unknowable and unspeakable; and it places the emphasis on the social web in which 
Jean-Christophe finds himself defined as epileptic, as inseparable from his disorder. 
Much later, during a family vacation, Jean-Christophe has a seizure on the parapet of a 
castle. As David and the boys’ father try to take care of him, a crowd forms. Their faces and, 
especially, their eyes grow larger, filling the background of the panels, so that their stares create 
a sense of crowding, oppression, and claustrophobia within the panels. At one point the reader is 
positioned as one of the members of the crowd, implicating the reader in the construction of 
Jean-Christophe’s body as spectacle (figure 6.13).  
 
Figure 6.13: more spectators (236). 
Indeed, the focus here is much more on the spectators as spectacle than on the seizure as 
spectacle. Significantly David no longer blames or resents Jean-Christophe for this scene, but the 
public around them: “God, I despise people like that. These nice, normal people—their gaze is 
burned into my memory” (236). This perhaps is a reflection of David’s growing awareness of the 
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role society has played in Jean-Christophe’s experience of disability. That is, while David is 
perhaps more accustomed to the sight of a seizure by this point (he is now in his late teens) he is 
still unaccustomed to the spectacle his brother produces.  
At this moment, David realizes his mother has disappeared as Jean-Christophe has this 
seizure, because she couldn’t take the pressure of being surrounded—yet again— by onlookers. 
David characterizes her actions here as a kind of betrayal, saying that while he understood her 
desire to leave, he had forced himself to stay, in order to not abandon Jean-Christophe: “I’m 
upset at her for letting us down at that moment. But I would dearly have loved to do the same. I 
would dearly have loved to be elsewhere. I forced myself to stay. She should’ve stayed too. We 
owe my brother this solidarity” (238). The mother’s escape is both a betrayal to the sense that 
she has been the nurturing figure throughout most of the text, and an indication of the ways in 
which the spectacle of the disabled body is not limited to Jean-Christophe, but extends to those 
who care for him. The family members are the ones who must deal with the paramedics and the 
police, who must calm the crowds that gather, who feel the gaze of the spectators at least as 
much as Jean-Christophe feels them. 
After touring the castle, the family visits a school for disabled children, where a friend 
works and teaches. Passing by one room, the boys see another child having a seizure in a bed: 
“I’ve never seen anyone other than my brother have a seizure. It fascinates me” (247). The panel 
shows the two boys standing in the doorway, gazing intently at the figure on the bed in the 
foreground. This image echoes the earlier scene in which Jean-Christophe faces the paralyzed 
young patient recovering from brain surgery. Interestingly, whereas David’s position as mere 
spectator to Jean-Christophe’s seizures is the source (or symptom) of much of David’s distress, 
here he seems to almost exalt or take pleasure in his role as spectator. He stands “fascinated” by 
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the sight—the visible encounter—of someone else going through ostensibly the same motions 
his brother goes through daily.  
Thus while the sight of Jean-Christophe’s contortions disturbs David’s sense of power 
and his sense of full-bodied-ness, the sight of this other person actually serves as an un-alien act; 
David is fascinated not by the boy’s otherness, but by his “sameness,” as it were. (A similar 
phenomenon occurs much later, when David meets a college friend’s epileptic friend: “I thought 
all epileptics were like my brother, their lives chopped into little bits by their seizures. And now I 
see someone who’s at peace. That does me good” [312]). In this way, the visual encounter with 
disability places Jean-Christophe within a web of relative “able-ness” and within the same 
passive gazing position as David. Within this single panel, then, Jean-Christophe and David are 
both situated within the nonlinear spectrum of embodied experience; Jean-Christophe is no 
longer the exclusive example of the disabled or “extreme” body, nor is David the exclusive 
audience member.  
Reacting to the boys’ stares, their mother offers the following piece of insight: “He’s 
probably upset that you’re looking at him like some strange beast;” to which David, in the 
captions, responds: “In the state he’s in I doubt he can tell, but whatever. I go back to my 
drawings [for the children]. Parents are always trying to shield us from sights that might 
traumatize us” (247). The mother here seems to find the act of looking to be a kind of violation; 
while David interprets her response as a protective measure for her own children, there is also an 
element of protection for the epileptic sufferer, as if she wants to shield him from their eyes. 
What is it about looking at the suffering patient that would be so traumatic? Indeed, this 
encounter seems to have the opposite effect on David. Accustomed as he is to the position of 
  292 
 
viewer, his fascination is short-lived as he responds nonchalantly and returns to drawing—that is, 
he returns to another kind of visual encounter. 
Jean-Christophe’s reaction, meanwhile, is somewhat more complicated and more 
ambiguous. On that same page, he declares that he wants “to be an educator for handicapped 
children” (247). It is as if this encounter—where he faces a body like his own, at a school similar 
to the one he attended in his late teen years—creates in Jean-Christophe a need to assert his own 
abilities rather than his disability, his wholeness rather than his fragmentation. Moreover, Jean-
Christophe’s declaration also connects him—however briefly—to the disabled “community” 
(such as one exists) and to the label “handicapped.” He wants to teach others, and presumably to 
help them. In this way Jean-Christophe does not exactly embrace or even admit to his 
limitations—embodied or constructed—but he does express some form of desire to belong to a 
collective.  
Unfortunately, his mother’s response to his declaration actually isolates Jean-Christophe 
even further, pitting him, however unintentionally, against his brother: “Oh, come on, Jean-
Christophe, think about that. You can’t even take care of yourself. You didn’t interact with the 
children at all. At least David did some drawings for them” (247). The mother’s response seems 
a little harsh, especially as it deviates somewhat from the nurturing role she’s occupied for much 
of the memoir. At the school, as she did at the castle, she betrays the role of nurturer in her 
somewhat uncharacteristic confrontation with Jean-Christophe. While at other points she urges 
Jean-Christophe to study or to find a job, at this moment she actively works against his 
expression of a wish for a career. Granted, given the fact that he has not even received a high 
school diploma, and given his medical and social history, it does seem unlikely that Jean-
  293 
 
Christophe would ever be a special education instructor. Nonetheless, the mother’s response is 
somewhat troubling. 
One part of what is so troubling is the dissonance between the mother’s attempts to 
protect from sight but not from the verbal. In one short response to her son, the mother has both 
undermined Jean-Christophe’s agency—he “can’t even take care of [him]self”—and placed him 
in isolation, separating him not only from the children he proposes to educate, but also from his 
own brother. In this moment, Jean-Christophe belongs only with himself, a position the panels 
reinforce through their depiction of Jean-Christophe glaring at David in the corner (figure 6.14). 
Just as the public gaze orients, defines, and limits Jean-Christophe, so to a certain extent does his 
family’s gaze. 
 
Figure 6.14: an exchange of gazes (247). 
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At certain moments, Jean-Christophe rails against the isolation that results from his 
socially constructed impairment, even as his physical limitations increase. Current medical 
research shows that the more seizures an individual experiences, the more prone s/he becomes to 
have further seizures: “The risk after prolonged seizures (e.g. status epilepticus) is quite a 
different matter, and severe status can result in significant cerebral damage and consequent 
cognitive decline, a risk that is probably greatest in children and that increases the longer the 
seizure persists (Shorvon 79). Jean-Christophe is thus caught in an endlessly debilitating cycle, 
as his seizures remain uncontrolled and epilepsy affects his physical and mental health. As Jean-
Christophe ages and lives with his disorder even longer, he becomes increasingly violent and 
confrontational with the members of his family. At one point he rages at David: “Us handicapped 
folks gotta stage a revolt! We’re gonna take machine guns and we’ll shoot normal people in the 
legs, so there! Then they’ll see what it’s like bein’ handicapped when they’re in a wheelchair… 
They treat us like dogs. We gotta revolt, like Gandhi” (272). In this somewhat misguided 
statement (as David points out, Gandhi was a proponent of non-violent protest, not gunning 
people down in their knees), Jean-Christophe verbalizes what the memoir tries to show—that is, 
all the various ways that those individuals considered disabled can be “treated like dogs,” 
condescended to, and viewed as sub-human or animal.  
Moreover, Jean-Christophe seems to want to identify with a larger group, the 
“handicapped folks,” thus both reiterating the construction of a group identity defined in relation 
to the normative standard (the able-bodied), and reinforcing the notion that Jean-Christophe is 
searching for a sense of belonging, rather than a sense of being the bodily extreme. 
Unfortunately, that need for belonging also seems to manifest itself in violence, itself a bodily 
extreme. Around this point in the narrative, Jean-Christophe’s anger and violence becomes 
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worse, as evidenced here in his desire to shoot people in the legs. Notably, however, this is a 
violent threat which, were it enacted, would transform “normal” bodies into visibly handicapped 
ones. Jean-Christophe exhibits a need to render visible the invisible limits of the body, a need 
that is perhaps connected with Jean-Christophe’s own mostly-invisible disability. 
David’s response is somewhat problematic in his dismissal of Jean-Christophe’s bodily 
experience: “But you don’t have a physical handicap. You can walk, you can move! If you’d just 
put your mind to it you could start things, turn your life around!” (272). This response plays into 
the notion of Jean-Christophe’s illness as something incomprehensible, but also something 
moral, a form of laziness that he could “put his mind to” and overcome. He disregards the 
lingering effects of the seizures on Jean-Christophe’s mental, emotional and physical well-being, 
instead placing the blame on Jean-Christophe for not overcoming this disorder on his own. Yet 
just a few panels later on the following page, David reveals that his brother “is at the Salpêtrière 
Hospital in Paris, for some tests” (273). The memoir thus depicts a disconnect in David’s mind, 
between refusing to recognize his brother’s impairment and in nearly the same breath 
recognizing that his life is severely limited by the disease and necessitates a visit to a special 
facility. The contradiction between David’s argument that his brother does not have a physical 
handicap, and Jean-Christophe’s visit to one of the most famous medical facilities in France 
indicates David’s own inability to reconcile his understanding of normalcy with his brother’s 
experiences.  
Thus even as B. depicts his brother’s struggle with both embodied and socially imposed 
limitations, he himself struggles to navigate his own conception of Jean-Christophe. That is, 
David has a particularly difficult time recognizing Jean-Christophe’s physical or embodied 
experience. Near the end of the text, there is a visual return to the opening page, as B.’s portrayal 
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of Jean-Christophe’s body undergoes a substantial change: “Suddenly I realize that the illness 
has been affecting him physically. He didn’t become this way from one day to the next but I 
didn’t want to see it. I refuse to see him sick. I won’t accept it. I’m callous” (341). The text 
reflects David’s sudden shift in viewing his brother, as literally from one page to the next Jean-
Christophe undergoes this physical transformation from thinner and unscarred to bloated and 
marked. This shift occurs through a visual encounter— the one depicted earlier, on the opening 
page— and David must actually embrace seeing his brother as he is. It is as if David had until 
this point enacted a willful blindness, itself an embodied limitation, in order to maintain the 
illusion that his brother is not disabled. 
The following page continues: “I’ve got this notion that we shouldn’t see him as a sick 
person but treat him as a normal one [...] But his seizures, the drugs, the wounds that resulted 
from his falls gave him little choice. His options were necessarily more limited than mine. 
Seeing him as he is now, with his face marked by the disease, I can accept this evidence” (342).  
 
Figure 6.15: Jean-Christophe’s face as landscape (342). 
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These dialogue balloons are inscribed within the oversized image of Jean-Christophe’s swollen 
face, the familiar dragon of epilepsy forming his eyebrows; the face itself becomes a page-sized 
panel. The avatars of the young brothers and the older David wandering around the surface of 
this face; the physical body here becomes a kind of landscape (figure 6.15). Yet while the 
disordered body becomes the physical space of the narrative, it also breaks down the neat panel 
divisions that characterize much of B.’s spatio-topia (layout). This image contrasts greatly with 
the opposite page, where a disturbing and non-verbal dream occupies nine evenly spaced panels; 
the representation of the physical, embodied reality becomes more chaotic and overwhelming 
than the dream world. 
Within the landscape of the disabled body, time and space collapse, as several different 
avatars of David wander across Jean-Christophe’s face, narrating the monologue quoted above. 
Thus the comic collapses distinctions between past and present, body and space, representation 
and reality. As Jean-Christophe and David navigate separately the social and physical 
ramifications of epilepsy, their struggles simultaneously bring them together and hold one 
another apart. In appearing as several selves on this landscape, B. illustrates his own 
fragmentation literally in the face of his brother’s illness. This scene thus acts as one of several 
moments in which B. insists on both his similarities with his brother and their fundamental 
differences. Doing so ultimately serves to create a sense in which the text as a whole undermines 
the convention of a bodily standard of “normal” against which everyone must measure 
themselves.  
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Family Trees and Embodied Histories: Undermining Normalcy and Difference 
B. weaves his brother’s illness together with instances of David’s own sense of 
victimhood, as well as with historical trauma, in order to express the social and embodied 
limitations of disability as a messy web that stretches to include many people, not just the 
singular disabled body. Disability thus becomes a looser category, as the comics medium 
emphasizes the similarities between David’s able-bodied self and his brother, both of whom 
experience limitations of the body and the social. The split necessarily embodied in Jean-
Christophe, due to the incomprehensible nature of his seizures, forces the confrontation—always 
visual and visible—with David’s own emotional and bodily split. B. then also shows the same 
fragmentation in various narrated historical encounters, implying that the disabled body in pieces 
finds its corollary in a history riddled with aporetic gaps. 
Although throughout much of the text, David seems to enact the same kind of social 
stigmatization of disability, as he grows older (and, confusingly, becomes B., the artist and 
creator) his views become much more nuanced and complex. At one point, B. writes “I observe 
him. I study him. I cling to the idea of not being like him” (214). Like the doctors who create 
images of Jean-Christophe’s brain, B. visually focuses on his brother’s illness, turning it into 
both an object of study and a confrontation through which he can try to assert his own bodily 
coherence. Ultimately, however, the text questions the notion of bodily coherence through the 
similarities between the two brothers. Indeed, drawing our attention to these similarities 
simultaneously undermines the very notion of a “norm” or a bodily standard, and instead plays 
upon the very instability of the physical body as a way of configuring identity more broadly. 
In fact, from the beginning of the memoir, B. both asserts and undermines epilepsy’s 
“abnormality.” Even within the first few pages of the memoir, a very young Pierre-François 
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recounts his experiences with “typhoons” that sweep him up as he sleeps, so that he wakes up in 
a different place in his bedroom and must either grope his way back to bed in the dark, or ask his 
sister Florence to open her door so he can see his way back. When Pierre-François then asks 
about Jean-Christophe’s first seizure, he says, “Actually, I know what has happened. He got 
carried away by a typhoon—I’m sure of it! But that’s bizarre! I didn’t think typhoons came 
around in the daytime! From now on I’ve gotta be really careful” (10). Thus, despite the initial 
declaration of difference between the brothers, B. almost immediately undermines that same 
difference, declaring each brother equally susceptible to epilepsy or “the typhoons.” 
These typhoons or “little explosions,” as he calls them elsewhere, return as a notion of a 
similar physical experience in the brain repeatedly, in an effort to establish a kind of shared 
physicality between the brothers. As a young adult at university, David falls into a depression, at 
one point fantasizing about forcing himself to have a seizure. He claims “I am an epileptic! 
Those electrical discharges in my brain, like explosions, that’s what they are! They’re tiny 
epileptic seizures!” (287). B. draws himself in these panels in a stylistically similar manner to 
Jean Christophe, covered in wavy lines, drooling and contorting, in ways that signify his “being 
taken” by the disorder. Within these panels, then, David and Jean-Chrisophe do share a kind of 
physical experience, one that David claims is both fantasy (“I could pretend to be epileptic,” he 
says [287]) and reality (“I am an epileptic!”).  
The comics medium thus allows for the slippage between the two bodies that David 
seems to crave, if only in an effort to understand his brother. B. literalizes this shift from one 
body to another, or the fragmentation of Jean-Christophe’s body, and its shift to David’s body 
(figure 6.16, 317). The panels depict stylized close-ups of sections of Jean-Christophe’s face, and 
there is a subtle shift in style as B. employs finer lines and something closer to gradient shading 
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than he did earlier in the text, again reflecting his adult perspective and his more nuanced 
understanding of the world.  
 
Figure 6.16: Jean-Christophe and David’s bodies in pieces (317). 
Despite “clinging to the idea of not being like him,” David ultimately comes to recognize 
his own fragmentation, both bodily and emotionally. This realization comes about during 
David’s own encounter with the medical world. The now adult David is in a relationship with a 
woman, and they decide to try to have a baby. Unfortunately, they have difficulty becoming 
pregnant, so David goes to the doctor for some testing. The hospital space functions in the same 
threatening way as it did in the first section of the book, where Jean-Christophe also underwent 
testing; “This universe brings back too many bad memories,” David claims (325). And like Jean-
Christophe, David experiences various forms of failure from medicine to diagnose and treat him: 
“A cold and distant doctor performs my examination [...] Apparently there’s nothing wrong with 
me” (325). David is then sent to a fertility doctor, who claims that David’s sperm are bifurcated, 
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and therefore they are not fast enough to reach his partner’s egg. David’s reproductive cells, that 
is, are literally split in two; the genetic material that he would pass on to the next generation—his 
bodily, genetic legacy—is fragmented; “the doctors can’t explain this phenomenon” (325).  
B.’s response to this news is, of course, to use his signature surreal style to explore the 
emotional and bodily ramifications of this news. Fantastic images reminiscent of the fantasy 
genre stories he illustrated earlier surround these central panels revealing David’s initial 
diagnosis. Within this frame of bizarre creatures, he envisions his sperm with two heads or two 
tails, and on the following page he draws a two-headed sperm with one of his own face, and one 
his brother’s (figure 6.17). “Am I a double myself? Or am I always just half of these monsters? 
Then who is the other half?” (326).  
 
Figure 6.17: bifurcated sperm, David’s split self (326). 
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Thus Jean-Christophe visibly occupies one half of David’s genetic material and, by 
implication, one half of David’s embodied infertility, thus underscoring that disability is an 
unfixable category that can occur in anybody (and any body). Moreover, as David’s infertility 
eventually leads to the dissolution of his relationship with his girlfriend, the text offers us yet 
another instance of an individual’s embodied experience existing within a larger social web, 
reminding the reader that one person’s embodied experience is rarely limited in social practices 
to that same lone individual. 
For Jean-Christophe, deviations from the norm are a source of tension, as they seem to 
heighten his sense of bodily threat. Jean-Christophe’s increasingly troubling social and mental 
issues and his general inability to function in “normal” social situations both stem from and 
impact his position as victim of the disease and the instability it has wrought on his life. 
Complicated issues of victimhood appear throughout the text, and apply to both Jean-Christophe 
and David. In the sequence including page 337 cited above, for example, Jean-Christophe first 
declares his intent to become a Muslim (an intent given up once David threatens to circumcise 
him), then insists on learning “La Marseillaise” in response to his encounters with some 
immigrants.  
This scene (and many others) connects Jean-Christophe’s limitations with his desire to 
belong to a group or an identity larger than the disabled body. Seemingly unaware of the link 
between Islam and the Algerian immigrants he rails against, Jean-Christophe’s desire lies not 
with a specific ideology, but with the stability and sense of belonging that come with adhering to 
a particular identity, be it religious or national. Moreover, David’s offer to circumcise Jean-
Christophe “cuts to the heart of the matter” (“j’ai tranché le vif de cette conversation...” 6.25) 
and silences him further on the subject of conversion. The ultimate barrier, for Jean-Christophe, 
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is the threat to the already-disabled body. Identifying outside of that body is one of his greatest 
desires; encountering any additional threat to that body is one of his most crippling fears. 
Indeed, from the beginning of the text, B. depicts Jean-Christophe as someone desperate for 
approval and needing to belong to a stable and strongly delineated group. 
 
Figure 6.18: Jean-Christophe’s obsession with Hitler (21). 
Throughout Jean-Christophe’s life, this need for stability and control takes the form of an 
obsession with Nazi Germany and Hitler (figure 6.18). Indeed, unlike the implicit Nazi 
tendencies of Ozymandias in Watchmen discussed earlier in Chapter Two, Jean-Christophe’s 
turn to Nazism is overt. Later, B. is careful to note that “there’s nothing particularly Nazi-ish” 
(309; “il n’y a pas grande-chose de nazi...” 6.33) about Jean-Christophe’s fascination, but rather, 
a bizarre enactment of the desire for control and stability in his continually destabilized life. As 
B. writes early on: “Seized by this sudden weakness, he (Jean-Christophe) develops a huge 
craving for power and domination. Where I’m an anonymous crowd of Mongols, he’s a supreme 
leader. His dream is that of an eternal parade by an army that worships him...” (21). B. thus 
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rationalizes Jean-Christophe’s fantasies and turns them away from any kind of actual racism, 
making them instead about a fantasy of control in response to his lack thereof.  
B.’s explanation, however, does not directly take into account the complicated web of 
familial and global history, victimization, and racism surrounding the two brothers. In fact, the 
historical trauma of war and the personal experiences of medical trauma, for Jean-Christophe, 
and passive witness, for David, are threads of identity converging and weaving together in the 
two boys. Where Jean-Christophe resists his position of passivity that results from his disease by 
engaging in fantasies of control, David inverts his physical “superiority” and his position of 
passive audience to his brother’s suffering, along with his own precarious tendencies to cover up 
his own suffering in order to spare the others around him. He does so by identifying both himself 
and Jean-Christophe with the victims of moments of trauma, particularly the Holocaust and the 
Algerian War. Drawing the genocide against the disabled during Nazi rule of Germany with 
French colonialism and with the Nazis’ other victims, particularly the Jews, creates a network of 
historical victimization that situates Jean-Christophe and David as two complementary figures. 
In opposition to his brother’s fixation with Hitler, David purposefully takes the side of 
the victims of genocide. Pierre-François first learns of the Holocaust in his paternal grandfather’s 
four-volume history on World War II. As a young boy obsessed with battles, war, and violence, 
the books hold a deep attraction for him: “I’m little when I first plunge into these books. They’re 
awesome, they’re loaded with battleground photographs” (172). This statement accompanies a 
panel crammed full of tank guns and helmeted soldiers, with a small Pierre-François mostly 
hidden behind a large book in the lower right corner. On the following page, however, the 
caption reads only, “At the end of the fourth volume…” as the crowded war scene shifts abruptly 
to a solitary figure in striped pajamas, head bald, cheeks emaciated, hands clawing at the 
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blackness behind him (figure 6.19, 173). This figure looms over young Pierre-François in the 
right corner as he was in the previous panel, and it seems the concentration camp victim is the 
visual end to the caption’s textual sentence (that is, the image literally completes what the 
ellipses leaves unwritten). Since Pierre-François lacks the vocabulary to speak of what he is 
confronting, the only recourse is to draw what he sees.  
 
Figure 6.19: David learns of the Holocaust (173). 
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This image proves to be central for Pierre-François and his conscious formation of 
identity. When he is a little older, Pierre-François learns his mother wanted to name him David, 
but his paternal grandfather protested, thinking the name “too Jewish” (170). This revelation 
proves to be key for Pierre-François, who decides to change his name to David not only as a 
rebellion against his grandfather, and not only as a means of consciously constructing an identity 
and becoming an adult, but also as an act of solidarity with the historical victims of trauma, 
particularly the Holocaust. “Suddenly this first name, David, takes on enormous importance, far 
beyond my brother’s disease. It becomes a way of staking out a position. I was on the side of the 
glorious Indians against the lowly, shabby cowboys. I’d be on the side of the skinny Jews against 
the fat Nazis” (173). B. draws David as a thin boy wearing a headdress, ribs protruding and 
riding a stylized horse.  
David thus makes a connection between himself, the victims of the Holocaust, and the 
Native Americans. B. presents these distinct historical and personal moments as both convergent 
and concurrent: the Nazi genocide, the genocide in the Americas, and David’s life exist 
simultaneously within one panel. Such a connection is a potentially problematic one, as David 
runs the risk of equating massive historical genocides with one person’s private, individual 
experience. The difference in scale and enormity alone might make one uncomfortable with the 
link David makes. However, the text makes it clear that David’s connection between himself and 
victims of historical catastrophe is not one of usurpation, or a vertically-oriented hierarchy of 
pain and shame. The looming presence of the concentration camp victim, and its literally 
unspoken horror, precludes the assumption that David is making any equalizing or trivializing 
claims to victimization and trauma. While he is “staking out a position,” as he says, doing so is 
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not at the expense of others’ pain; in this way, David avoids undermining his brother’s specific 
experiences and their still-mysterious nature. 
In fact, he also visually allies Jean-Christophe and the concentration camp victim twice, 
through Groensteen’s “braiding” (that is, nonlinearly associated images or metaphors that form 
patterns or motifs). Two pages after B. depicts the concentration camp victim and changes his 
name to David, Jean-Christophe forms an almost-perfect mirror image of the Holocaust victim. 
Jean-Christophe’s body contorts and floats above David’s head against a solid black background 
in a similarly tense position as the camp victim, though he faces the opposite direction (figure 
6.20).  
 
Figure 6.20: Jean-Christophe’s body echoes the Holocaust victim’s (175). 
Having the two bodies echo one another in this way indicates not only that Jean-Christophe, 
despite his fantasies of control and domination, is in fact victimized; these images also indicate 
the ways that both historical and local traumas literally hang over David’s head. Moreover, 
David and Jean-Christophe both become figures associated with different groups of victims 
during the Nazi regime—the Jews and the disabled, respectively—and David’s appropriation of 
a quasi-Jewish identity draws him marginally closer to Jean-Christophe’s position of victim. 
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This position is further reinforced with the similarities between the earlier appearance of 
the young patient in Professor T’s hospital and the image of the Holocaust victim David 
encounters (see again figure 6.6). Visually, the two victims are strikingly similar, with their 
strained faces and emaciated bodies clothed in stripes. While this first scene is initially one of 
foreboding, once we see the later scene of David’s encounter, the earlier scene takes on further 
meaning, as the Holocaust prisoner looks like the epilepsy patient. That is, B. presents this as a 
moment of non-consecutive visual confrontation with the victims of trauma: medical trauma in 
Jean-Christophe’s case, and historical trauma in David’s. The comics medium thus serves as one 
way of expressing the aporetic confrontation of both medical trauma and historical trauma, and 
the ultimate unknowability that epilepsy and the Holocaust present. B. uses the visual as a kind 
of continuation or punctuation to the verbal component of the memoir at certain points, 
combining verbal and visual not to bridge or fill the gap in his knowledge, but rather to draw our 
attention to the gap’s existence. Indeed, the scene with the young paralyzed patient and the scene 
with the Holocaust victim are both instances in which the visual punctuates the verbal story, 
forcing the narrative to pause while simultaneously completing the thoughts begun in the 
captions. 
Thus, B. creates a web of identity in which his experience is but one point or one pixel—
and Jean-Christophe’s is another, since, as discussed earlier, his fantasies of control manifest 
themselves as a fascination with Adolf Hitler. Thus Jean-Christophe and David place themselves 
on the opposite sides of that particular catastrophe; yet in their day-to-day interactions, it 
becomes clear that David and Jean-Christophe fluctuate between dominating and submitting to 
one another. David can physically dominate his brother, beating him up, playing tricks on him 
(like stealing his dessert at meals, urinating into his bathwater, etc.), and even aggravating him 
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into having seizures. However, Jean-Christophe clearly dominates David’s life as well, as 
epilepsy forces both of them into communes, therapies, diets, encounters with gurus, 
pilgrimages, and so on, as well as into the eyes of the public. 
Paradoxically, the spectacle of Jean-Christophe’s body is precisely B’s attempt to avoid 
that same dominance, to de-exoticize the disabled body, to render Jean-Christophe’s experience 
more relatable, and to expose the complex social web that surrounds the encounter with the 
disabled “other.” This text configures the historical and social as interactive and multidirectional; 
understanding the past is a way of understanding the present. While he insists that epilepsy is not 
hereditary, B. simultaneously proposes that the web of the unspeakable trauma that surrounds 
Jean-Christophe is similar to the web of historical trauma that infiltrates so many other layers of 
the boys’ life. Therefore the suffering of both men is historically and socially situated and 
constructed, and it opens up the possibility for understanding the disabled body on a spectrum 
rather than as the extreme exception as so many other works of literature posit it. If those 
“normal” people—members of his own family, friends, colleagues, even David himself— 
understand themselves as victims in some capacity, then everyone else is also disabled, indeed, 
as trauma literally un-ables these people from speaking their experiences. Rather than being 
“normal,” Epileptic proposes that everyone is “aberrant” to some degree, with Jean-Christophe 
merely being at one point in a nonlinear model of ability. 
B. includes some of the major wars of the 20th century in this complicated web of 
embodied suffering, from the two World Wars to the Algerian War (1954-1962) and the 
Indochina Wars (roughly 1954-1979, including what in the US is called the Vietnam War). 
Learning of the World Wars through huge tomes of history, what might be called “Official 
History” coincides with the familial history (maternal grandfather’s involvement in WWI, 
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paternal’s in WWII). The grandparents’ stories take their places within and against the official 
History of the World Wars, positing the individual and the familial as situated inside the 
authoritative version of larger historical movements. The books that Pierre-François reads are, 
for the most part, unconcerned with the individual (at least as far as B. portrays these books). 
When he describes reading one on WWII, he calls them “loaded with battleground photographs,” 
and the panel is packed full of artillery, tanks, and other weapons, along with some faces in 
profile of the soldiers, all of whom look vaguely similar and stand for part of the nameless crowd 
of soldiers. 
In contrast with these books, B. includes stories of his grandfathers’ individual 
experiences during the war, which emphasize the personal over the global. “My grandfather 
served in that war… He tells me a few boring anecdotes, but what I want to hear are tales of 
hand-to-hand combat with bayonets” (22). Pierre-François’s early fascination is with the 
battleground depictions in the large history books, and his grandfather presents a split with that 
narrative. His grandmother admonishes him: “You shouldn’t ask Grandpa about all that. He 
suffered, you know.” Crucially, “It’s my mother who tells his story, in July 1996” (22). His 
grandfather remains silent about his experiences, and thus the second-hand narration is filled 
with the absence of personal details; speaking the war is an act of only partial closure of the gaps 
in both family and history. 
B. then tells the story of his mother telling the story of her father during WWI, a story 
that focuses on the grandfather’s experiences and emotions while in the trenches. This story, 
however, is not situated within a larger picture of the war as one would learn about it through a 
volume of history like the Larousse mensuel illustré or Le Panorama de la guerre, the massive 
books Pierre-François so avidly reads when he visits his grandparents. That is, B. recounts the 
  311 
 
personal experiences of his grandfather, the scenes he witnessed, but he does not situate these 
scenes with any specificity. The grandfather goes “the front” and “the trenches,” but there are no 
particular locations, military names, or other features of historical specificity to ground this story 
until the end of the scene, when B. recreates a letter his grandfather’s cousin sent home during 
the war. This letter contains specific dates and place names, but it is still so short and so very 
specific as to only reinforce the particularity of B.’s grandfather’s experiences, rather than move 
them into the sphere of a larger political history. 
The grandfather’s actions, too, are related as particular and personal incidents rather than 
politically significant points in a global war. B. portrays his grandfather as someone detached 
from, and disgusted by, his fellow soldiers’ vulgar behavior both in the trenches and in the 
homes they occupy. At one particularly important moment, his grandfather’s company “snuck all 
the way to the German trench and slit everyone’s throats. I don’t know how he managed it, but 
my grandfather avoided taking part in the massacre. He kept an awful memory of this episode 
and claimed, after the end of the war, that he’d never killed a German” (27). The grandfather is 
thus somewhat removed from the violence of war as active participant, yet he is simultaneously 
involved as active witness. The suffering that B.’s grandfather experiences is thus not limited to 
his physical encounters during the war, but to his role as witness—a position echoed, as we have 
seen, in representations of both Jean-Christophe and David throughout the memoir. Thus B. 
creates a web of familial and historical interstices of experiences and witnessing.  
B.’s paternal grandfather is also situated within this web through his experiences in 
WWII. “The war also invades Bourges, at the house of my grandparents on my father’s side. 
They’ve got four big books on the Second World War. The minute I get to their house I plunge 
into them. My grandfather André fought in that one. He guarded the bridges in Mehun” (29). 
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This grandfather’s service is also a story of gaps, as the Germans had already crossed the bridge 
he was guarding, and he and his company finished the war without entering into combat, without 
ever seeing a German, and without even a lieutenant after theirs deserts their company after a 
few months of service. This story of doing practically nothing again contrasts with the “official” 
history, whose pages are full of action and combat. 
The dissonance between “official” and lived history mimics the distance between Jean-
Christophe’s lived experience of his disorder and what remains for David B. to narrate. Like B.’s 
story of his brother’s disorder, the war is a narrative of gaps, missed opportunities, and 
divergence from the norm. Moreover, the familial involvement in the war raises questions of 
David’s role in History itself, and his position as spectator to or even perpetrator of acts of 
violence against those who deviate from “the norm.” Epileptic thus questions the stakes and 
responsibilities of those who witness, who are drawn into a web of memory and suffering 
without directly experiencing those events. 
 
Implicated in the Visual and Historical: Gaps in Representing War and Trauma 
Following Michael Rothberg’s recent adaptation of the term “implication,” which he uses 
“in order to gather together various modes of historical relation that do not necessarily fall under 
the more direct forms of participation associated with traumatic events, such as victimisation and 
perpetration,” I argue that Epileptic positions David as a point in this spectrum of implicated 
involvement in both the history of violence and the history of disability (“Implicated” 40). This 
category of “implication” includes “bystanders, beneficiaries, latecomers of the postmemory 
generation and others connected ‘prosthetically’ to pasts they did not directly experience” 
(“Implicated” 40). Just as David is the outside spectator to his brother’s disorder, as discussed 
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above, so too is he in some ways a spectator to larger historical moments and legacies of trauma, 
which brings him further into a hierarchical system from which he, consciously or not, has 
benefited. 
 
Figure 6.21: the Algerian War and David as belated witness (30). 
While understanding the official and the familial histories requires a certain amount of 
work for Pierre-François, it is even more difficult for him to reconcile with the Algerian War: 
“But there are no books on the Algerian War to be found” (30). Official history has not yet 
caught up with the lived traumatic experience of this war. Instead, Pierre-François must rely on 
overheard conversations in order to visualize this war: “I overhear conversations that demolish 
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the pretty history-book images I’d drawn.” The images here depict Pierre-François as very small, 
below very large adult faces speaking about the Algerian War and atrocities encountered there. 
Then there is a shift to a stylized image of a black man, torso nude, and face in an expression of 
immense pain (figure 6.21). Behind him lurk three perversely smiling white faces. The caption 
reads, “They tortured for practice, or just for the hell of it, not to get any kind of confession” 
(30). Though not explicitly labeled as such, it is apparent that the three men are French, torturing 
an Algerian— and enjoying the sight of this torture.  
In the following panel, there is another stylized black body, this time pictured in 
silhouette; while this figure visually echoes the tortured body of the previous panel, from its 
heavy blackness to the white outline of the lips, it is actually not a physically tortured body, but 
the image of an adult relaying an anecdote— there are two points of a shirt collar visible (a detail 
easily missed by a hasty reader). A very small Pierre-François appears here, looking intently at 
the blacked-out figure, with his head at the same angle as the central French soldier from the 
preceding panel. The suggestions arising from this visual echo are somewhat disturbing: that 
Pierre-François, even at age four or five, is somehow implicated in the torture of Algerians; that 
the act of watching is an act of perverse violence; even, perhaps, that the recitation of horror after 
the war is painful in a way that is similar to, if distinct from, the pain of the tortured body. He is 
also a belated witness to this pain, so that his connection with history mimics the structures of 
trauma itself. 
These implications, however, remain ambiguous. This ambiguity is itself a product of 
that same perplexing incompleteness in representing war that pervades the text. On the second 
page, in the same panel that visually establishes the brothers as nearly identical in their youth, the 
Algerian War already appears as something outside of time and outside of understanding: “1964. 
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I’m living in Orléans with my parents, my brother, and my sister. The Algerian War ended two 
years ago but I’m not even aware of its occurrence yet. I do know that De Gaulle is the President 
of the Republic” (2). Within this narration we can see that the Algerian War operates as a 
“hiccup” in both knowledge and narration; the caption draws attention to its own nonlinear 
construction through B.’s later factual knowledge of the war’s existence juxtaposed with the 
young David’s ignorance. Indeed, the images in the panels do not show the war or De Gaulle, but 
the siblings standing in a row. The historical thus functions here as textual but not visual 
background. 
However just a little bit later, David responds to the neighborhood children’s use of a 
racial slur: “ ‘Raghead.’ There’s a word I never heard at home. My dad hadn’t served in the 
Algerian war but I’d heard about it” (14). The War itself as an abstract concept occupies an 
uneasy, unstable position in David’s world, reflected in the narrative’s negation of itself (which 
is true? Has David heard of the Algerian War at this age or not?) within a few pages. Moreover, 
B. situates this instability within a familial network, as Pierre-François’s understanding of the 
Algerian War rests on the absence of his father’s service.  
Indeed, this war forms a kind of narrative, familial, and historical gap, where Pierre-
François’s knowledge comes only from bits and pieces overheard from his parents and their 
friends. The story of the war can first only be told through overly simplified illustrations and 
sentences, a reflection of Pierre-François’s childlike understanding of the war: “Algeria is a 
desert full of fortresses with legionnaires inside. One day the Beduins got fed up and, mounted 
on horses and camels, they came and attacked the fortresses. Little by little they took over all the 
fortresses. The legionnaires fell back in Algiers. The Beduins attacked Algiers and the 
legionnaires got on the boat and came back to France. The Algerian war was over...” (14-15). 
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The images in these panels are reminiscent of Pierre-François’s early drawings of Mongol 
massive battles, with near-identical soldiers and very simple buildings, backgrounds, and 
linework. This narration of the Algerian War lacks any mention of France’s colonial legacy, of 
the intense political situation in the 1950s and 60s, of decolonization, or any of the other nuances 
one might read in a more “official” history. This history of the war, like boys’ understanding of 
race, war, and politics more broadly, is both juvenile and filled with unknown aporia. 
 
Figure 6.22: War and illness as gap; Pierre-François and David together in final row (32). 
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Something of a more nuanced understanding of the Algerian War occurs a little later in 
the first part, but it requires a massive narrative shift forward in time, to the present-day David B. 
listening to a colleague describe his trip away from Paris (figure 6.22). Even here, the actual acts 
of war remain completely unknown; the colleague describes leaving Paris and then leaving 
France, but cuts his narrative off after leaving France, saying: “And then there was the war” (32). 
Those who speak about the war do so against a solid black background; visually the focus 
becomes the speaker rather than an illustrated history, as we see with B.’s depiction of his 
grandfathers’ experiences. These panels render the lacuna of the Algerian War, making the 
absence of this narrative visually present, by focusing instead on the faces of the people 
speaking. 
This lacuna is even more pronounced, as B. depicts the speakers fading away—just faint, 
broken white outlines of faces against the same black background—as the captions explain that 
both David’s colleague and his father’s friend die of cancer shortly after relating their 
experiences to him. Cancer almost becomes, by association, the punishment for speaking about 
the Algerian War. Moreover, through the visual erasure of the speakers, B. emphasizes the 
ephemeral nature of the body, and visibly establishes the ways in which disability and disease 
can manifest themselves on any body.  
The unrepresentable Algerian War and the cancer that strikes the two survivors here find 
their analogue on the opposing page, which describes both textually and pictorially Jean-
Christophe’s seizures (see again figure 6.2). Paradoxically, B.’s depiction of the seizure is 
perhaps the most straightforward, literal rendering of Jean-Christophe’s illness in the whole 
memoir. It is as if the absence within the narrative of the Algerian War and the confrontation 
with the fluidity of disease actually helps give words to the disorder the boys face. As mentioned 
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above, this ability stems in part from the link between disease and war, as speaking the war and 
disabled bodies intertwine. “Indeed, [gangrene] was used in one important moral polemic— 
against the French use of torture in Algeria in the 1950s; the title of the famous book exposing 
that torture was called La Gangrène” (Sontag 85). There is thus a chain of signification weaving 
together illness and violence: torture in Algeria is allegorized though gangrene; speaking about 
the war is silenced with cancer; and these aporetic histories, both familial and global, help 
undermine notions of normalcy and aberrance. All of these movements allow for epilepsy and 
other experiences of embodied difference to become not a linearly defined extreme, but rather a 
point within a spectrum in which no body nor history is the standard or median.  
Immediately following this confluence of disease and the Algerian war, B. shifts to the 
Indochina Wars as he depicts a confrontation of avatars past and present, as the young Pierre-
François speaks with the older David B. (see again figure 6.22): “1914-1918. 1939-1945. 1954-
1962. Even if I didn’t live through them, these dates are part of my life, too” (32). The older 
David interjects: “We’re forgetting about the Viet Nam wars,” to which Pierre-François 
responds, “No... we’ll be talking about them later on” (32). In actuality, the Vietnam War 
appears only briefly, almost by way of omission: “I begin my military service in Chalons sur 
Saire and end up in Paris, hidden away in an office. I’m discharged with the rank of private first 
class and make the rounds at the magazines with my pages.” (316). It is unclear whether David 
remains in France between these two time-places, or whether he goes to Vietnam. The Indochina 
Wars are ambiguously located as absence, be that as absence from B.’s narrative, or as absence 
of service all together. David’s military service is also a hole in the narrative, one that occasions 
a confrontation between the avatars of Pierre-François and David—a visual literalization of the 
fragmentation that plagues both David and his story of Vietnam. 
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From his grandfathers to his colleagues and even himself, B. creates a social web through 
which war and illness intertwine. David’s fragmented body, his visual encounters with history, 
and the presence of the glaring absences in narratives of war all work together to undermine the 
notion that Jean-Christophe’s body is the extreme. While it is obvious that Jean-Christophe’s 
epilepsy is overwhelming, incomprehensible, and disruptive, his disorder is but one point within 
a complex labyrinth of embodied suffering. 
 
Conclusion 
War and illness thus coexist in the narrative without signifying or functioning as 
metaphor for one another, and without erasing the other’s significance. In Multidirectional 
Memory, Michael Rothberg proposes a way of understanding “memory as multidirectional: as 
subject to ongoing negotiation, cross-referencing, and borrowing; as productive and not 
privative” (Rothberg 3). In Epileptic, not only memories but also embodied experiences become 
multidirectional, as the fragmentation inherent to the comics medium allows for a sense of 
disorder to permeate the text as a whole.  
Epilepsy does not usurp historical catastrophes like the Holocaust, nor personal crises 
like infertility. Rather, B.’s interweaving of these moments illustrates the fallacy of the norm. 
That is, everyone is in some way “disordered,” and drawing our attention to this construction 
does not undermine the individual significance or related suffering of each experience. As B. 
notes, “there is no order in this world, poor brother, since nothing can cure you. There is only 
disorder” (310). B.’s observation is coupled with an image of Jean-Christophe’s distorted body 
in mid-seizure, while the once-orderly script from the cover of Mein Kampf now swirls around 
him in disarray. The perverse order of the Nazi regime, responsible for the catastrophic 
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destruction of so many victims, is thus shown as “disordered” alongside the disordered and 
disabled body. 
Epileptic demonstrates that Jean-Christophe’s disorder can be figured on a continuum of 
human experience, rather than as an example of disability’s total alien-ness. Western medicine 
still places the onus of recovery from epilepsy on the patient, saying “[t]he overall aim [of 
treatment] is to encourage as normal a lifestyle as possible, and to balance risks and benefit” 
(Handbook 75, emphasis mine). The patient must become as “normal” as possible, perpetuating 
the idea that disability is some extreme position that deviates in unacceptable ways from the 
standard. Rather than forcing the patient to adapt to this arbitrarily defined standard, Epileptic 
suggests, perhaps we can adjust our understanding of bodies and experiences to be more 
inclusive: “If one argues that the current predicament of, and social attitudes toward, people with 
disabilities are inadequate, then demonstrating the kaleidoscopic nature of historical responses to 
disability is an important tool for interrogating the ‘naturalized’ ideology hiding behind current 
beliefs” (Mitchell and Snyder 44). 
Focusing on the representation of the physical body and Jean-Christophe’s limitations 
and abilities, B.’s memoir thus actively works against the stereotypical use of the trope of 
disability in literature, which Mitchell and Snyder describe as “to engage oneself in an encounter 
with that which is believed to be off the map of ‘recognizable’ human experiences… It is the 
narrative of disability’s very unknowability that consolidates the need to tell a story about it” 
(Mitchell and Snyder 5-6). While David never presumes to “know” his brother’s experience, the 
memoir does not set out to control Jean-Christophe through an act of so-called “narrative 
prosthesis” or narrative normalizing. Rather, B. depicts the complex ways in which Jean-
Christophe’s body is “deviant” and uncontrollable by questioning the very notion of normalcy to 
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begin with: he and his brother are both physically and psychologically similar, and both are 
victims and perpetrators of suffering. 
In a narrativized experience so bound up with the act of looking, Epileptic also forces us 
as readers to look and to read in challenging, unsettling ways. “When the productive, 
intercultural dynamic of multidirectional memory is explicitly claimed… it has the potential to 
create new forms of solidarity and new visions of justice” (Rothberg 5). Indeed, as Epileptic 
challenges notions of a standard against which both histories and bodies should be measured, it 
opens up possibilities for a refiguring of disability not as the limit case, but as one point in a 
more inclusive model of difference and commonality.
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Epilogue 
Epileptic’s nonlinear model of identity and history offers a new framework for 
conceptualizing the relationship between trauma, memory, and visuality in comics, and even for 
understanding comics themselves. As the redrawn photographs in Fun Home, Batman’s 
flashbacks, and Epileptic’s shifting panels all demonstrate, images can be disorienting, 
destabilizing, and unfamiliar all while simultaneously drawing us in to a narrative both contained 
within and escaping from the text. To consider these elements of text, image, and the 
extradiegetic space of the page as working in tandem rather than competitively is to consider 
them as related yet differentiated representational mechanisms. That is, the verbal, the visual, 
and the “in-between” could become different but related points in a nonlinear spectrum of 
representation, particularly in relation to trauma and memory. 
Comics seem to be caught in endless deliberations of origin, definition, and structure, as 
creators, scholars, and fans try to create a critical language appropriate for discussing the 
medium. As I laid out in the introduction to this project, various critics prioritize or lay claim to 
one aspect of comics over another, like David Carrier’s privileging of the speech balloon or 
Groensteen’s emphasis on the image over the textual. Epileptic’s nonlinear model can provide a 
way of de-centering comics, drawing them out of their recent scholarly hierarchical struggle. 
Instead, this model asks us to return to W. J. T. Mitchell’s claim that pictures want “an idea of 
visuality equal to their ontology,” a way of seeing and understanding that grants pictures “equal 
rights with language, not… turned into language” (What Do Pictures Want 47). Allowing image 
and text equal grounding, equal space to “speak” through the comics medium, can result in this 
kind of visuality.  
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This new kind of visuality, in which we recognize visual media’s equal role with text in 
the creation of social relations and in the performance of narrative, also allows for a 
simultaneous consideration of the textual itself. Reading, that is, becomes a visual performance 
as much as it becomes an interpretive act. Reading comics means reading not only for plot but 
also for space, for the textual’s visual appearance and layout on the page. For example, the 
specific use of lettering in Arkham Asylum, Bechdel’s use of captions to deliberately conceal 
parts of her images, and Spiegelman’s movement between print and script move the textual into 
the realm of the visual, rather than seeing the text as mere conveyor of information. 
Equally significant to this decentering, multidirectional project is the space between word 
and image, both literally and figuratively. Comics’ particular relationship to trauma and memory 
lies precisely in this gap, where the reader transforms the panels’ content into narrative. Creating 
a whole from the sum of the parts glosses over of the fractured and fragmented structure, so that 
reading comics means both active participation and willing suspension of the recognition of that 
activity. Comics thus mimic the act of eliding the traumatic event, as we often ignore or repress 
the cognitive and visual work we do in the act of reading comics. Moreover in their spatio-
topical structure, comics also mimic the temporal suspension of trauma itself. Past and present, 
visibile and absent, all exist simultaneously on the comics page. Thus when Spiegelman, for 
example, crowds out the gutter space with background images or shadows and thereby 
confounds and confuses the reader, he also creates a sense of crowding, of busyness, that is both 
spatial and temporal. Works like No Towers actually draw our attention to the cognitive and 
narrative work the reader does in other comics.  
Although Will Eisner calls the separation between word and image “arbitrary” in comics, 
I believe it is not arbitrary but necessary, in order for comics to represent trauma, memory and 
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loss in complicated and innovative ways. However, this project leaves open several avenues for 
future work. For example, a broader historical perspective, involving an examination of works 
from the significant “ages” of comics, would create a fuller and deeper understanding of the 
mechanisms of trauma and memory discussed here as inherent to the comics medium itself, 
regardless of genre, history, or national tradition. Likewise further analysis within other national 
traditions would help enlarge our understanding of these mechanisms. Do trauma and memory 
function in the same way in Japanese manga, for example? Do the formal differences between 
manga and so-called Western comics reflect other, culturally specific conceptions of memory 
and trauma? Do South African comics speak to these issues in the same ways, or are the 
constructions of the verbal and the visual different in works by artists like Joe Daly and Anton 
Kannemeyer? Are these constructions dependent on or reflective of issues of colonization and, in 
the case of Daly, immigration? Can we take up this last question in conjunction with other 
comics of migration to the US, including works by the famous Los Bros Hernandez? 
Considering such questions echoes the turn in recent decades to the question of “world 
literature” and global networks. This dissertation points out some of the ways in which comics 
speak to one another across national boundaries, and, by extension, questioning the role of 
national identity in the creation of comics themselves. If a quintessentially American superhero 
like Batman, for example, can be placed in conversation with comics from France, then likewise 
we can open up the question of what “American” means to include a global network.  
Moving to more thematic rather than contextual concerns, Robert Loss’s forthcoming 
work on what he calls “profluent lingering” provides a new, valuable intervention into the notion 
of how comics function. Profluent lingering is the need to progress forward through the narrative 
in a comic in tension with the desire to stay and linger on the images and panels of the page: 
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[W]hile we push forward, we're aware of the urge to stop and look; while we stop and 
look, we're aware of the urge to push forward. This give-and-take is what I call “profluent 
lingering”: the experience of reading a comic which is the result of the variable tensions 
between a generally narrative progression and a quality of stillness, both of which 
manifest in multiple media—pages, panels, images and words—that are arranged 
sequentially. We might also think of it as the constant negotiation that goes on in the 
reader's mind between the forward momentum of narrative and the temporary stasis of 
looking at a single image. (2) 
This notion of the medium itself as agent, acting on the reader, resonates with the work done in 
this dissertation. Clearly, the tensions in the representation of and response to time itself here 
have greater implications for the representation of trauma and memory, where the past loses its 
temporal fixity and moves into the present. Caught, as the reader is, between past, present, and 
future thus extends to the very act of reading comics as a whole, not just on a given page, as 
discussed above. Teasing out these connections between profluent lingering, trauma, and 
visuality in comics would have valuable resonance in trauma, memory, and comics studies. 
 This dissertation, then, is a move forward in several directions among many possibilities 
for the future of trauma studies and of comics studies. Raising questions of how we see, picture, 
imagine, and narrate personal suffering and historical catastrophe, this project considers the 
shifts and similarities in ways of seeing trauma and memory across admittedly limited national 
and generic contexts. Issues of disability, postcolonialism, sexuality, and desire, among others, 
are brought into a multivalent consideration of comics, illustrating the medium’s propensity 
toward narratives of struggle, loss, and trauma, a propensity that rests on the very structure of the 
comics medium itself.
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